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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the effect of negative emotion induction on the 
production rate of false memories. False memories are a significant concern for 
situations in which the accuracy of memory is relied upon or called into question.  
Within the legal system eyewitness testimonies may often be the only available 
evidence in determining who committed a crime. In addition, in many clinical and 
counselling therapies memory is a central focus. In both sectors, emotion, 
particularly negative emotion, may affect the encoding and retrieval of false 
memories. Past research has previously shown that negative emotion, depending on 
the situation, can significantly increase, or protect against, false memory 
production. However, there are still many gaps in our understanding of these 
effects, and this thesis examines the effect of negative emotion inductions on the 
production of endogenous and exogenous false memories.  With spontaneous 
endogenous false memory production, there is little known about the effect of 
discrete emotions, and emotion congruency. This thesis presents novel evidence of 
a discrete emotion congruency effect with spontaneous false memory production. 
This thesis also presents new perspectives on the effect of negative emotion on 
existing memories. Source memory errors for new false information are shown to 
be inflated for negative stimuli compared to neutral and positive.  In addition, there 
is evidence that negative emotion inductions can alter the affective qualities of an 
already established neutral memory. The experiments presented support 
associative activation accounts of false memory production. The experimental 
evidence also demonstrates a need for future research to consider motivational 
aspects of emotion and investigate how goal relevance may facilitate false memory 
production. 
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"Remembrance of things past is not necessarily 
the remembrance of things as they were"  
Marcel Proust 
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction and Literature Review 
Memory is fallible.   
As Marcel Proust succinctly put, memory is not always an accurate record of 
what happened.  It does not work to objectively record events exactly, and retain 
the recordings, unchanged, over time.  It is a mechanism by which experiences are 
interpreted, and remembered within the context of those interpretations.  Memory 
is subject to forgetting, updating, and errors (Neath & Surprenant, 2003).  Specific 
details of an event, or even entire events themselves, may be falsely remembered.   
Memory is also subjective inasmuch as it is considered to be an adaptive 
mechanism for survival (Nairne, 2010), and therefore what is remembered, and how 
it is remembered, is dependent on the situation and the individual’s appraisals of 
what is relevant at that time.  A key factor in guiding perception and subjective 
interpretations is emotion.  Emotion too is considered an adaptive mechanism for 
survival (Damasio, 2006) and can affect the production of true and false memories. 
Much is known about true memory production and the effect of emotion. 
However, research into emotion and false memory production is much younger, and 
also has vastly different implications.  It is a common misunderstanding that 
memory works like a camcorder, and this myth can cause us to rely too heavily on 
memories which are in fact much more fallible.  This is most noteworthy within the 
legal system, where memory may often serve as the only evidence in determining 
who committed a crime.   
It is important to understand how accurate an eyewitness’s memory is likely 
to be and given the often emotional nature of the situations and events in question, 
it is important to understand how emotion affects the production of false 
memories.  It is also important to understand how emotion affects memory 
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accuracy in clinical settings.  In many clinical and counselling therapies memory is 
the main focus and therefore it is important to understand first how reliable those 
memories may be, and second what effect recalling such memories in a potentially 
emotional state may have.  
This thesis reviews the literature on false memories and emotion and 
presents experimental evidence of the effect of emotional experiences, and 
emotional stimuli, on the spontaneous production of false memories, source 
monitoring of new false information, and manipulations of already established 
memories.  Theories of false memory production, and of emotion, are discussed in 
light of the experimental results and previous literature, and in particular, 
Associative Activation Theory (AAT; Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009), 
along with appraisal theories of emotion (Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 2013; 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), is shown to be a robust account of the effects of emotion 
on false memories.  The experimental evidence also adds to the growing false 
memory literature and presents novel findings of a discrete emotion-congruency 
effect with spontaneous false memory production. 
1.1 False Memories 
 False memories refer to memories that we believe and experience to be real 
but are in fact of details of, or whole, events that we did not experience.  Research 
into false memories took off predominantly around the 1980’s and 1990’s1, driven 
in the most part by its practical implications, and remains a popular topic in 
psychology.  Possibly, the most widely known example of these practical 
implications relates to eyewitness testimony.   
                                                 
1
 Wells & Olson (2002) outline much of the research being conducted at this time, and 
highlight the poor and questionable legal procedures that came to light, compelling 
researchers to investigate how reliable subsequent memory reports were 
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Prominent trials from the USA in the 1980’s expedited false memory 
research with the surfacing of poor police procedures, and suggestive interview 
techniques (Garrett, 2011; Howe & Knott, 2015; Loftus, 1996).  Statistics show that 
over 70% of wrongful convictions in the USA overturned through new DNA evidence 
were originally convicted based on a misidentification from an eyewitness (Garrett, 
2011).  Research into these cases has helped to inform our understanding of the 
development of false memories and of the procedures used when dealing with an 
eyewitness, and many of the advances made in this area have now been 
successfully integrated into the legal sectors (e.g. Fisher & Geiselman, 2010; 
National Research Council, 2014).   
In the 1990’s there was also a surge of legal cases involving hypnotic 
techniques to retrieve repressed memories.  It was believed that painful or 
traumatic material could be rendered inaccessible to the conscious mind as a 
mechanism to protect the individual (e.g. Briere & Conte, 1993).  There is, however, 
much debate as to whether these mechanisms really exist, how common it is, and 
how reliable the retrieval techniques are (Loftus, 1993; Loftus & Ketcham, 1996).   
Howe and Knott (2015) present some of the key cases from this period, and 
highlight the strong suggestive influences that led to a number of distorted 
memories.  Although they do not claim that no memories can be retrieved using 
similar techniques, they caution that memories are too easily distorted. 
On a lighter note, there are also many famous instances of false memories 
being reported for widely documented events, allowing researchers to validate or 
invalidate the statements made, showing quite clearly that false memories occur in 
a variety of situations.  For example, in an interview about the 9/11 attacks George 
Bush spoke confidently of his vivid memory for the time leading up to and after the 
- 20 - 
attacks occurred, yet in his report he included details and events that could not 
possibly have happened (Greenberg, 2004).   
Despite these widely publicised inaccuracies and phenomenon of memory, 
in legal proceedings jurors and judges often have misconceptions, and naïve beliefs, 
about the accuracy of a reported memory (e.g., Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas, & 
Bradshaw, 2006; Magnussen, Melinder, Raja, & Stridbeck, 2010).  Memory experts 
are called upon to evaluate eyewitness testimonies, and in doing so challenge many 
of these myths (e.g. Conway, 2013; Howe, 2013a; 2013b).  Research is used to guide 
these judgements but, while it has come a long way, there is still much that we do 
not know about false memories and the factors that protect against or increase 
their production.  
1.1.1 False Memory Research  
 When measuring false memory production there are two predominant 
branches, endogenous and exogenous false memory production.  The former, 
endogenous, refers to an internal cause or origin of the false memory, whereas the 
latter, exogenous, refers to an external cause or origin.  Endogenous false memories 
are thought to arise through naturally occurring processes in memory whereby the 
automatic act of encoding information produces errors that are later retrieved.  
Whereas, exogenous false memory production is considered to be the product of 
suggestive influences, memory distrust, and possible reconsolidation mechanisms, 
that ultimately lead to individuals adding to or changing existing memory traces, so 
that subsequent reports include false memories.  
Endogenous False Memories 
 In order to measure spontaneous false memory production, the 
Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm (DRM; Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 
1995) was developed.  Deese (1959) pioneered this procedure by presenting 
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participants with lists of 12 words, asking them to remember the words, and later 
recording their free recall.  The key interest here was the intrusions in the memory 
test, that is, any words recalled that were not on the original lists.  Deese concluded 
that the probability of a word being falsely recalled could be predicted by the 
average frequency with which that word would occur as an association to the list 
words presented.   
Modelling their experiments on that of Deese (1959), Roediger and 
McDermott (1995) extended this research and created additional word lists likely to 
elicit memory intrusions.  These DRM lists, now commonly used in false memory 
research (Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001), are constructed according 
to association norms.  The words in each list (e.g., steal, robber, crook…) are all 
semantically related to one non-presented word (e.g., thief), known as the critical 
lure.  The first word in each of the lists is the highest associate of the critical lure and 
subsequent words are arranged in descending order of associative strength.  False 
memories are then measured as a function of the critical lures freely recalled, or 
recognised as old. 
Exogenous False Memories 
False memories can also be produced as a result of external suggestions.  In 
order to emulate suggestive interviewing techniques used in legal and clinical 
settings Elizabeth Loftus developed the misinformation paradigm.  There is evidence 
that suggestive interviewing techniques within the legal sector have led to false 
convictions (Loftus, 1975), and within the clinical sector similar techniques were 
criticised when used to help individuals retrieve repressed memories of events for 
which there was little to no evidence (Loftus & Ketcham, 1996).   
In the classic misinformation paradigm, participants are asked to remember 
an event, often presented as a slideshow of images, are later given false verbal 
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information, often in the form of leading questions or other people’s accounts of 
the events, and in a final session are given a memory test for the original event.  In 
the original study participants were shown a slideshow of images depicting a traffic 
accident and were later given misinformation regarding the presence of a stop or 
yield sign (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978).  Keeping with the practical implications for 
suggestive police interviewing, Loftus et al. presented the misinformation as leading 
questions in an interview about what participants had seen in the original slide 
show.  Many participants in these studies then incorporate the misinformation into 
their memory for the original event, and subsequent research using the same 
paradigm has shown a fairly consistent effect with approximately a 40% hit rate 
(Loftus, 2005). 
1.1.2 Theories of False Memory 
Two theories that explain many of the effects seen with false memory 
production are fuzzy trace theory (FTT; Brainerd & Reyna, 2002; Brainerd & Reyna, 
2001) and associative activation theory (AAT; Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 
2009; Wimmer & Howe, 2009).  FTT comes from a dual-process perspective and 
suggests that information is encoded and stored as two different memory traces; 
verbatim traces, which are concerned with item-specific and surface information, 
and gist traces, which are concerned with more meaning-based, semantic 
information.  Gist traces are said to decay slower than verbatim and thus false 
memories come from reliance at retrieval on these gist traces and a lack of verbatim 
memory. 
AAT on the other hand, suggests that increases in true and false memories 
come about through automatic spreading activation of concepts.  Neural 
representations of information presented to individuals are activated and this 
activation spreads along neural networks to associated concepts.  Just as increased 
- 23 - 
activation may account for increases in the strength of true memories, false 
memories are produced when spreading activation converges on a particular 
associate, bringing the activation of the false item to a threshold necessary for recall 
or recognition.  Although AAT is unique in itself, it is rooted in a compelling history 
of associative network theories and models, such as the activation-monitoring 
framework (Gallo & Roediger, 2002; Roediger et al., 2001; Watson, Balota, & 
Roediger, 2003), and the Laws of Association developed by 19th century British 
empiricists (e.g., John Locke, David Hume) (Neath & Surprenant, 2003).   
Moving away for a moment from the typical DRM paradigm, spontaneous 
false memories can also be produced when lists are compiled using phonological 
associates with, and in place of, semantic associates (Watson, Balota, & Roediger, 
2003).  Finley, Sungkhasettee, and Roediger (2017) demonstrated that adding 
phonological associates to semantic lists increased production rates of the critical 
lure.  Results such as these highlight the need for theories of false memory, like AAT, 
that are not restricted to semantics, as with FTT. 
Although originally constructed to explain spontaneous false memories, AAT 
can also be applied to the misinformation paradigm.  Since AAT predicts that 
spreading activation will occur at encoding, any misinformation consistent with 
these patterns of activation is more likely to be accepted.  Where attention may be 
drawn to central aspects of an image, activation of those details would result in an 
increase in a true memory trace as well as increased spreading activation to 
associated concepts.  Misinformation that conflicts with the true memory trace may 
therefore be less easily accepted, while details that do not directly conflict may be 
incorporated.  However, the picture here is not as clear as with spontaneous false 
memory production.  It is important to remember that although endogenous false 
memory production is often measured immediately and relies on purely cognitive 
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mechanisms, exogenous false memory production relies on other mechanisms such 
as social influence, and suggestibility, and is most often measured after a longer 
time delay. 
In addition to the two theories mentioned, Activation/Monitoring Theory 
(AMT; Roediger III, Balota, & Watson, 2001) and source monitoring theory (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay 1993) are also commonly used to explain false memory 
production.  AMT is similar to AAT in that is suggests false memories arise through a 
spreading activation and a failure to later identify which concepts were activated by 
the stimuli, and which were activated internally.  Unlike AAT however, AMT also 
posits that the false memories arise when individuals fail to monitor the source of 
the original activation.  AAT on the other hand refers to a single trace in which 
source information is encoded alongside item-specific informaiton and semantic 
information.  Spreading activations are therefore associated to this same source 
information and thus there is no distinction available to be monitored.   
 The other theory worth mentioning is source monitoring.  Source memory 
refers to details about the when, where, and how, of an event.  This information is 
superficial compared to the details and meaning of an event and so decays more 
rapidly.  The theory can be related to monitoring internal and external activations, 
however it is most often related to misinformation (Loftus, 2005).  It accounts for 
memory distortions whereby new mis-informaiton is associated with an original 
event memory, but the source of that information is not retained.  The theory is 
limited as it cannot be easily related to an underlying or neural mechanism, and the 
definition of the source of information is used too interchangeable to mean a 
temporal or physcial source versus the source of activation. 
This thesis focuses on AAT and FTT for two reasons.  First, the role of 
spreading activations amoung assoicated concepts is easily visualised and analogous 
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of spreading neural activations, thus AAT has clear merit for explaining cognitive 
processes.  AMT on the other hand obfuscates this notion and thus is less effective 
in it’s account of false memory effects.  Second, AAT and FTT are distinctive in their 
approach to explaining false memory production as they argue for either a single or 
dual memory trace, respectively.  This clear distinction allows for a comparison and 
consideration of the theories and provides different perspectives with which to 
consider the results of subsequent research. 
1.2 Emotion and False Memories 
Emotion has a significant impact on how we perceive the world and, from 
early memory research to more recent neuroscience techniques, there is evidence 
that emotion can have a significant biasing effect on the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying memory processes (e.g. Brown & Kulik, 2008; Talmi, 2013).  Individuals 
can create false memories for highly emotional events.  Implanted and suggested 
false memories have been successfully induced for being hospitalised overnight, 
witnessing a violent fight between your parents (Laney & Loftus, 2008), as well as 
invasive medical procedures (Hart & Schooler, 2006).  There is also evidence that 
emotional false memories are easier to elicit compared to neutral (Howe, 2007; 
Otgaar, Candel, & Merckelbach, 2008; Porter, Spencer, & Birt, 2003), and that this 
enhancement is more pronounced over a delay (Howe, Candel, Otgaar, Malone, & 
Wimmer, 2010).  Given that emotion is a prominent factor in both eyewitness 
testimonies and repressed memories (Bornstein & Wiener, 2010; Reisberg & Heuer, 
2007), it is essential to understand the effects of emotion on the rate and content of 
false memory production.  
1.2.1 Definition of Terms 
Terms such as emotion, mood, and affect, are often used interchangeably in 
research but the definitions and individual interpretations of these concepts vary.  It 
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is therefore important to clarify how these terms will be used throughout the thesis 
and the exact nature of their meaning.  The term emotion is used most often 
throughout this thesis as it is often used as an umbrella term. Appraisal theories of 
emotion predict that emotions are natural responses to changes in the environment 
and that they aid cognitive and behavioural changes that enable us to adapt to the 
changes, based on the goals and motivations of the individual (Moors, et al., 2013; 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  As such, this process is predicted to initiate changes in 
affect, valence, and arousal.  These terms, explained in detail below, are 
conceptualised as underlying mechanisms of emotion that all relate to the same 
overarching construct.  Mood on the other hand is a more general term used to 
refer to a much broader spectrum of feelings.  A ‘bad mood’ for example may refer 
to any combination and intensity of negative emotions, such as sadness or anger.   
Affect, as mentioned previously, relates specifically to the experienced 
qualities of an emotion.  The term affect has been used to describe both the 
experience or feeling of emotions, as well as the expression of emotions.  Reduced 
affect is often stated as a symptom of psychological disorders and refers to an 
individual expressing emotions in a more subdued manner than would be expected.  
In the case of the current research however, the term affect is used specifically in 
relation to the experience of different emotions.  Negative affect therefore refers to 
the experience of any negative emotion.  Lastly, valence and arousal are considered 
in terms of the circumplex model of affect (Posner, Russell, & Peterson, 2005; 
Russel, 1980).  These are two dimensions on which all emotional experience is 
proposed to exist and so theoretically underlie all emotions, affective experience, 
and mood.  Valence describes the dimension going from positive feelings to 
negative feelings, while arousal describes internal states of activation and readiness 
on a dimension from low to high.  For example, feeling calm and content would be 
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modelled as a slightly positive, low arousal, emotional experience, whereas feeling 
frustrated would be modelled as moderately negative, and high in arousal.   
Valence and arousal dimensions can be manipulated within affective 
experience or within stimuli presented and, as discussed later in the chapter, affect 
false memory production accordingly.  As mentioned however, when referring to 
emotions and affective experience we must also consider the effect of subjective 
appraisals and motivations associated with the underlying changes in valence and 
arousal.  These motivations may bias and guide cognitive processes to relevant 
information and thus predicted changes related to valence and arousal would most 
likely be restricted to this information. 
1.2.2 Emotion Induction and Measurement 
In order to measure the effect of emotion on false memories we must first 
consider how to experimentally manipulate and measure emotion.  Previous false 
memory research has typically used short movie clips, taken from databases such as 
Rottenberg, Ray, and Gross (2007a), to induce emotions (for other examples see 
Bartolini, 2011; Gross & Levenson, 1995; Hewig et al., 2005; Schaefer, Nils, Sanchez, 
& Philippot, 2010).  However, these techniques are not successful for all 
participants.  Other commonly used techniques include slideshows of images 
(Adam, Astor, Kramer, & Krämer, 2016), autobiographical recall (Erber & Erber, 
1994), and interactive manipulations (Kučera & Haviger, 2012; Lobbestael, Arntz, & 
Wiers, 2008).  Many comparisons of the techniques have been conducted, for 
example between recall and music (Jallais & Gilet, 2010), recall and films (Salas, 
Radovic, & Turnbull, 2012), music and films (Van der Does, 2002), and films and 
interactive scenarios (Lobbestael et al., 2008).  In many of these comparisons only 2 
techniques are compared, and in some cases the emotions induced vary according 
to the induction method used.  It is therefore difficult to draw any conclusions 
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regarding which techniques are the most effective or appropriate.  In addition, 
several meta-analyses and previous literature reviews have concluded that while 
there are some experimental results supporting the use of one technique over 
another the evidence is limited and most comparisons of techniques are conducted 
between studies (Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011; Martin, 1990; Phan, Wager, Taylor, 
& Liberzon, 2002; Westermann, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996).  In addition, there are various 
ways in which emotion and mood can be measured.  Comprehensive self-report 
questionnaires have been developed, such as the positive and negative affect scale 
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) in which participants rate how well 
different emotion adjectives describe their current mood.  In contrast, more 
abstract scales, such as the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994), 
measure the different dimensions of emotional experience without explicitly 
referencing discrete emotions.   
1.2.3 Emotion and False Memory Research 
Early investigations of emotion and memory focussed on general narrowing 
of attention as well as potential enhancement effects as a result of highly arousing 
emotional experiences.  Brown and Kulik (2008) coined the term “flashbulb 
memories” to describe strong, vivid memories of events that were consequentially 
surprising or emotionally arousing.  The authors draw on the theory “Now print!” 
(Livingston, 1967) which accounts for these effects by describing a step by step 
procedure where highly novel or distinct events are appraised for personal 
relevance, and in which relevant situations and all recent brain activity is 
permanently encoded.  Although we now have a much better understanding of this 
process, the general idea is one which has informed much research and knowledge.  
Loftus’s (1987) work on weapon focus effects also demonstrates a link between 
vividness of memory and arousal at encoding. 
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Research has also shown that with recall of traumatic memories there is a 
strong relationship between the perceived emotional intensity of the event and the 
confidence and clarity with which details are recalled, especially for central 
compared to peripheral details (Christianson & Loftus, 1990; Loftus & Ketcham, 
1996).  These studies provide clear insight into the relevance and implications of 
emotional memories. However, case studies of autobiographical memory are 
limited as there is no direct measure of the accuracy or false memory production.  
Indeed, Brown and Kulik (2008) caution that increased confidence in memory does 
not necessarily mean increased accuracy (see also Roediger & Desoto, 2013).  
However, early experimental research does reveal similar effects.  High arousal 
increased the strength of subsequent memory traces, and in many cases this was 
more prominent for central than peripheral details (Berntsen, 2002; Christianson & 
Loftus, 1991; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990).  Although there are also cases where high 
arousal disrupts true and false memory production (Morgan, Southwick, Steffian, & 
Hazlett, 2013). 
Another limitation of the autobiographical evidence, is that it confounds the 
effects of the emotional state of the person with effects of the emotional content of 
the stimuli.  Although there can be interaction effects between the two it is 
important to look at the effects of each separately, to gain a clearer understanding 
of the underlying mechanisms.  High arousing emotional states have been shown to 
increase spontaneous false memory production (Corson & Verrier, 2007), while 
increases in false memories associated with high arousal emotional stimuli are only 
apparent for negative but not positive stimuli (Brainerd, Holliday, Reyna, Yang, & 
Toglia, 2010; Mickley Steinmetz, Addis, & Kensinger, 2010).  With regard to 
misinformation effects, memory distortions have been shown to be more likely for 
negative, arousing stimuli (Gallo, Foster, & Johnson, 2009; Porter et al., 2003; Van 
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Damme & Smets, 2014), while a high arousal emotional state, induced after 
learning, reduces the endorsement of misinformation and therefore reduces false 
memory production (English & Nielson, 2010).   
As mentioned, there is also research looking specifically at the interaction of 
emotional state and emotional stimuli.  Knott and Thorley (2013) induced negative 
emotional states and showed an enhancement for valence-congruent false 
memories (see also Ruci, Tomes, & Zelenski, 2009).  In addition, congruency effects 
have been shown between individuals with depression and negative, depression 
relevant material (Howe & Malone, 2011; Moritz, Gläscher, & Brassen, 2005; 
Watkins, Mathews, & Williamson, 1992).  Although direct generalisations between 
effects of depression and effects of negative emotion cannot be made, it is worth 
noting the clinical implications of both branches of emotion-congruent false 
memory research.  
 Finally, distinctions should be made between the effects of different types 
of emotions.  Research initially looked into this by investigating the difference 
between emotional arousal, and emotional valence, as defined by the circumplex 
model of affect (Posner, Russell, & Peterson, 2005; Russel, 1980).  As noted 
previously with regard to the distinction between emotional states versus stimuli, 
for spontaneous false memory production emotional arousal tends to have more 
effect on false memory when experienced compared to when varied within the 
stimuli, whereas valence effects were more often seen for emotional stimuli and 
had little effect as emotion inductions (Brainerd et al., 2010; Corson & Verrier, 
2007).  For exogenous false memory production, a similar distinction between 
valence and arousal is seen.  Memory errors and distortions are more likely for 
negatively valenced stimuli compared to positively valenced.  Arousal effects are 
again mainly seen within emotion induction manipulations, however, within the 
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stimuli increased arousal causes greater false memories for peripheral compared to 
central details (Hoscheidt, LaBar, Ryan, Jacobs, & Nadel, 2014; Porter et al., 2003).  
Neurological evidence for the effects of emotion on memory support the existence 
of these two distinct dimensions as it demonstrates the involvement of different 
neural systems for each mechanism (Colibazzi et al., 2010; Kensinger, 2004).  
Although there is much support for this, appraisal theories of emotion would argue 
that this model is limited, and that motivational aspects of emotion are key in 
understanding the effects on cognitive processes (Moors et al., 2013).   
Within the last decade, several reviews of emotion and false memory 
research have endorsed the idea that inconsistencies in the valence and arousal 
argument can be explained by considering the motivation and goal relevance of the 
emotions (Harmon‐Jones & Price, 2012; Kaplan, Van Damme, & Levine, 2012; 
Kaplan, Van Damme, Levine, & Loftus, 2016).  Experimental research has also 
supported this idea as memory for neutral items presented during a goal conducive 
condition has been shown to be more resistant to decay (Montagrin, Brosch, & 
Sander, 2013).  Distinctions between pre- and post-goal emotions have also been 
shown to account for differences in memory distortions, whereby pre-goal emotions 
narrowed attention to relevant information and therefore increased the 
vulnerability of irrelevant information to misinformation effects (Van Damme, 
Kaplan, Levine, & Loftus, 2016).   
Particularly with respect to emotion congruency effects, if emotions direct 
cognitive processing of information relevant to the goals of the individual at the 
time, it stands to reason that discrete emotions differing in goal relevance and 
motivation would account for these effects more effectively than valence and 
arousal.  Indeed, discrete emotion congruency between the state of the individual 
and the stimuli presented has been shown to account for perceptual and processing 
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effects, whereas valence-congruence had no effect (Niedenthal & Setterlund, 1994).  
However, there is little research on the congruency effects of discrete emotions 
with false memory.   
1.2.4 Theories of Emotion and False Memory 
 As evidenced by previous research, the effect of emotion on false memory 
production is not straightforward.  The effects may depend on various dimensions 
and characteristics of emotion, and there may be different mechanisms for the 
effects seen with manipulations of emotional state versus those for the emotional 
content of the stimuli.  Never-the-less there are several theoretical perspectives on 
the effects found, and many of these derive from more general theories of how 
emotion affects cognitive processes.  
Bower’s (1981) Network Theory of Affect states that discrete emotions are 
represented as nodes and that emotional states or stimuli (internal or external) can 
activate corresponding and associated nodes.  As these associations develop during 
learning, each associated network of activations is specific to each individual.  The 
theory predicts that emotion-congruency, either between the state and stimuli or 
between the state at encoding and the state at retrieval, will enhance memory 
formation.  AAT leads on nicely from this theory as it predicts that increased 
spreading activation for emotionally congruent items will increase the chances of 
these items reaching an activation threshold necessary to produce false memories.  
In contrast, appraisal theories of emotion highlight the motivational and 
goal relevant aspects of emotional experience (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  Appraisal 
theories posit that emotions focus cognitive resources in favour of information 
congruent to the current emotional state or goals of the individual.  As such, like the 
network theory, AAT would predict that this enhanced processing would lead to 
increases in false memory production.  Emotion memory narrowing (Kensinger, 
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2009) also claims that emotions narrow focus and cognitive resources toward 
central aspects of a scene.  However, this theory relates specifically to 
misinformation effects as opposed to spontaneous false memory production, as it 
suggests that while resources are biased toward central details, peripheral details 
are not encoded as well and are therefore more vulnerable to errors and later 
memory distortions.   
Finally, an alternative account is the affect-as-information hypothesis (Clore, 
Gasper, & Garvin, 2001). This aligns with dual-process theories of false memory such 
as FTT, and relates to the emotional state of the individual.  The affect-as-
information hypothesis claims that valence influences the types of processing used 
to attend to and encode information.  Negative valence is said to encourage item-
specific processing while positive valence encourages more heuristic processing.  
Item-specific processing would increase memory for those details, thus increasing 
activation of the specific details, but also decreasing activation of any details less 
well attended.  However, this account is flawed due to its reliance on negative and 
positive affect, as recent research has shown pre- and post-goal distinctions are 
more appropriate (Kaplan et al., 2012).  
1.2.5 Practical Implications 
This research has significant implications for legal and clinical practice.  In 
legal situations eyewitness testimony is often relied upon and in some cases may be 
the only evidence available.  Given the often highly emotional nature of these 
events it is vital to understand the likelihood of false memories being produced.  
There is much research on variables affecting eyewitness accuracy that can be 
controlled by the legal system and this has direct implications on the procedures 
used (see Reisberg, & Heuer, 2007).  Although emotion may also affect these 
procedures, emotion is most often associated with variables that are out of the 
- 34 - 
control of the legal system and must therefore be understood fully to determine the 
probability that a testimony is accurate.   
Generally, the more serious a crime is the more emotional it is likely to be 
for the victims and witnesses to experience.  As we can see from previous research, 
an emotional experience during an event is likely to affect the false memory 
production in that the more emotionally arousing the experience the more false 
memories will be produced (Corson & Verrier, 2007).  In addition, false memories 
tend to be greater for information that is more negative (Brainerd, et al., 2010).  As 
well as the encoding of the event, false memories may be produced at various 
stages of the eyewitness process.  Much research has been conducted on false 
memories produced through misinformation effects during interviews and 
identification procedures (see Loftus, 2005) and these effects are inflated for 
negative stimuli (e.g. Gallo, Foster, & Johnson, 2009; Porter et al., 2003). 
Similar concerns are apparent within clinical settings.  False memories for 
emotional events may be produced spontaneously, as well as after the events have 
occurred during discussions and while reminiscing about events.  We cannot make 
generalisations between everyday emotional experiences and traumatic events or 
clinical emotion disorders, such as depression or anxiety, however it is important to 
note that during any counselling sessions various emotional states may be elicited 
and memories of other (non-traumatic) events may be retrieved.  For example, in 
assessing the significance of emotionally distressing memories a negative emotional 
state may be induced in the individual and this may affect the retrieval and 
reconsolidation of other memories discussed.  Discussion and elaboration of 
memories may enhance spreading activations, increasing the chances of 
spontaneous false memories being produced, as well as increasing the possibility of 
misinformation effects occurring.  Emotional elaboration has indeed been shown to 
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significantly increase memory distortion (Drivdahl, Zaragoza, & Learned, 2009).  
False memory research is needed to help counsellors avoid inflating the production 
of negative false memories, especially when concerned about an individual’s 
psychological well-being. 
1.3 Summary and Thesis Outline 
In summary, this thesis investigates the effects of negative emotion of both 
branches of false memory production, endogenous and exogenous, as well as 
looking at the most effective ways to manipulate emotion for this purpose.  First, in 
Chapter 2 a review of the literature on emotion induction techniques is presented 
along with an experimental investigation of four techniques, suitable for various 
applications within psychology research, and assessment of the intensity and 
selectivity of inductions for a range of discrete emotions.  In addition, two different, 
commonly used self-report measurement techniques are employed to provide a 
comparison of the two and to provide a more in-depth evaluation of the inductions.  
Much of the literature reviewed is shown to only focus only on a limited number of 
techniques and is often limited to one or two emotions.  Experiment 1 therefore 
gives a broader, more comprehensive, investigation of the effectiveness of these 
techniques. 
 In Chapters 3 and 4 there is then a direct investigation of the effect of 
emotion on false memory production.  In Chapter 3 there is a closer look at the 
valence and arousal literature and the limitations discussed so far.  Experiments 2 
and 3 are conducted in order to investigate the effect of discrete emotions, beyond 
the effects of arousal and valence, on spontaneous false memory production.  
Specifically looking at the congruency between the emotion induced and the stimuli 
presented.  AAT and appraisal theories of emotion together highlight the relevance 
of motivation and predict that false memories should increase for information 
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congruent to the discrete emotions and not just the valence of the emotion, as 
previously shown (Knott & Thorley, 2013). 
In Chapter 4 a different approach is taken, and a simplified study of 
misinformation effects is presented using experimental manipulations of valence 
only.  Unlike research on spontaneous false memories, the misinformation literature 
has already begun to look closer at effects of motivation, and pre- versus post-goal 
emotions. However, there is less known about the simple effects of negative 
emotion on source monitoring memory for new misleading information.  
Experiment 4 therefore investigates this effect, and discusses the role of motivation 
with emotion effects on misinformation.  In Experiment 5, this line of investigation 
is extended to look at the changing affective qualities of memory instead of the 
explicit content.  There is an investigation of distortions of the affective qualities of 
originally neutral memories, and a novel perspective on false memory is discussed.   
The findings in each chapter are discussed in light of past research, 
theoretical implications, specifically for AAT and appraisal theories of emotion, and 
the practical implications for the legal and clinical sectors.  The possible mediating 
role of motivation in emotions effects on cognition is also discussed throughout, and 
suggestions are made for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Emotion Induction Techniques 
2.1 Overview 
The focus of this thesis is to examine the effect of negative emotion 
inductions on the production of false memories.  It is therefore necessary to first 
glean the most effective and appropriate induction technique.  In 1924 Carney 
Landis faced the same question.  He wanted to examine patterns of facial 
expressions in participants experiencing different emotions and, therefore, needed 
to induce these emotions in the lab.  In doing so he employed methods that 
included placing firecrackers under participant’s chairs and having them decapitate 
rats (Landis, 1924).  Fortunately, emotion induction techniques (EITs) have advanced 
greatly since the early 1900’s.  Researchers now have access to a variety of stimuli 
and procedures specifically designed to induce a range of emotional states, many of 
which are discussed in this chapter.   
The problem, however, is that with this multitude of techniques available 
there is still much unknown about which techniques are the most effective and 
reliable, which produce the most intense emotional experiences, as well as which 
induce the most specific emotional states.  There are many areas of research that 
utilise emotion induction techniques (Coan & Allen, 2007) and so it is important to 
better understand the techniques available and be able to make informed decisions 
as to which to use in experimental procedures.  The literature covered in this 
chapter examines commonly used EITs and an experimental comparison of a 
selection of techniques (films, pictures, news reports, and autobiographical recall) is 
presented.  In some cases, certain techniques are much more suited to specific 
emotions or mood states, however, the general consensus reached is that each of 
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the techniques tested are effective and, therefore, an appropriate technique can be 
chosen in line with the parameters of the research being conducted. 
2.2 Introduction 
Affective influences are widely researched throughout the cognitive, 
behavioural, and neuroscience domains. However, the literature on effective mood 
and emotion induction techniques has been limited, with few comparisons made, 
few emotions compared, and variations in the measures used to validate the 
inductions.  Much of the original research on EITs was concerned with developing 
cognitive therapies for disorders such as depression and anxiety (Blackburn, 
Cameron, & Deary, 1990; Bouhuys, Bloem, & Groothuis, 1995; Chartier & Ranieri, 
1989; Clark, 1983; Gerrards-Hesse, 1994; Velten, 1968).  Whereas now, there are 
many instances where emotion induction is merely an experimental manipulation, 
and whereby its subsequent effect on another process is the main focus of the 
research.   
Velten (1968) developed a paradigm in which self-referential statements 
were used to induce either feelings of elation or depression.  Although widely used 
at the time, there were several studies published in the 1980’s disputing the 
effectiveness of this technique and suggesting alternatives such as emotional music 
(Albersnagel, 1988), autobiographical recall (Brewer, Doughtie, & Lubin, 1980), and 
interactive achievement tasks (Chartier & Ranieri, 1989).  Although there were some 
advantages to the Velten technique there were greater concerns that the emotional 
states were too short lived (Clark, 1983; Isen & Gorgoglione, 1983) and that the 
technique was restricted to only a small subset of emotional experiences (Jennings, 
McGinnis, Lovejoy, & Stirling, 2000).   
Alternative techniques also being developed at the time included audio-
visual stimuli (e.g. film clips, pictures, music), internally generated experiences (e.g. 
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imagery, autobiographical recall), and interactive manipulations (e.g. goal 
achievement tasks)2.  Interactive scenarios have a great advantage in that they allow 
natural, ecologically valid, emotion inductions to occur.  Participants may be asked 
to interact with another participant within an emotionally charged context (Roberts, 
Tsai, & Coan, 2007) or they may unwittingly be exposed to events or task outcomes 
designed to elicit a natural emotional reaction (Kučera & Haviger, 2012; Lobbestael 
et al., 2008).  Either way, the emotions are induced in a natural way.  One of the 
biggest issues with these techniques however is the ethical quandary that 
participants are unable to give fully informed consent.  Another concern is the 
practical limitations.  These techniques are highly involved and are likely to 
introduce many confounding variables if the situations are not carefully controlled.  
Many of these inductions would be conducted in a natural setting, and not a 
laboratory, and so subsequent tasks would also be conducted in this non-laboratory 
environment. 
As an alternative, ecologically valid technique, autobiographical recall is 
often used.  Asking participants to recall a time when they experienced a specific 
emotion enables researchers to tap into a genuine emotional experience.  Through 
careful instruction these emotions can then be re-experienced in the moment 
(Erber & Erber, 1994).  Although much easier to implement than the interactive 
techniques, there are considerable concerns regarding demand characteristics 
associated with autobiographical recall.  The instructions for such a technique are 
explicit in giving the purpose of the recall and the desired outcome of the task.  That 
said, alongside self-report measures of the emotions induced, there is confirmatory 
evidence of their effectiveness from autonomic nervous system activity (Kop et al., 
2011).  
                                                 
2
 These are just a selection of the techniques used.  For more inclusive reviews see Martin 
(1990), Gerrards-Hesse (1994), and Westermann, Stahl, and Hesse (1996). 
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 The third category mentioned are techniques using audio-visual stimuli.  
These include playing music (Hausmann, Hodgetts, & Eerola, 2016), presenting 
pictures (Adam et al., 2016), and showing movie clips (Knott & Thorley, 2013).  
These techniques allow for more control within the experiment as the stimuli have 
often been normed in previous research (e.g. films: Gross & Levenson, 1995; 
pictures: Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993).  These EITs can also be kept 
consistent across participants, can be replicated between studies, and can be 
presented in a controlled laboratory environment.  Although experimental control is 
increased, the biggest concerns here are the strength of the emotions experienced 
and the potentially artificial nature of their elicitation.  It seems there is a natural 
trade-off with EITs that as ecological validity and strength of induction increase, 
experimental control and replicability decrease. 
In order to increase the effectiveness of emotion inductions one possibility 
is to use a combination of techniques, drawing on the advantages of each.  For 
example, combining music and imagery has been shown to induce much stronger 
emotional experiences compared to either technique alone (Mayer, Allen, & 
Beauregard, 1995).  However, using these techniques together has also been shown 
to lead to much more complex results (Jallais & Gilet, 2010).  For example, including 
more direct instructions may also increase the effectiveness and strength of the 
emotion inductions, however, this also increases confounds of demand bias and 
cognitive control.   
So far the advantages and disadvantages of popular techniques have been 
discussed. However, when choosing an appropriate technique researchers also need 
to consider which will provide the optimal emotional response.  For this purpose, 
the research is somewhat lacking.  Previous reviews and meta-analyses of the 
emotion induction literature have criticised the lack of articles looking at more than 
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one technique (Martin, 1990) and the limited range of emotions examined 
(Westermann et al., 1996).  Salas, Radovic, and Turnbull’s (2012) comparison of 
internally and externally generated emotions is perhaps the most informative of the 
literature reviewed. This review showed that films and autobiographical recall are 
both effective at producing a range of discrete emotions but that recall, an 
internally-generated technique, favours positive valence and high arousal emotions.   
Previous articles have shown that music is more effective at inducing 
sadness than film clips (Van der Does, 2002), but that recall is more effective and 
reliable than music at inducing a range of different emotions (Jallais & Gilet, 2010).  
One possible explanation for the supremacy of recall in these studies is the element 
of personal relevance.  Increased personal relevance of induction procedures has 
been shown to increase the subsequent effectiveness of the techniques (Hazlett, 
2012).  This is unsurprising when considering leading cognitive theories of emotion.  
Here, emotions are considered to be evolutionary mechanisms whose purpose is to 
optimise appraisals of our environment and guide subsequent cognitive and 
behavioural responses (Moors et al., 2013). 
With regard to the more interactive manipulations mentioned earlier, 
Kučera and Haviger (2012) presented findings that interactive manipulations used to 
induce anger and fear were more successful than audio-visual stimuli that were 
used to induce joy and sadness.  Although informative regarding the experience of 
emotions, in terms of comparing the effectiveness of two techniques, this example 
is substantially limited because different emotions were used with the different 
techniques.  It is not possible to conclude whether one method was more effective 
or whether the high arousal of fear and anger, compared to joy and sadness, 
accounts for the results.  
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As well as variations in the emotions induced and techniques compared, the 
studies reviewed also utilized different self-report measures to validate the 
inductions.  In one instance, scales measuring changes in arousal and valence were 
used (Jallais & Gilet, 2010) providing clear evidence of the strength of the 
inductions. In others, more descriptive questionnaires using emotional adjectives 
that are rated on how well they describe the participants current state were 
employed (Kučera & Haviger, 2012; Salas et al., 2012).  These more descriptive 
measures can be used to examine the specificity of the inductions. However, the list 
of emotional words can also introduce confounds.  Although much of the literature 
is informative for studies concerned directly with emotional experiences or their 
associated neural substrates, for the purpose of inducing a range of emotions in 
order to compare subsequent effects, the literature is somewhat inadequate and 
additional research is needed. 
2.3 Experiment 1: 
Evaluating Emotion Induction Techniques and Self Report Measures of Emotion 
 Experiment 1 was designed to examine four different emotion induction 
techniques: films, pictures, news reports, and autobiographical recall.  Film clips are 
a popular technique to use, and specifically so in the false memory literature (Knott 
& Thorley, 2013; Ruci, Tomes, & Zelenski, 2009).  Collections of normed film clips 
make this technique particularly useful because they provide a reliable set of stimuli 
from which various discrete emotions can be induced (e.g. Bartolini, 2011; 
Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007).  Although film clips have been shown to be 
effective in a variety of contexts (e.g. Hagemann et al., 1999) there is a concern that 
people view these stimuli as entertaining and consequently detach from the events 
depicted, particularly if they have prior exposure (film clips are often taken from 
popular movies – e.g., The Shining – Stephen King).  In order to evaluate the 
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effectiveness of using real-life events, news reports were considered as an induction 
technique.  Although there are very few instances in which this method has been 
used (Unz & Schwab, 2005), including it in this experiment enables an examination 
of a more ecologically valid and personally relevant technique.   
Picture sets are also an effective means of emotion elicitation and may, in 
some cases, be more effective than films. This is because they allow for a range of 
stimuli to be presented for one emotion.  For example, a clip from a horror movie 
may not scare everyone (leading to some failed inductions) whereas a variety of 
typically scary images may be more encompassing.  The International Affective 
Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999) provides arousal and valence 
ratings for each image and therefore facilitates the creation of subsets of images, 
ones that have been successfully used to induce emotion in past research (Adam et 
al., 2016; Biss, Weeks, & Hasher, 2012). 
 Examining films, pictures, and news reports, allows a comparison between 
different types of audio-visual stimuli3.  However, all of these techniques rely on 
externally generated emotion.  Salas, Radovic, and Turnbull (2012) compared 
internally and externally generated discrete emotions and although both techniques 
were effective, they found there were slight differences in the types of emotions 
best induced by the different techniques.  The internally-generated technique was 
shown to favours positive valence and high arousal emotions, and elicited greater 
intensity overall compared to the externally-generated induction.  In addition, 
personal relevance has been shown to greatly enhance the effectiveness of emotion 
inductions (Ellard, Farchione, & Barlow, 2012; Hazlett, 2012).  Therefore, by 
including autobiographical recall as an induction technique in this experiment, it will 
                                                 
3
 Music was not chosen as a technique due to methodological issues with the discrepancy 
between the length of music clips and the length of the film clips (Hausmann et al., 2016) as 
well as the potential ambiguity in the target emotions associated with the music clips. 
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allow an examination of both of these factors, and as with the other chosen 
techniques, has been used in a variety of experiments as an EIT (e.g. Erber & Erber, 
1994; Kop et al., 2011). 
A further consideration when manipulating emotion is the measure used to 
validate any inductions.  Different measures are often used in different studies. For 
example, inductions using the IAPS are typically measured using the self-assessment 
manikin (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994; Gupta et al., 2007), whereas Kučera and 
Haviger (2012) and Jallais and Gilet (2010) used more detailed, explicit, emotion 
questionnaires.  The key difference between these measures is the nature in which 
emotional experiences are identified.  The SAM is a pictorial representation of 
dimensions thought to underlie emotional experience.  Participants rate how 
positive/negative their current mood state is and how high/low the corresponding 
arousal levels are.  The abstract nature of this scale allows for a measure of emotion 
to be taken without explicitly drawing participant’s attention to discrete emotions.  
This is particularly useful in memory studies of emotional stimuli as it prevents 
confounding the memory data by presenting emotional adjectives.  An alternative 
that does use emotional adjectives is the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  This is a popular measure that presents multiple 
emotion adjectives and asks participants to rate to what extent each describes their 
current mood state.  The PANAS allows for a much more concrete measure of 
discrete emotions. However, it also presents an increased risk of demand 
characteristics compared to the SAM.  The effectiveness of the emotion inductions 
in Experiment 1 are therefore measured using both the SAM and an adaptation of 
the PANAS scale. 
In summary, Experiment 1 assesses the effectiveness of film clips, affective 
pictures, news reports, and autobiographical recall at inducing anger, fear, sadness, 
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and happiness, along with a neutral induction.  The analysis is separated into 
specificity, whether the induction is specific to the target emotion or elicits a cluster 
of emotions, and intensity, the strength of the subjective experience of the emotion 
experienced.   
2.3.1 Method 
Participants 
For an 80% chance of finding a medium effect size with an alpha of .05 we 
need 112 participants.  The purpose however of this study is to pilot possible 
techniques to be used throughout the thesis and so a total of 71 participants (23 
male) were recruited through local advertisements in the areas surrounding City, 
University of London, with the age range being 18-35 (M = 25.33, SD = 5.41).  
Participants were fully informed as to the procedure of the experiment but were not 
told directly that the purpose was to evaluate to the effectiveness of the different 
inductions in order to avoid demand characteristics.  Participants were given an £8 
inconvenience allowance.  There were 4 conditions for the between group variable 
(films, pictures, recall, and news) and participants were split randomly into each 
group with the sample sizes being 17, 18, 19, and 17 respectively4. 
Design 
A 4 (Technique: film, picture, recall, news) x 5 (Emotion: anger, fear, sad, 
happy, neutral) mixed design was used, where the between-participants variable 
was Technique and the within-participant variable Emotion.  Randomising the order 
of the emotion presentation eliminated order effects and participants were 
randomly allocated to each of the technique groups. 
 
                                                 
4
 These sample sizes are small for a design of this complexity; however, the purpose of this 
experiment was to inform the selection of a reasonable emotion induction technique to be 
used throughout the false memory research in this thesis.  As such, a more comprehensive 
evaluation was deemed unnecessary. 
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Materials 
Films.  Five film clips were selected from Rottenberg, Ray, and Gross (2007) 
and Bartolini (2011), each lasting approximately 3-4 minutes.  The film chosen for 
neutral inductions was a clip from “The President’s Men” in which a reporter is 
asking questions while a court trial appears to be commencing in the background.  
For inductions of fear a clip was taken from “Halloween” and shows a woman 
entering a house at night and being pursued by an attacker.  A clip from the film 
“My Bodyguard” depicting a scene in which a young boy is being bullied was used to 
induce anger.  Sadness was induced using a clip from “The Champ” in which a young 
boy witnesses his injured father die, and happiness was induced using a clip of a 
football teams triumphant win taken from “Remember the Titans”.   
Pictures.  For the picture inductions a slideshow of 50 images was created 
(see Figure 2.1) for each emotion, with images presented for 5 seconds each.  
Images were selected from the IAPS database (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999) 
using the corresponding arousal and valence ratings for the desired emotions and 
subjectively checking the content for the most appropriate images for each emotion 
(for a full list of images refer to Appendix A).  Valence and arousal scores for fear 
and anger images were similar and for each scale were between 1 and 4, and 5 and 
8 respectively.  For sad images valence scores were between 1.5 and 4.5, and 
arousal scores between 3 and 6.  Valence scores for happy images were between 6 
and 9, and arousal scores were between 3 and 7.  Finally neutral images were 
chosen with valence scores between 4 and 6, and arousal scores between 1.5 and 
4.5 (see Table 2.1 below for descriptive statistics). 
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Figure 2.1: Example images used for each of the emotion inductions  
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Table 2.1: Arousal and valence ratings for images chosen for each emotion  
 Arousal  Valence 
 M SD  M SD 
Anger 5.72 2.27  2.60 1.61 
Fear 6.28 2.13  2.77 1.62 
Sad 4.65 2.13  3.10 1.58 
Happy 5.31 2.33  7.60 1.50 
Neutral 3.06 1.93  4.78 1.16 
 
News Reports.  A pilot study with 30 participants was conducted online to 
gather ratings for anger, fear, sadness, and happiness for a selection of news 
articles.  The results of the pilot can be found in Appendix B.  The articles chosen 
were between 800 and 1100 words in length with 1 or 2 accompanying photos.  The 
neutral article described the different “cultural meals” provided by McDonalds 
stores in different countries; the anger article described a vicious homophobic 
attack in London; the fear article described a non-fatal shark attack in a highly-
populated “low-risk” area; the sadness article described an accident in which two 
toddlers were killed at their home while playing; and finally the happiness article 
described a D-Day veteran who attended anniversary commemorations in 
Normandy and returned saying his trip “meant the world” to him.  Participants were 
asked to spend 3-5 minutes reading over each of the articles and to imagine the 
events were happening to them or someone close to them. 
Autobiographical Recall.  Participants in the recall condition were not 
presented with any stimuli but were instead asked “to think back to a time in your 
life when you felt really [angry/scared/sad/happy]”.  For the neutral induction, the 
instructions were to “think back to a typical day at school or college”.  Participants 
were asked to spend 3-4 minutes imagining the event and trying to recall as many 
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details as possible.  Further instructions to help participants remember the event 
clearly were adapted from Erber and Erber (1994).  Participants were asked to 
remember the events “vividly”, to “see all the details”, to picture the events “as 
they happened”, to “experience the events” and to let themselves “react as if the 
event was happening now”.  Finally, to increase the strength and richness of the 
recall participants were asked to write down details about the event and answer 
questions about each event.  Details and answers about sensitive topics were not 
shared with the researcher and were only a tool to enhance recall. 
Measurement scales.  Emotion was measured using two different 
questionnaires.  The first was the SAM, a pictorial scale from 1-9 measuring arousal 
and valence.  The second was an adaptation of the PANAS, for which participants 
were presented with four adjectives related to each of the four emotions (anger, 
fear, sad, happy) giving sixteen adjectives in total, and asked to rate to what extent 
each word described their current mood on a scale from 1 to 7 (1 being not at all, 7 
being extremely).  
Procedure 
All aspects of the experiment were run on a computer. To begin participants 
were asked to complete an adaptation of the PANAS followed by the SAM 
measuring arousal and valence. This was followed by the first emotion induction. 
Depending on the assigned group, participants were either shown a video clip, a 
slide show of images, a newspaper article, or instructions to recall a period in their 
life pertaining to one of the five emotions. Immediately following the emotion 
induction, the SAM and then PANAS were presented followed by a distractor task.  
For those participants in the autobiographical recall group only, there were 
additional questions regarding the recency, intensity, and personal relevance of the 
memory recalled, as well as any emotion regulation strategies employed whilst 
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recalling the memory.  The distractor task consisted of 4 simple math questions: 
counting backward in 3’s, a simple equation, completing a number sequence, 
calculating a proportion of a large number.  The distractor task was not timed nor 
was progression restricted by answering correctly. However, any participants’ 
whose responses later indicated they had not attended to the distractor task were 
removed from the analysis5.  Finally, a second SAM questionnaire was given after 
the distractor task to validate the intended return to a neutral mood.  
This procedure was repeated for each of the 5 different emotions.  
Participants were debriefed at the end of the experiment before being given one 
final mood check to ensure everyone left the experiment in a neutral/positive 
mood.  The entire session lasted approximately 45 minutes.  All induction 
techniques lasted between 3 and 5 minutes and this was comparative across 
emotion conditions. 
2.3.2 Results 
Data was recorded for 71 participants; 2 were removed due to missing data 
and a further 3 were removed due to lacking or incorrect data on the distractor 
tasks.  Of the remaining 66 participants, 18 were male, the ages ranged from 18 to 
35 (M = 25.33, SD = 5.37), and there were 17 participants in the film, picture, and 
(autobiographical) recall groups, and 15 in the news group.  Scores from the 
adapted PANAS scale were averaged for each of the response sub-scales (Anger, 
Fear, Sadness, and Happiness), for each of the emotion conditions (Anger, Fear, Sad, 
Happy, and Neutral), and changes in arousal and valence were calculated by 
subtracting the responses given immediately before from the responses given 
immediately after each induction.  Given that these changes are dependent on 
direction the changes in arousal scores for sad and neutral and the changes in 
                                                 
5
 Participants were deemed to have not engaged with the distractor task if 2 or more of the 4 
questions were left blank or if 3 or more answers were incorrect.  
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valence scores for anger, fear, and sad were reverse coded in order to account for 
the expected directions and allow comparison between the different emotions 
induced.  The analyses are then organised according to each of the research 
questions.  The intensity analysis examined how strong the emotional responses 
were for each of the inductions and the specificity analysis examined the responses 
to target emotions when compared to non-target emotions (for descriptive statistics 
see Table 2.2 for SAM scores, and Table 2.3 for PANAS scores).   
Intensity Analysis 
Arousal and Valence.  Two 4 (Technique: film, picture, recall, news) x 5 
(Emotion: anger, fear, sad, happy, neutral) mixed ANOVAs were run for changes in 
arousal and valence separately, with Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests.  In such 
cases where the assumption of sphericity was violated, the Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction is reported (see Figure 2.2 and 2.3).   
For the changes in arousal there was a significant main effect of Emotion, 
F(4, 248) = 2.43, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, a significant main effect of Technique, F(3, 62) = 
4.18, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .17, but no significant interaction effect of Emotion x Technique, 
F(12, 248) = 1.10, p = .36, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .05.  Pairwise comparisons for Technique show films 
elicit significantly greater changes in arousal compared to news, p < .01; however, 
no other differences were significant (all p’s > .1).  For Emotion, the changes in 
arousal were significantly higher for neutral inductions compared to sad, p < .05; but 
again, no other differences were significant (all p’s > .1).  
For the changes in valence scores there was a significant main effect of 
Emotion, F(4, 248) = 9.11, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .13, no significant main effect of Technique, 
F(3, 62) = 2.00, p =.12, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .09, and no significant interaction effect of Emotion x 
Technique, F(4, 248) = 1.55, p = .11, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .07.  Pairwise comparisons for Emotion 
reveal that the changes in valence were significantly greater for happiness and 
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sadness compared to anger, fear, and neutral (all p’s < .05); all other differences 
were not significant (p’s = 1.00).   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Mean changes in arousal scores as a function of target emotion and 
induction technique (error bars represent standard deviation)  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Mean changes in valence scores as a function of target emotion and 
induction technique (error bars represent standard deviation). 
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Table 2.2.  Change in responses for the SAM scale following each emotion induction 
 
 
Films 
 
Pictures 
 
Recall 
 
News 
 
   
95% CI 
   
95% CI 
   
95% CI 
   
95% CI 
 
 
M SE LL UL 
 
M SE LL UL 
 
M SE LL UL 
 
M SE LL UL 
Arousal 
                   
 
Anger .71 .46 -.27 1.68 
 
.29 .36 -.47 1.06 
 
.88 .51 -.21 1.97 
 
.33 .47 -.68 1.35 
 
Fear 1.76 .54 .62 2.91 
 
.12 .36 -.65 .89 
 
.94 .52 -.17 2.05 
 
-.20 .47 -1.21 .81 
 
Sad .06 .47 -.93 1.05 
 
-.76 .45 -1.72 .19 
 
.12 .62 -1.19 1.43 
 
-.07 .53 -1.2 1.07 
 
Happy 1.65 .59 .39 2.91 
 
.00 .53 -1.12 1.12 
 
.76 .55 -.41 1.94 
 
.07 .48 -.97 1.10 
 
Neutral -1.29 .44 -2.22 -.37 
 
-1.59 .45 -2.55 -.63 
 
-1.65 .44 -2.57 -.72 
 
-.53 .45 -1.49 .42 
 
                    
Valence 
                   
 
Anger -.53 .38 -1.34 .29 
 
-.76 .45 -1.72 .19 
 
-.53 .52 -1.62 .56 
 
-.93 .52 -2.05 .18 
 
Fear .29 .39 -.53 1.12 
 
-.29 .47 -1.29 .70 
 
-.88 .41 -1.75 -.01 
 
-1.00 .47 -2.00 .00 
 
Sad -1.71 .51 -2.79 -.62 
 
-.94 .45 -1.89 .01 
 
-2.35 .52 -3.46 -1.25 
 
-2.2 .73 -3.77 -.63 
 
Happy 2.47 .55 1.31 3.64 
 
1.59 .40 .73 2.44 
 
2.06 .46 1.09 3.03 
 
.80 .48 -.23 1.83 
 
Neutral -.24 .38 -1.04 .57 
 
-.29 .38 -1.1 .51 
 
1.12 .53 -.02 2.25 
 
.93 .37 .14 1.73 
- 5
3 - 
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Table 2.3.  PANAS ratings for each emotion sub-group following each emotion induction 
  
Films 
 
Pictures 
 
Recall 
 
News 
    
95% CI 
   
95% CI 
   
95% CI 
   
95% CI 
  
M SE LL UL 
 
M SE LL UL 
 
M SE LL UL 
 
M SE LL UL 
Anger 
                   
 
Anger 3.9 0.38 3.09 4.7 
 
2.62 0.31 1.96 3.27 
 
3.71 0.44 2.78 4.63 
 
3.45 0.43 2.53 4.37 
 
Fear 1.65 0.2 1.22 2.08 
 
1.66 0.24 1.15 2.17 
 
1.91 0.24 1.41 2.42 
 
2.4 0.44 1.46 3.34 
 Sad 3.32 0.24 2.82 3.83 
 
2.76 0.3 2.12 3.41 
 
2.66 0.38 1.85 3.48 
 
3.33 0.34 2.6 4.07 
 
Happy 1.99 0.18 1.6 2.37 
 
1.9 0.27 1.32 2.47 
 
2.62 0.29 2.01 3.23 
 
1.92 0.2 1.5 2.34 
                     
Fear 
                   
 
Anger 1.65 0.23 1.16 2.14 
 
1.71 0.19 1.29 2.12 
 
2.74 0.45 1.78 3.69 
 
1.93 0.27 1.36 2.51 
 
Fear 3.69 0.39 2.87 4.51 
 
1.82 0.24 1.31 2.33 
 
3.35 0.38 2.54 4.17 
 
2.92 0.39 2.07 3.76 
 
Sad 2.12 0.25 1.58 2.65 
 
2.12 0.23 1.63 2.61 
 
3.53 0.45 2.59 4.47 
 
2.43 0.28 1.84 3.02 
 
Happy 2.51 0.3 1.88 3.15 
 
1.94 0.29 1.32 2.56 
 
2.31 0.28 1.72 2.9 
 
2.25 0.24 1.73 2.77 
 
- 5
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Sadness 
                   
 
Anger 1.78 0.21 1.33 2.23 
 
1.99 0.15 1.66 2.31 
 
2.28 0.43 1.36 3.2 
 
2.17 0.32 1.47 2.86 
 
Fear 1.68 0.21 1.24 2.11 
 
1.62 0.25 1.09 2.15 
 
2.5 0.42 1.61 3.39 
 
2 0.28 1.4 2.6 
 
Sad 3.82 0.3 3.19 4.46 
 
2.75 0.32 2.07 3.43 
 
4.07 0.42 3.18 4.97 
 
3.3 0.36 2.53 4.07 
 Happy 1.85 0.19 1.45 2.26 
 
1.93 0.24 1.42 2.43 
 
1.82 0.21 1.38 2.27 
 
2.17 0.28 1.56 2.78 
                     
Happiness 
                   
 Anger 1.28 0.16 0.94 1.62 
 
1.16 0.07 1.02 1.31 
 
1.34 0.2 0.92 1.75 
 
1.38 0.22 0.91 1.85 
 
Fear 1.26 0.13 1 1.53 
 
1.26 0.22 0.8 1.73 
 
1.5 0.23 1.02 1.98 
 
1.57 0.27 0.99 2.14 
 
Sad 1.28 0.12 1.03 1.53 
 
1.24 0.12 0.98 1.49 
 
1.41 0.18 1.03 1.8 
 
1.38 0.14 1.08 1.68 
 
Happy 4.01 0.32 3.34 4.68 
 
3.21 0.38 2.4 4.01 
 
4.47 0.24 3.96 4.98 
 
3.43 0.46 2.46 4.41 
                     
Neutral 
                   
 
Anger 1.65 0.25 1.11 2.18 
 
1.43 0.18 1.05 1.8 
 
1.32 0.14 1.02 1.63 
 
1.18 0.09 1 1.37 
 
Fear 1.28 0.12 1.03 1.53 
 
1.13 0.1 0.91 1.35 
 
1.34 0.18 0.95 1.72 
 
1.35 0.16 1.01 1.69 
 
Sad 1.66 0.17 1.3 2.03 
 
1.62 0.14 1.32 1.92 
 
1.56 0.24 1.06 2.06 
 
1.35 0.13 1.06 1.64 
 
Happy 2.29 0.26 1.75 2.84 
 
2.07 0.37 1.28 2.87 
 
3.31 0.25 2.78 3.83 
 
3.22 0.31 2.54 3.89 
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PANAS ratings.  A 4 (Technique; Film, Picture, Recall, News) x 4 (Emotion; 
Anger, Fear, Sad, Happy) repeated measures ANOVA was run for each of the five 
target emotions induced (Anger, Fear, Sad, Happy, Neutral), with Bonferroni 
corrected post-hoc tests (see Figure 2.4). 
Anger Induction.  For the anger emotion induction there was a significant 
main effect of Emotion, F(2.17, 134.34) = 25.14, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .29, no significant main 
effect of Technique, F(3, 62) = 1.79, p = .16, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .08, and no significant interaction 
effect of Emotion x Technique, F(6.50, 134.34) = 1.74, p = .11, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .08.  Pairwise 
comparisons for Emotion show the responses for “anger” were significantly higher 
than for “fear”, p < .01, and “happy”, p < .01, and the responses for “sad” were 
significantly higher than for “fear”, p < .01, and “happy”, p < .01 (no other 
differences were significant, p’s > .05).   
Fear Induction.  For the fear emotion induction there was a significant main 
effect of Emotion, F(2.33, 144.23) = 8.00, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .11, a significant interaction 
effect of Emotion x Technique, F(6.98, 14.23) = 2.63, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .11, and a 
significant main effect of Technique, F(3, 62) = 5.37, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .21.  Pairwise 
comparisons for Technique show recall elicited significantly higher responses 
compared to pictures, p < .01, but no other differences were significant (all p’s > .1).  
Pairwise comparisons for Emotion show significantly higher responses to the sub-
scale “fear” compared to the subscales “anger”, p < .01, and “happy”, p < .05, but 
not “sad”, p = .1.  Responses to the sub-scale “sad” were also significantly greater 
compared to “anger”, p < .01 (no other differences were significant, p’s > .05).  Post-
hoc analyses of the interaction effect revealed that films (M = 3.69, SD = 1.60) and 
recall (M = 3.35, SD = 1.59) induced significantly greater responses to the target sub-
scale, fear, compared to pictures (M = 1.82, SD = .99), p’s < .05.  Films (M = 2.11, SD 
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= 1.04) and pictures (M = 2.11, SD = .96) induced significantly lower responses to the 
non-target subscale sad compared to recall (M = 3.53, SD = 1.84), p’s < .05. 
Sad Induction.  For the sad emotion Induction there was a significant main 
effect of Emotion, F(2.18, 135.37) = 30.47, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .33, no significant main 
effect of Technique, F(3, 62) = 1.90, p = .14, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .08, and no significant interaction 
effect of Emotion x Technique, F(6.55, 135.37) = 1.34, p = .26, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06.  Pairwise 
comparisons for Emotion show the only significant differences were found for the 
sub-scale “sad” whereby responses to all other emotion sub-scales were 
significantly lower (all p’s < .001).  
Happy Induction.  For the happy emotion Induction there was a significant 
main effect of Emotion, F(1.50, 92.76) = 106.60, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .63, a significant main 
effect of Technique, F(3, 62) = 2.98, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .13, but no significant interaction 
effect of Emotion x Technique, F(4.49, 92.76) = 1.34, p = .26, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06.  Pairwise 
comparisons show overall responses in the Recall group were significantly higher 
than those in the Pictures group, p < .05, no other differences for Technique were 
significant (all p’s > .1).  For Emotion responses the only significant differences were 
found for the sub-scale “happy” whereby responses to all other emotion sub-scales 
were significantly lower (all p’s < .001).   
Neutral Induction.  For the neutral emotion Induction there was a 
significant main effect of Emotion, F(1.82, 112.60) = 44.65, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .42, a 
significant interaction effect of Emotion x Technique, F(5.45, 112.60) = 3.28, p < .01, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .14, but no significant main effect of Technique, F(3, 62) = 1.30, p = .28, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.06.  Pairwise comparisons for Emotion show responses were significantly greater 
for the sub-scale “happy” compared to all other emotion sub-scales (all p’s < .001), 
and responses for “sad” were significantly greater compared to “fear”, p < .05, 
however the mean difference in this case was .27 (95% CI [.02, .53]) meaning that 
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participants responses were within half a point on the Likert scale.  No other 
differences were significant (all p’s > .05).  Post-hoc analyses of the interaction 
effect revealed that for the sub-scale happy, recall induced significantly greater 
responses compared to pictures, p < .05. 
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Figure 2.4. Mean responses to emotion sub-scales as a function of technique used, 
for each of the emotions induced (error bars represent standard deviation; 
response scale ranged from 1 to 7).  
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Specificity Analysis  
In order to examine whether target emotions were induced independently 
of the non-target emotions, simple contrasts were run with the target emotions as 
the reference point.  For the neutral induction the reference emotion used was 
happiness.  For the anger inductions simple contrasts showed that overall responses 
to the target emotion were significantly higher than all non-target emotions (all p’s 
< .05), and there was a significant interaction effect of Emotion x Technique for the 
contrast between the target anger and non-target sadness (p < .05) but not with 
fear (p = .05) or happy (p = .42).  Post-hoc analyses show that this difference 
between anger and sad items was only present in the recall group (p < .01).   
Within the fear inductions overall responses to the target emotion were 
significantly higher than all non-target emotions (all p’s < .05).  There was also a 
significant interaction effect of Emotion x Technique for the contrast between the 
target fear and non-targets anger (p < .01) and sadness (p < .01) but not happy (p = 
.23).  Post-hoc analyses show that the target emotion responses were significantly 
higher than responses to anger items within the film group (p < .01) and news group 
(p < .05), and compared to the responses for sad items within the film group (p < 
.01).   
For the sad inductions, again all contrasts with the target emotion and non-
targets were significant (all p’s < .01), and there was a significant interaction effect 
of Emotion x Technique between the target sad and non-target anger (p < .05), but 
no significant interaction for contrasts with fear (p = .11) and happy (p = .15).  Post-
hoc analyses show that this difference between responses for the target sad and 
non-target anger was significant in all technique groups (all p’s < .01).  
For the happy inductions, all contrasts with the target emotion were 
significant (all p’s < .01) but there were no significant interaction effects (all p’s > 
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.10).  With the neutral inductions overall responses to the happy sub-scale were 
significantly higher than all other emotion sub-scales (all p’s < .05).  There was also a 
significant interaction effect of Emotion x Technique for the contrast between 
happy and anger (p < .01) and happy and sadness (p < .05) but not fear (p = .07).  
This difference between responses to happy and anger sub-scales were only 
significant in the recall (p < .01) and news groups (p < .01), and responses to happy 
were greater than sad sub-scales only in the recall (p < .01) and news groups (p < 
.01). 
Self-Report Measures 
In order to examine the relationship between the two different self-report 
measures used in the study we ran bivariate correlations with the reported changes 
in valence and arousal and the reported experiences of each discrete emotion.  
Because the direction of the changes in arousal and valence is important in this 
instance we have used the original data, not the reverse coded data necessary for 
the means comparisons.  The results of the Pearson’s correlations are shown in 
Table 2.4.  
For the arousal scale there was a significant positive relationship between 
expected changes in arousal and reported experiences in target-emotions for fear r 
= .34, p < .05, and anger r = .30, p < .05, however for sad and happy inductions no 
relationships between changes in arousal and target-emotion ratings were 
significant.  Also, no correlations between changes in arousal and non-target 
emotion ratings were significant.  For the measurement of valence, the results show 
significant positive relationships between expected changes in valence and reported 
experiences of the target emotions for anger r = .25, p < .05, sad r = .47, p < .01, and 
happy r = .31, p < .05, inductions.  However, for the fear induction there was no 
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significant relationship between expected changes in valence and reported 
experiences of fear.   
There were a number of significant correlations between expected changes 
in valence and reported experiences of non-target emotions.  For the anger 
induction expected changes in valence were positively correlated with reported 
experiences of sadness r = .28, p < .05, and negatively correlated with reported 
experiences of happiness r = -.31, p < .05.  With the sadness induction expected 
changes in valence were positively correlated with reported experiences of anger r = 
.27, p < .05, and fear r = .28, p < .05.  For the happiness inductions, expected 
changes in valence were negatively correlated with reported experiences of anger r 
= -.29, p < .05, and sadness r = -.31, p < .05.  For the neutral emotion inductions 
there was a negative relationship between expected changes in valence and 
reported experiences of sadness r = -.25, p < .05.  No other correlations with the 
changes in valence were significant.   
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Table 2.4.  Pearson’s correlation between target emotion responses for the PANAS scale and corresponding SAM responses (sig in parentheses) 
   Arousal Changes for Emotion Induced  Valence Changes for Emotion Induced  
Target Emotion: Anger  Fear  Sad  Happy  Anger  Fear  Sad  Happy  
 Anger   .30*  .15  -.09  -.06  -.25*  .08  -.28*  -.31*  
 (.02)  (.22)  (.46)  (.61)  (.04)  (.52)  (.03)  (.01)  
 Fear .17  .34*  -.18  -.14  -.12  -.10  -.22  -.04  
 (.18)  (.01)  (.15)  (.27)  (.34)  (.40)  (.08)  (.72)  
 Sadness -.08  -.06  .02  .19  -.27  -.28*  -.47**  -.16  
 
(.54)  (.65)  (.86)  (.12)  (.03)  (.02)  (.00)  (.20)  
 Happiness -.20  .08  -.01  .10  .29  .06  .31*  .31*  
 (.12)  (.51)  (.94)  (.43)  (.02)  (.65)  (.01)  (.01)  
 Neutral .07  .19  -.15  .14  .11  .03  .25*  .12  
 (.59)  (.13)  (.22)  (.28)  (.38)  (.81)  (.05)  (.35)  
* p < .05    ** p < .01 
- 6
3 - 
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2.3.3 Summary 
This experiment is one of very few to directly compare multiple different 
emotion- and mood-induction techniques across a range of discrete emotions (see 
Martin, 1990; Salas et al., 2012; Westermann et al., 1996).  The results are broken 
down into the intensity of the emotion induced, and the specificity of the induction.  
Overall films and autobiographical recall appear to be the most effective 
techniques, compared to pictures and news reports.   
Comparing the magnitude of changes in valence there were no significant 
differences between the techniques used.  However, the magnitude of changes in 
arousal was greater when film clips were used, compared to news reports.  For 
inductions of fear, films and recall induced greater responses to the congruent 
PANAS sub-scale suggesting a more intense experience compared to pictures, and 
for inductions of happiness, recall induced greater responses to the congruent sub-
scale compared to pictures.  Films and recall also came out as the most effective 
techniques with regards to the specificity of the emotions induced.  For inductions 
of fear, film clips and news reports produced the greatest distinction between the 
experience of the target and non-target emotions, whereas for inductions of anger 
recall produced the greatest distinction.  It should be noted that these results 
should not be used to discredit any of the techniques used, but rather are useful to 
inform researchers looking specifically for a technique that will create the largest 
changes in emotional state, and the most specific inductions.   
Although the specificity analysis shows responses to the target emotion for 
fear inductions were significantly greater than all other responses, within the 
intensity analysis there is evidence that within these same fear inductions the 
responses to the sad sub-scale were significantly greater than to the anger sub-
scale.  Further analysis reveals these responses to the sad sub-scale were greater in 
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the recall group compared to films and pictures.  Although recall was shown to 
produce some of the greatest intensity levels for target emotions the fact that it 
also produces some quite high experiences of non-target emotions brings into 
question whether it is in fact a reliable technique.  Autobiographical recall 
techniques allow participants to tap into real experiences of emotion and re-
experience them in the moment, however this also means there is little control over 
what events are used to elicit the emotion and thus it is likely other emotional 
experiences will also be re-established. 
 Comparing the techniques was the primary goal of this experiment however 
there are also interesting comparisons to be made between the inductions of the 
emotions themselves.  On average, inductions of happiness and sadness were much 
more successful at inducing the specific emotion without also inducing non-target 
emotions.  Although the specificity analysis shows responses to the congruent sub-
scales for inductions of fear and anger were significantly greater than responses to 
non-target sub-scales, the intensity analysis showed that response to the non-target 
sub-scale sad were, in both cases, also significantly greater than other sub-scales.  In 
addition, the changes in valence for happy and sad inductions were significantly 
greater than anger and sad, suggesting more intense experiences of these emotions.  
As a comparison group many studies use a neutral induction in their design 
(e.g. Knott & Thorley, 2013) however the results of this study highlight the need for 
clarity when opting for this induction.  Changes in arousal and valence for the 
neutral induction were expected to be minimal however for arousal the changes 
were greater for the neutral inductions compared to the sad inductions.  In addition, 
ratings on the emotion sub-scales were significantly higher for the happy scale 
compared to all other scales, and significantly greater for the sad scale compared to 
fear.  Further analysis of the happiness ratings showed they were greater in the 
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recall group compared to the pictures group.  These results highlight the ambiguity 
that comes with a neutral condition.  The term neutral may be used to describe a 
range of emotion and mood states simulating happiness, contentment, and 
boredom (to name just a few).  Thus, when employing a neutral condition 
researchers should be wary to clarify its exact nature. 
An additional purpose of this experiment was to use two very different but 
effective measurement scales in order to aid comparisons between studies.  As a 
result of this manipulation the relationship between the scales could be evaluated.  
All correlations were in the expected direction showing no immediate concerns with 
either scale.  The changes in valence corresponded well to the target emotion 
responses for the PANAS scales, with the exception of the fear induction.  There is a 
lot of variability within the intensity of the PANAS scores for fear between the 
different techniques.  This alongside the fairly small changes in valence may account 
for the lack of an overall correlation.  In addition, there was no significant 
relationship between the changes in arousal and the reported experiences of 
sadness and happiness.  Given that noticeable changes in arousal for the sad 
inductions are not likely this may contribute to a non-significant relationship with 
subjective experiences of the emotion, however the same cannot be said for happy 
inductions.  The most likely explanation amounts to the definition of happy.  Like 
with the neutral inductions, the term can be used to describe a range of positive 
emotions.  The variation in arousal among these possible emotional states may have 
created additional noise in the data.  
It is also necessary to take caution when evaluating the SAM results since 
the variation within participants was quite high, and calculating changes in valence 
and arousal does not account for the possibility that participants’ emotional states 
may have been similar to the target emotion prior to the induction.  Researchers 
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may benefit from using the raw responses from SAM scales, especially when 
comparing between participants, since these nevertheless indicate the current 
emotional state of the participant. 
2.4 Conclusions 
This research examined in this chapter focusses on the use of various 
emotion induction techniques and experimental evidence is presented supporting 
the use of the different methods, whilst also highlighting important considerations.  
Emotion inductions are used frequently in psychology research (Coan & Allen, 2007) 
and yet it is difficult to know which techniques will give the best results.  The study 
presented in this chapter expanded on previous research (e.g. Ellard et al., 2012; 
Kučera & Haviger, 2012; Salas et al., 2012) by examining a range of discrete 
emotions along with a range of induction techniques.   
In the introduction EITs were considered in three categories: audio-visual 
stimuli, internally generated experiences, and interactive manipulations.  Although 
interactive manipulations have been shown to be highly effective at inducing 
ecologically valid and intense emotional experiences (Kučera & Haviger, 2012; 
Lobbestael et al., 2008; Roberts et al., 2007) the ethical and practical limitations of 
such methods reduce their suitability for many experiments, and as such 
Experiment 1 focused only on comparing different presentations of audio-visual 
stimuli and autobiographical recall.  
Autobiographical recall was shown to be one of the better techniques 
reviewed.  The key advantages to this technique being the ecological validity of the 
emotions experienced.  The emotions elicited are based on real-life experiences of 
the participant, levels of personal relevance are therefore very high which increases 
the strength of emotional experiences (Ellard et al., 2012).  However, there is 
limited experimental control over what specific experiences are recalled, and with 
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everyday emotional events there is often a cocktail of emotions induced thus 
compromising the specificity of the target emotion.  
In terms of audio-visual stimuli it appears film clips may be the most 
effective technique.  From a practical standpoint there are various normed film sets 
available to choose from, covering a wide range of emotions (Bartolini, 2011; Gross 
& Levenson, 1995; Johnathan Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007; Schaefer et al., 2010).  
These film clips (all spoken in English) have even been shown to be effective with 
non-native English speakers (e.g. Hagemann et al., 1999).  Experiment 1 also 
suggests that film clips are a more effective technique than pictures.  The intensity 
and specificity of emotions induced appears to be greater for film clips, possibly due 
to their more immersive nature, and the variations within the picture slideshows.  It 
was hypothesized that the diversity gained though using multiple images would 
increase the generalizability of the inductions and therefore increase the overall 
effectiveness, however, this was not supported.  News reports as an induction 
technique shows potential however further work developing the stimuli is needed.  
In Experiment 1 news reports, as with all the techniques used, elicited the expected 
responses in each emotion induction, however the intensities were relatively low.  
To increase the effectiveness of this method the reports would need to be tailored 
more to the target emotions.  It may also be worth using video clips in place of 
written reports, however this limits the researcher’s future ability to edit and tailor 
the information included. 
As well as the varying efficiency of the techniques there are also differences 
in the ease at which certain emotions can be induced.  Experiment 1 revealed much 
more effective inductions of sadness and happiness compared to fear and anger.  
Sadness and happiness, although distinctively negative and positive, can be used to 
describe many more variations in emotional state than fear and anger.  This 
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generalisation may increase the likelihood of participants reporting experiencing 
them.  It may also be that within a controlled experimental environment these 
emotions are easier to elicit.   
Coppin and Sander (2016) reviewed theoretical approaches to emotion and 
consider the view that emotions are a multicomponent phenomenon, composed of 
expression, action tendency, bodily reaction, feeling, and cognitive appraisals.  
Several of these components relate to a response motivated by the emotion 
however, if the responses in a laboratory are inhibited or suppressed, the subjective 
experience of the emotion may also be reduced.  Fear, and sometimes anger, is 
predominantly associated with immediate behavioral responses to a threat, 
whereas happiness and sadness are associated with more measured, long-term 
motivations, by which associated information cumulates to guide future behaviour.  
In a laboratory environment, inductions of fear and anger have no real purpose, no 
action to guide, and therefore the subjective experience may be automatically 
down-regulated. 
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Chapter 3 
Emotion-Congruent Spontaneous False Memories 
3.1 Overview 
 Research into the effects of emotion on spontaneous false memory 
production has so far been limited to generic moods.  Often this generalisation 
comes about by focussing emotion manipulations on changes in arousal and 
valence.  Arousal and valence are important dimensions of emotions and can 
account for many of the effects emotion has on cognitive functions.  However, they 
are not all encompassing as there is more to emotional experiences than these two 
dimensions.  Emotions are led by appraisals and as such the distinct motivations 
associated with discrete emotions also affect cognitive resources, such as attention 
and memory.  In this chapter, literature on emotion and spontaneous false 
memories is reviewed, and two experiments are presented, in which the effect of 
discrete negative emotions on false memory production is examined.  First, by 
manipulating and comparing sadness and fear, two discrete negative emotions with 
similar valence levels but different arousal levels, and second with anger and fear, 
two discrete negative emotions with similar levels of both valence and arousal.  The 
subsequent results provide evidence for discrete emotion-congruent spontaneous 
false memories, irrespective of arousal and valence. 
3.2 Introduction 
Spontaneous false memory production is enhanced for mood-congruent 
stimuli.  Ruci, Tomes, and Zelenski (2009) investigated the effect of positive and 
negative valence on spontaneous false memory production for positive, negative, 
and neutral stimuli.  The authors predicted that manipulating both the mood of 
participants and the emotion of the material would induce a mood congruence 
effect in memory.  The recognition results supported this prediction.  False memory 
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production was enhanced for emotional material that matched the emotional state 
of the participant at encoding.  This finding was replicated by Knott and Thorley 
(2013) who in addition, showed that mood-congruent false memories persisted over 
a one week delay, while incongruent and neutral false memories did not.  
The focus of these studies was on differences in valence, whereas other 
research has shown that the level of arousal associated with emotions is another 
important factor to consider.  In fact, valence and arousal have been shown to have 
very different effects on false memories.  For example, Brainerd, Holliday, Reyna, 
Yang, and Toglia (2010) measured the effects of arousal and valence when varied 
orthogonally across materials.  False memory rates were found to be higher for low 
valence and high arousal, however the effects of arousal were only present for 
negatively valenced material (Steinmetz, Addis, & Kensinger, 2010).  In contrast, 
Corson and Verrier (2007) examined the effects of arousal and valence on false 
memory by inducing a range of discrete emotional states.  A temporary mood 
induction technique was used to induce happiness, serenity, anger, and sadness; 
chosen to give distinctions between high and low arousal, and positive and negative 
valence.  False memories were measured for neutral stimuli and the results revealed 
that high arousal led to more false memories, but there was no effect for valence.  
The authors concluded that higher arousal increased confidence leading to an 
increase in the number of false memories being reported.  Although this research 
goes to furthering our understanding of how arousal and valence affect false 
memory production, it fails to address any other dimensions of emotion that may 
also have an effect on false memory production.  
In a review of the emotion and memory research literature, Levine and 
Pizarro (2004) argued that it made little sense to limit research to the effects of 
emotional arousal on memory, stating that people may feel elated, terrified, 
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despairing, or furious – but they are never just “aroused”.  Many cognitive theories 
of emotion stress the importance of appraisals.  Emotions help people evaluate 
their environment based on their specific goals and guide appropriate action (Frijda, 
1988; Moors et al., 2013).  This aspect of emotion cannot be explained in terms of 
arousal and valence and thus for a complete understanding of the effects of 
emotion we need to look beyond these effects.   
Lench, Flores, and Bench (2011) conducted a meta-analysis of studies using 
discrete emotions as the independent variable and evaluated the range of results 
according to different models of emotion; specifically models of the effect emotion 
has on cognition, behaviour.  The effects of each of the discrete emotions reviewed 
gave conflicting evidence for dimensional models, such as valence and arousal.  
Although the results of the meta-analysis are restricted by the selection criteria, the 
authors present evidence in favour of evaluating discrete emotions rather than 
focusing on dimensional differences.   
Research has recently shown how important specific emotional states may 
be in false memory.  Although caution is appropriate when generalising from 
psychopathology to everyday emotional experiences, Howe and Malone (2011) 
showed specific emotion congruent effects for false memories in individuals 
diagnosed with a major depressive disorder (Moritz et al., 2005).  Howe and Malone 
(2011) warned clinical practitioners, during discussions in therapy, not only to be 
aware of the presence of false memories, but also of the possibility of inducing new 
false memories.  This paper raises an interesting question of whether this 
congruency effect is also present within typical everyday emotional experiences, 
and highlights the importance of understanding what effect discrete emotional 
states have on memory production.  
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In addition, the effect of emotion on false memory production has practical 
implications for scenarios in which memory accuracy is questioned.  In many legal 
trials memory serves as the only source of evidence.  If an eyewitness’ memory is 
biased towards information deemed most appropriate according to their emotional 
state then it is important to understand to what extent this effect occurs and, more 
so, to what extent this biasing effects the production of false memories.  The aim of 
this chapter is therefore to expand on the work of Ruci et al. (2009) and Knott and 
Thorley (2013), by manipulating and comparing distinct negative emotions, to 
investigate whether there is a discrete emotion-congruency effect with 
spontaneous false memories.   
3.2.1 Theoretical considerations 
According to theories of spreading activation such as associative activation 
theory (AAT; Howe et al., 2009) and Bower’s Network Theory of Affect (Bower, 
1981) we would expect to see an increase in the production of false memories for 
material that is emotionally congruent to that of the participant.  AAT hypothesizes 
that knowledge is stored in a semantic network and when a concept is activated, 
this activation spreads to other neighbouring concepts.  Once activation reaches a 
threshold the source of this activation can be misattributed to the original stimulus, 
subsequently producing a false memory.  Bower’s Network Theory of Affect 
similarly suggests that emotion concepts and memories are interconnected and so 
when an emotion is experienced there is an automatic activation of events in 
memory related to that emotion (and vice versa).  Consequently, as discrete 
emotions activate associated concepts and related emotional experiences we would 
expect to see an increase in false memories produced as the thresholds are more 
likely to be reached.  These theories are also consistent with appraisal theories of 
emotions.  Cognitive processing is enhanced for information relevant to a person’s 
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emotional state (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 2014) therefore relevant information is 
more readily activated and related false memories are more likely to be produced.   
Fuzzy-trace theory (FTT; Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2016) would also predict 
these effects.  FTT states that at encoding both verbatim and gist memory traces are 
stored, and that as verbatim traces deteriorate gist traces are more readily available 
and therefore lead to the retrieval of false memories.  These gist traces contain 
semantic information associated with the remembered stimuli as well as the 
emotional state and therefore would lead to an increase in false recognition of 
emotionally congruent information.  
3.2.2. Experimental Paradigm 
As with many of the experiments mentioned in this chapter, the following 
experiments measured false memories using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott 
paradigm (DRM; Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995).   The DRM paradigm 
(explained in full in Chapter 1) is a popular procedure used to study the 
spontaneous creation of false memories.  DRM word lists are typically 10-15 words 
in length, and are arranged in descending order of associative strength to one non-
presented word, known as the critical lure. 
The presence of these critical lures in memory is measured via a recognition 
test, following a distractor task.  In order to further validate the false memories 
reported the following experiments also measure recollective experience.  
Specifically, upon reporting that they recognise a word as being presented in the 
original lists, participants are asked to give a remember-know-guess judgement; 
where ‘remember’ measures the presence of a distinctive recollective experience, 
‘know’ measures a sense of familiarity, and ‘guess’ measures a level of uncertainty. 
In order to experimentally induce the discrete emotions prior to encoding 
the participants are shown short film clips, taken from Rottenberg et al. (2007).  
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Previous emotion-congruent false memory studies have successfully used this 
technique (Knott & Thorley, 2013; Ruci et al., 2009).  In Chapter 2 it was argued that 
autobiographical recall would produce stronger emotional experiences.  However, 
for the following experiments, the use of this technique would confound the 
memory results for the emotion list words, thus film clips are used to induce the 
desired emotions.  The same can be said for the more descriptive self-report scales, 
for example the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988), therefore the self-assessment manikin (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994) 
is used to get self-report measures of arousal and valence throughout the 
experiments.  
Finally, as a comparison group to the experimental negative-emotion groups 
the experiments employ a control group where no emotion manipulation is used.  
Typically, control groups display quite a positive affective state (Diener & Diener, 
1996), and as such there are advantages to controlling the emotional state by 
presenting a neutral emotion induction.  However, there is also much controversy 
over what constitutes a neutral emotion.  In Chapter 2 the issues with defining 
neutral emotion were discussed, and the possible variations from boredom-like to 
happy-like emotional states were highlighted as a key consideration.  In addition, 
the intent is to conduct comparisons between the experimental negative emotion 
groups and a true control group, therefore no emotion induction is used.  
3.3. Experiment 2: 
Emotion Congruent DRM False Memories with Fear and Sadness 
Experiment 2 was designed to investigate the emotion congruency effect, 
which is well established in false memory literature with generic emotional 
inductions (e.g., negative).  Rather than use a non-specific negative mood induction, 
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two negative emotions, fear and sadness, were manipulated.  It was predicted that 
the emotion congruency effect would extend to these specific negative emotions. 
3.3.1. Method 
Participants 
A total of 74 University students (31 male) participated voluntarily in the 
experiment and were awarded course credits for their time.  All participants were 
between the ages of 18 and 35 (M = 24.30, SD = 4.89) and were enrolled on either 
an undergraduate or postgraduate course at City, University of London.   
Design 
A 3 (Emotion: sad, fear, control) x 3 (List: sad, fear, neutral) mixed design 
was used with a standard DRM paradigm, and a recognition memory test as the 
dependent variable.  Emotion group was the between group variable for which 
participants were randomly assigned, and List was the within group variable.  
Recognition responses were taken for target words, filler items, and critical lures.  A 
post-hoc measure of recollective experience was taken whereby participants were 
asked if ‘old’ responses were based on either remember, know, or guess 
judgements; where ‘remember’ measures the presence of a distinctive recollective 
experience, ‘know’ measures a sense of familiarity, and ‘guess’ measures a level of 
uncertainty.  Instructions were based on those from (Rajaram, 1993). 
Materials 
For the emotion inductions short film clips were taken from Rottenberg et 
al. (2007), and the control group underwent no induction procedure.  The film clips 
were chosen because they have been normed previously and elicited the highest 
levels of the desired emotion, as well as being specific to that emotion.  The clip for 
the sad induction was from “The Champ” in which a boy cries out as he watches his 
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father die.  The clip for the fear induction was from “Silence of the Lambs” in which 
a woman is pursuing a killer through a dark basement.   
Since only the effects of emotion at encoding were of interest in this study, 
prior to retrieval all participants watched a short clip from a nature documentary.  
This ensured that all participants were in a comparable, somewhat neutral, 
emotional state at retrieval.  To monitor emotional states throughout the 
experiment the SAM was used to get self-report measures of arousal and valence.  
As noted, this questionnaire uses pictorial representations of arousal and valence 
alongside a 9-point scale thus enabling us to get a measure of these two dimensions 
without confounding the memory results by introducing emotion words; we 
especially wanted to avoid using the critical lures. 
For the to-be-remembered stimuli, nine 12-item DRM lists were created 
from the University of South Florida free association norms (Nelson, McEvoy, & 
Schreiber, 2004; Roediger & McDermott, 1995).  Of these lists, three were 
associated with sadness, three with fear, and three were neutral (i.e. not related to 
an emotion).  The critical lures for the lists were sad, upset, sorrow, fear, scared, 
danger, needle, cup, and slow (full lists in Appendix C).  The list presentation order 
was randomised, average backward associative strength (BAS)6 was matched 
between the negative lists but was slightly higher for neutral lists, and arousal and 
valence scores were taken for the list words in each list7 (see Table 3.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 BAS is taken from the University of South Florida free association norms website 
(Nelson et al., 2004) and represents the rate at which a list word associates to the lure. 
7
 Arousal and valence scores for each word is taken from the database of Affective Norms for 
English Words (Bradley & Lang, 1999). 
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Table 3.1:  Average BAS, arousal, and valence scores for fear, sad, and neutral 
DRM lists. 
  
 BAS 
 
Arousal 
 
Valence  
  
 M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD  
List:  
        
 
 
Neutral  .21 .19 
 
4.91 1.25 
 
5.24 2.15  
 
Fear  .10 .15 
 
5.29 1.07 
 
5.27 1.93  
 
Sad  .12 .14 
 
4.96 1.23 
 
4.60 1.89  
 
Procedure 
After giving written and verbal consent all participants were given a SAM to 
complete.  Comprehensive instructions were given initially to ensure full 
understanding of the scales, and subsequent SAMs were then accompanied with 
basic instructions in order to avoid too long a delay between the emotion inductions 
and encoding.  Participants in the sad and fear emotion groups were instructed to 
watch the corresponding film clips, and were then given another SAM.  All 
participants were then instructed to listen carefully to the nine DRM lists, presented 
in auditory form with 1 second between each spoken word, and were aware they 
would be tested on their memory of the words later.  The neutral film clip was then 
presented, acting as a distractor task in addition to the emotion induction, and was 
followed by a final SAM.  Last, instructions for the memory test were given.  Here, 
participants were asked to decide if they recognised each word presented to them 
as being in the original lists by responding to the words as ‘old’ or ‘new’.  Once done 
for all the words, if participants recognised a word as ‘old’ they were then asked 
whether this decision was based on remember, know, or guess judgements 
(remember meaning they experienced a memory of the word, know meaning the 
word feels familiar but they do not have the explicit memory of it, and guess 
meaning they are just guessing that it was presented). 
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3.3.2. Results  
Of the original 74 participants, 9 were removed due to missing data, and 3 
were removed because their valence scores increased following the emotion 
induction procedure, leaving 21 in the control group, 23 in the sad group, and 18 in 
fear group.  Post hoc power analyses were conducted showing that for an 80% 
chance of finding a medium effect size with an alpha of .05 we needed 90 
participants. 
Emotion Manipulation  
At the beginning of the experiment no significant differences were found 
between the groups for arousal, F(2, 61) = .92, p = .40, or valence, F(2, 61) = .98, p = 
.38.  Following the emotion induction the differences between groups were 
significant for arousal F(2, 61) = 11.69, p < .01, and valence, F(2, 61) = 17.91, p < .01.  
Pairwise-comparisons, with a Bonferroni adjustment, showed that arousal scores 
within the fear group (M = 6.44, SD = 1.82, 95% CI [5.54, 7.35]) were significantly 
higher than the sad group (M=3.87, SD=1.79, 95% CI [3.90, 4.64]) and control group 
(M=4.62, SD=1.53, 95% CI [3.92, .32]); however, the difference between the sad and 
control groups was not significant.  The valence scores were significantly lower 
within the sad group (M=3.21, SD=1.48, 95% CI [2.58, 3.86]) and fear group 
(M=4.06, SD=1.63, 95% CI [3.24, 4.86]) compared to the control group (M=5.95, 
SD=1.53, 95% CI [5.25, 6.65]); however, the difference between the sad and fear 
groups was not significant.  These results validate the emotion induction procedure 
as they confirm the expected changes in arousal and valence for the desired 
emotions.  Fear is considered to be negative valence and high arousal emotion, 
whereas sadness is negative valence and low arousal. Thus, it was expected that the 
valence scores between the groups would not differ but the arousal would.  In line 
with this we also expected the arousal between sad and control not to differ 
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significantly.  Following presentation of the neutral clip (at retrieval) there were 
again no significant differences between groups for arousal, F(2, 61) = .09, p = .91, 
or valence, F(2, 61) = .25, p = .78. 
Recognition Responses 
The proportion of correct recognition of old words, false recognition of 
critical lures, and false recognition of filler words were coded.  Separate 3 (Emotion: 
fear, sad, control) x 3 (List: fear, sad, neutral) repeated measures ANOVAs were 
conducted for true and false recognition responses, as well as for remember, know, 
and guess responses.  Where the assumption of sphericity was violated the 
Greenhouse-Geisser statistics are reported, and all post-hoc tests were run with a 
Bonferroni correction. 
False recognition of critical lures.  For false recognition of critical lures (see 
Table 3.2 for descriptive statistics) there was a significant main effect of List, F(1.61, 
95.35) = 18.54, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .24, but not Emotion, F(2, 59) = .36, p = .69,  𝜂𝑝
2   = .01, or 
List x Emotion interaction, F(3.23, 95.35) = .39, p = .78, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01 (Figure 3.1).  
Pairwise comparisons for the main effect of List showed that recognition of fear 
related critical lures (M = .93, SD = .18) was significantly higher than sad (M = .85, SD 
= .18), p < .01, and neutral lists (M = .70, SD = .30), p < .01, and that recognition of 
sad related critical lures was significantly higher than neutral, p < .01.  In contrast to 
what was hypothesised, these results show no indication of a discrete emotion-
congruent effect on false memory production.  
For remember recognition of critical lures (Figure 3.2) there was a significant 
main effect of List, F(2, 118) = 4.04, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06, but again no significant effect 
of Emotion, F(2, 59) = .48, p = .62, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .02, and no interaction effect of List x 
Emotion, F(4, 118) = 1.35, p = .26, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04 (Figure 3.2).  Pairwise comparisons for 
List showed that recognition of fear critical lures (M = .41, SD = .39) was significantly 
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greater than sad (M = .27, SD = .31), p < .05.  The difference between neutral critical 
lures (M = .32, SD = .26) and fear was not significant however, p = .29, nor was the 
difference between neutral and sad, p = .77.   
For know recognition of critical lures there was a significant main effect of 
List, F(2, 118) = 3.52, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06, but no significant effect of Emotion, F(2, 59) = 
.20, p = .82, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, and no interaction effect of List x Emotion, F(4, 118) = .96, p = 
.43, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03.  Pairwise comparisons for List reveal that responses to sad critical lures 
(M = .32, SD = .23) were significantly greater than neutral critical lures (M = .20, SD = 
.24), p < .05, but that no other differences were significant (all p’s > .05).  For guess 
recognition of critical lures there was no significant main effect of List, F(2, 118) = 
1.16, p = .32, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, no significant effect of Emotion, F(2, 59) = 1.63, p = .20, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.05, and no interaction effect of List x Emotion, F(4, 118) = 1.01, p = .41, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03.   
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Table 3.2: False recognition responses to critical lures as a function of emotion and list  
  Fear Group  Sad Group  Control Group 
    95% CI    95% CI    95% CI 
  M SE LL UL  M SE LL UL  M SE LL UL 
Overall Recognition               
 Fear lists .94 .06 .83 1.06   .91 .04 .84 .99   .94 .03 .88 1.00 
 Sad lists .83 .04 .75 .92   .84 .04 .76 .93   .87 .04 .80 .95 
 Neutral lists .76 .06 .62 .90   .67 .06 .54 .80   .70 .07 .56 .84 
Remember                
 Fear lists .54 .09 .34 .74   .35 .08 .19 .51   .38 .09 .20 .56 
 Sad lists .24 .08 .08 .40   .35 .06 .22 .47   .21 .07 .06 .35 
 Neutral lists .31 .06 .18 .45   .33 .05 .23 .44   .32 .06 .19 .45 
Know                
 Fear lists .22 .06 .10 .35   .33 .07 .19 .48   .29 .06 .17 .41 
 Sad lists .39 .06 .26 .52   .30 .05 .21 .40   .29 .05 .19 .39 
 Neutral lists .24 .05 .13 .35   .19 .05 .08 .29   .19 .06 .07 .31 
Guess                
 Fear lists .19 .07 .04 .33   .23 .06 .10 .37   .22 .07 .08 .36 
 Sad lists .20 .07 .05 .36   .19 .05 .07 .30   .38 .07 .23 .53 
 Neutral lists .20 .07 .06 .34   .14 .04 .07 .22   .19 .05 .09 .29 
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Figure 3.1. Proportion of ‘old’ responses to critical lures as a function of emotion 
group and list emotion (Error bars represent SE) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Proportion of ‘remember’ responses to critical lures as a function of 
emotion group and list emotion (Error bars represent SE) 
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True recognition of list items.  For true recognition responses (see Table 3.3 
for descriptive statistics) there was a significant effect of List, F(1.80, 106.40) = 
9.615, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .14, but not Emotion, F(2, 59) = 2.33, p = .11, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .07, or List x 
Emotion interaction, F(3.61, 106.40) = .32, p = .85, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01.  Pairwise comparisons 
for List show recognition of fear related list items (M = .79, SD = .17) was 
significantly higher than neutral (M = .68, SD = .21), p < .01, and that recognition of 
sad related list items (M = .79, SD = .19) was significantly higher than neutral, p < 
.01.  The difference between fear and sad was not significant, p = 1.00.  For 
remember responses to list items there was no significant effect of List, F(2, 118) = 
1.37, p = .26, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, Emotion, F(2, 59) = 1.32, p = .28, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, or List x Emotion 
interaction, F(4, 118) = .11, p = .98, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00.  Again, there is no apparent effect of 
the emotion manipulation. 
For know responses to list items there was a significant effect of List, F(1.70, 
99.90) = 17.52, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .23, but not of Emotion, F(2, 59) = .19, p = .82, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, 
or List x Emotion interaction, F(3.39, 99.90) = .37, p = .80, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01.  Pairwise 
comparisons for List show that fear related list items (M = .25, SD = .16) were 
significantly higher than sad related list items (M = .17, SD = .15), p < .05, and 
neutral (M = .11, SD = .11), p < .05, and that sad related list items were significantly 
higher than neutral, p < .05.  For guess responses to list items there was no 
significant effect of List, F(2, 118) = 2.40, p = .10, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, Emotion, F(2, 59) = .05, p 
= .96, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, or List x Emotion interaction, F(4, 118) = .18, p = .95, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01.   
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Table 3.3: Recognition responses to target items as a function of emotion and list  
  Fear Group  Sad Group  Control Group 
    95% CI    95% CI    95% CI 
  M SE LL UL  M SE LL UL  M SE LL UL 
Overall Recognition               
 Fear lists .83 .04 .76 .91  .81 .04 .72 .89  .73 .04 .64 .82 
 Sad lists .83 .03 .76 .90  .79 .03 .72 .86  .75 .05 .66 .85 
 Neutral lists .70 .05 .60 .81  .72 .04 .63 .81  .61 .05 .51 .72 
Remember                
 Fear lists .40 .06 .27 .52  .38 .05 .28 .48  .32 .05 .22 .42 
 Sad lists .35 .05 .24 .45  .31 .04 .22 .40  .30 .06 .18 .42 
 Neutral lists .41 .05 .30 .53  .40 .05 .29 .51  .33 .04 .25 .41 
Know                
 Fear lists .17 .03 .11 .24  .19 .04 .11 .26  .16 .04 .08 .24 
 Sad lists .28 .03 .21 .34  .25 .03 .18 .32  .23 .04 .15 .31 
 Neutral lists .10 .02 .06 .14  .11 .02 .06 .16  .12 .03 .06 .17 
Guess                
 Fear lists .27 .04 .18 .35  .24 .04 .15 .33  .25 .04 .16 .35 
 Sad lists .20 .04 .11 .29  .21 .03 .15 .28  .21 .05 .10 .31 
 Neutral lists .19 .03 .12 .26  .21 .04 .13 .28  .17 .04 .09 .25 
- 8
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It is interesting that although no emotion-congruency effects emerged in the old or 
remember response data there is evidence here within the know responses of a 
generic emotion-congruency effect.  Participants in each of the negative emotion 
groups reported knowing that significantly more of the negative list items had been 
presented compared to the neutral items.  
False recognition of filler items.  For false recognition of negative and 
neutral fillers (see Table 3.4 for descriptive statistics) there was a significant effect 
of List, F(1, 59) = 84.16, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .59, but not Emotion, F(2, 59) = 2.03, p = .14, 𝜂𝑝
2 
= .06, or List x Emotion interaction, F(2, 59) = 2.46, p = .09, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .08.  For remember 
responses there was a significant effect of List, F(1, 59) = 11.13, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .16, but 
not Emotion, F(2, 59) = 1.08, p = .35, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, or List x Emotion interaction, F(2, 59) = 
.30, p = .75, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01.  For know responses there was a significant effect of List, F(1, 
59) = 33.24, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .37, Emotion, F(2, 59) = 3.63, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .11, and List x 
Emotion interaction, F(2, 59) = 3.69, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .11.  For guess responses there was 
a significant effect of List, F(1, 59) = 13.45, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .19, but not Emotion, F(2, 
59) = .08, p = .92, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, or List x Emotion interaction, F(2, 59) = .09, p = .91, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.03.  For all main effects of List (Table 3.5) the responses were greater for negative 
lists compared to neutral lists (all p’s < .05).   
Negative valence has been shown to increase response bias (Howe et al., 
2010) and thus is it expected that responses to negative filler items would be higher 
than neutral.  The increased semantic density between emotional stimuli has been 
shown to account for many of the effects of emotion on sensitivity and memory 
accuracy (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Windmann & Kutas, 2001), and may account for 
the increased responding to filler items.  The same, however, could also be said for 
responses to the critical lures, and therefore signal detection analysis was 
conducted.  
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Table 3.4: Recognition responses to filler items as a function of emotion and list  
  Fear Group  Sad Group  Control Group 
    95% CI    95% CI    95% CI 
  M SE LL UL  M SE LL UL  M SE LL UL 
Overall Recognition               
 Negative lists .66 .04 .58 .74  .54 .05 .43 .65  .46 .04 .38 .53 
 Neutral lists .30 .06 .17 .42  .27 .05 .17 .37  .26 .05 .16 .36 
Remember                
 Negative lists .15 .04 .06 .24  .13 .03 .06 .19  .08 .02 .03 .14 
 Neutral lists .06 .02 .01 .11  .05 .02 .01 .10  .04 .02 -.01 .08 
Know                
 Negative lists .23 .04 .15 .31  .14 .03 .08 .20  .10 .02 .04 .15 
 Neutral lists .04 .02 .00 .08  .05 .02 .02 .09  .03 .01 .01 .06 
Guess                
 Negative lists .28 .05 .19 .38  .28 .04 .20 .35  .28 .03 .20 .35 
 Neutral lists .19 .05 .09 .29  .16 .03 .09 .24  .19 .05 .09 .29 
- 8
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Table 3.5: Main effect of List for filler recognition responses 
  Negative List  Neutral List  
  M SD  M SD  
Measurement:       
 Old .55 .22  .27 .23  
 Remember .12 .15  .05 .10  
 Know .15 .15  .04 .07  
 Guess .28 .17  .18 .19  
 
Signal Detection Analysis 
False memory data.  Signal detection (d’ and criterion C) analysis (Stanislaw 
& Todorov, 1999) for false memories was conducted by comparing responses for 
fear and sad related critical lures against responses to negative filler items, and for 
neutral related critical lures to neutral filler items.  These scores were then entered 
into the same ANOVAs as above.   
Sensitivity analysis.  The d’ scores for overall false recognition responses 
yielded no significant main effect of List, F (1.51, 89.10) = 2.78, p = .08, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .05, 
Emotion, F(2, 59) = 1.94, p = .15, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06, or List x Emotion interaction, F(3.02, 
89.10) = 1.59, p = .20, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .05.  For remember responses there was a significant 
main effect of List, F(2, 118) = 4.28, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .07, but no significant effect of 
Emotion, F(2, 59) = .08, p = .92, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, and no interaction effect of List x Emotion, 
F(4, 118) = 1.29, p = .28, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04.  Pairwise comparisons for List show scores for the 
fear lists (M = .77, SD = .34) were significantly greater than the sad lists (M = .65, SD 
= .23), p < .05, as were scores for the neutral lists (M = .76, SD = .25), p < .05.  The 
difference in scores between the fear and neutral lists was not significant, p = 1.00.  
For know responses there was no significant main effect of List, F(1.77, 104.49) = 
.44, p = .62, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, Emotion, F(2, 59) = 1.18, p = .32, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, or List x Emotion 
interaction, F(2, 104.49) = .38, p = .80, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01. For d’ scores of guess responses 
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there was also no significant main effect of List, F(2, 118) = .54, p = .58, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, 
Emotion, F(2, 59) = 1.32, p = .28, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, or List x Emotion interaction, F(4, 118) = 
.99, p = .42, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03.   
These analyses suggest that in most cases, sensitivity to critical lures was 
similar across List and between the Emotion groups.  The exception to this, in the 
remember data, indicates a lower sensitivity for sad lists.  The scores themselves 
however were moderately high and so although sensitivity is lower it is of little 
concern since we can conclude participants were more selective for critical lures 
than filler items.  This difference is also expected since there were fewer responses 
to sad related critical lures compared to fear (see Figure 3.2) while the filler items 
are the same for the two negative lists. 
Response bias analysis.  The criterion C scores for overall false recognition 
responses showed a significant main effect of List, F (1.37, 80.91) = 56.24, p < .001 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .49, no significant main effect of Emotion, F(2, 59) = 1.28, p = .29, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, and 
no significant List x Emotion interaction, F(2.74, 80.91) = .08, p = 1.00, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00.  For 
List, pairwise comparisons show that criterion C was significantly higher for neutral 
lists (M = 1.00, SD = .15) compared to sad lists (M = .84, SD = .11), p < .001, and fear 
lists (M = .82, SD = .11), p < .001, and significantly higher for sad lists compared to 
fear lists, p < .05.  For remember responses there was a significant main effect of 
List, F(2, 118) = 4.01, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06, but no significant effect of Emotion, F(2, 59) = 
1.05, p = .37, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, and no interaction effect of List x Emotion, F(4, 118) = 1.29, p 
= .28, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04.  Pairwise comparisons for List show scores for the sad lists (M = 1.23, 
SD = .18) were significantly higher than fear lists (M = 1.17, SD = .17), p < .05, but the 
difference between neutral lists (M = 1.22, SD = .12) and fear lists was not 
significant, p = .07, neither was the difference between neutral and sad lists, p = 
1.00.   
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For know responses there was a significant main effect of List, F(2, 118) = 
12.67, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .18, no significant main effect of Emotion, F(2, 59) = 2.00, p = 
.15, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06, and no significant List x Emotion interaction, F(4, 118) = .82, p = .51, 𝜂𝑝
2 
= .03.  Pairwise comparisons for the main effect of List show criterion C scores were 
significantly higher for neutral lists (M = 1.28, SD = .11) compared to fear lists (M = 
1.20, SD = .12), p < .01, and sad lists (M = 1.18, SD = .13), p < .01.  The difference 
between sad and fear list was not significant, p = .61.  For guess responses there 
was also a significant main effect of List, F(2, 118) = 3.58, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06, but not a 
significant main effect of Emotion, F(2, 59) = .86, p = .43, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, or List x Emotion 
interaction, F(4, 118) = .77, p = .55, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03.  Pairwise comparisons show criterion C 
scores were higher for neutral lists (M = 1.24, SD = .15) compared to sad lists (M = 
1.17, SD = .17) but the difference was not significant, p = .06.  The differences were 
also not significant between neutral lists and fear lists (M = 1.19, SD = .15), p = .23, 
and between sad and fear list, p = 1.00. 
The results of the response bias analysis support theories that negative 
stimuli induce less selective responding.  However, beyond the overall false 
recognition data, this pattern was only evident in the know responses.  For 
remember responses participants were more selective with sad related list words 
compared to fear, however there were no differences between the negative lists 
and neutral lists.  This suggests that the increase in remember responses for the fear 
compared to the neutral lists were due to an increase in false memories rather than 
response bias. 
True memory data.  An analysis of d’ scores was also conducted for true 
memories in the same manner as above, using true recognition responses as the 
signal responses and filler items as noise.   
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Sensitivity analysis.  For old recognition responses to target items, the 
corresponding d’ scores yielded a significant main effect of List, F (1.67, 98.21) = 
10.37, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .15, no significant main effect of Emotion, F (2, 59) = .58, p = .56, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, or List x Emotion interaction, F (3.33, 98.21) = .92, p = .44, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03.  
Pairwise comparisons show scores for the neutral lists (M = .89, SD = .20) were 
significantly greater than the fear lists (M = .80, SD = .14), p < .01, and the sad lists 
(M = .80, SD = .15), p < .01, but the difference between fear and sad lists was not 
significant, p = 1.00. 
For d’ scores of remember responses there was a significant main effect of 
List, a significant main effect of List, F (2, 118) = 4.80, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .08, no significant 
main effect of Emotion, F (2, 59) = .21, p = .81, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, or List x Emotion interaction, 
F (4, 118) = .10, p = .98, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00.  Pairwise comparison show scores for the neutral 
lists (M = .82, SD = .21) were significantly greater than the fear lists (M = .71, SD = 
.21), p < .05, but the difference between the neutral and sad lists (M = .75, SD = .19) 
was not significant, p = .11, nor was the difference between the fear and sad, p = 
.78.   
For d’ scores of know responses there was a significant main effect of List, F 
(1.78, 105.05) = 4.47, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .07, no significant main effect of Emotion, F (2, 
59) = 1.08, p = .35, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, or List x Emotion interaction, F (3.56, 105.05) = .36, p = 
.82, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01.  Pairwise comparison show scores for the fear lists (M = .82, SD = .21) 
were significantly greater than the sad lists (M = .71, SD = .21), p < .05, but the 
difference between the fear and neutral lists (M = .75, SD = .19) was not significant, 
p = .29, nor was the difference between the sad and neutral, p = .77.  For d’ scores 
of guess responses there was also no significant main effect of List, F (2, 118) = 2.18, 
p =.12, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, no significant main effect of Emotion, F (2, 59) = .16, p =.85, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.01, and no significant List x Emotion interaction, F (4, 118) = .26, p = .90, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 01.   
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At all levels of the recognition measurements the negative filler items 
elicited greater response rates compared to the neutral items.  This difference 
influences the signal detection analysis and it is unsurprising therefore to see that 
with old and remember responses, sensitivity is higher for neutral stimuli compared 
to negative.  This finding should be taken into consideration when analysing the true 
memory data since the higher rate of old responses for fear and sad items 
compared to neutral items may be due to less selective responding for negative 
stimuli.  Within the know responses the sensitivity scores suggest greater signal 
detection for the fear stimuli. However, given that the same filler items were used 
for the negative lists this difference may simply be a reflection of the already higher 
recognition responses to target fear items. 
Response bias analysis.  The criterion C scores for overall true recognition 
showed a significant main effect of List, F (1.45, 85.79) = 54.40, p < .001 𝜂𝑝
2 = .48, a 
significant main effect of Emotion, F(2, 59) = 3.54, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .11, but no significant 
List x Emotion interaction, F(2.91, 85.79) = .75, p = .52, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03.  For List, pairwise 
comparisons show that criterion C was significantly higher for neutral lists (M = 1.00, 
SD = .12) compared to sad lists (M = .87, SD = .11), p < .001, and fear lists (M = .87, 
SD = .11), p < .001, but the difference between sad lists and fear lists was not 
significant, p = 1.00.  For Emotion, the criterion C scores were significantly higher for 
the control group (M = .95, SD = .11) compared to the fear group (M = .87, SD = 
0.10), p < .05, and compared to the sad group (M = .90, SD = .12) but this difference 
was not significant, p = .37.  The difference between fear and sad group was also not 
significant, p = .72. 
For remember responses there wasn’t a significant main effect of List, F(2, 
118) = .71, p = 50, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, no significant main effect of Emotion, F(2, 59) = 1.83, p = 
.17, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06, and no significant interaction effect of List x Emotion, F(4, 118) = .05, p 
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= 1.00, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00.  For know responses there was a significant main effect of List, F(2, 
118) = 40.36, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .41, no significant main effect of Emotion, F(2, 59) = 
2.45, p = .10, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .08, and no significant List x Emotion interaction, F(4, 118) = 1.80, 
p = .14, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06.  Pairwise comparisons for the main effect of List show scores were 
significantly higher for neutral lists (M = 1.32, SD = .06) compared to fear lists (M = 
1.21, SD = .09), p < .001, and sad lists (M = 1.25, SD = .10), p < .001, and for sad lists 
were significantly higher than fear lists, p < .05. 
For guess responses there was a significant main effect of List, F(2, 118) = 
7.28, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .11, but not a significant main effect of Emotion, F(2, 59) = .03, p = 
.97, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, or List x Emotion interaction, F(4, 118) = .10, p = .98, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00.  Pairwise 
comparisons show criterion C scores were significantly higher for neutral lists (M = 
1.23, SD = .13) compared to fear lists (M = 1.19, SD = .11), p < .05, and were higher 
compared to sad lists (M = 1.16, SD = .12) but the difference was not significant, p = 
.09.  The difference between fear and sad lists was also not significant, p = .42.  
Similar to the false memory data, these results show that negative stimuli 
induce less selective responding, but again, this was not significant in the remember 
responses.  In addition, as well as in the old and know responses, the guess 
responses were more selective for neutral stimuli compared to fear (but not sad).  
This is congruent with accounts that suggest recognition responses for negative 
valence stimuli increases for fillers and targets equally (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; 
Windmann & Kutas, 2001).  In addition, fear at encoding induced less selective 
responding at retrieval compared to the control group.  
3.3.3. Summary 
 Experiment 2 shows evidence of an enhanced emotional false memory 
effect.  The results from the false recognition responses support past research 
showing that recognition of critical lures is greater for negative stimuli compared to 
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neutral (Howe, et al., 2010).  The results also suggest that response bias was less 
selective for negative lists than neutral lists.   
In the remember data there is evidence that participants produced more 
false memories for fear-related stimuli compared with sad-related stimuli.  Analysis 
of response bias suggests that this effect may have been caused by a general 
increase in responding for fear stimuli over that of sad stimuli.  Based on previous 
research, it could be predicted that there would be a difference in response bias 
between negative and neutral lists such that negative stimuli leads to an increase in 
general responding for targets and fillers alike (Windmann & Kutas, 2001). However, 
this would not account for the difference between fear and sad lists.  In fact, Dougal 
and Rotello (2007) examined recognition of emotional versus neutral stimuli and 
demonstrated that response bias was more lenient for negative-arousing stimuli 
compared to positive-arousing and neutral stimuli.  That negative and positive 
stimuli were matched on arousal indicates a valence driven effect. However, this 
would predict the opposite result to that found for the fear and sad lists since 
valence scores were lower for the sad lists compared to fear lists. 
An additional explanation for the enhanced fear-related false memories is 
that fear and sad stimuli differ with regards to arousal.  FTT predicts that valence 
related increases in semantic connections among targets increases gist traces 
leading to greater false memory production (Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2016).  
Likewise, AAT posits that the increased sematic density facilitates spreading 
activations enhancing false memory production (Howe et al., 2009).  Predictions 
regarding arousal however are not so consistent with the current findings.  FTT 
predicts that within the stimuli, moderate arousal increases attention, enhancing 
memory for verbatim traces, and supressing false memories (Bookbinder & 
Brainerd, 2016).  The results do not support such predictions however, and analysis 
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of the old and remember responses indicate greater false memory production for 
stimuli with higher arousal.  AAT on the other hand predicts that increased attention 
to target items would increase subsequent spreading activations leading to greater 
false memory production.   
AAT also predicts an enhancement of emotion-congruent false memory 
production seen in previous studies (Knott & Thorley, 2013; Ruci et al., 2009).  
Experiment 2 did not support the experimental hypothesis of a discrete emotion-
congruent effect with DRM false memories.  A limitation of this study is that it was 
underpowered, needing an additional 10 participants in each group, however it is 
unlikely this alone led to the rejection of the hypothesis as the basic pattern of 
results does not indicate any evidence to the contrary.  It is possible that the lack of 
any such finding in this experiment is due to the overriding effects of valence and 
arousal.  Matching arousal and valence for manipulated discrete-emotions would 
allow a much clearer examination of a discrete emotion-congruency effect.  
According to spreading activation theories one would expect experiencing a discrete 
emotion to increase spreading activation associated with the congruent stimuli. 
Similarly, appraisal theories of emotion would predict that memory process be 
enhanced for congruent stimuli since it is most relevant to the emotional motivation 
(Moors et al., 2013).   
3.4. Experiment 3: 
Discrete Emotion-Congruent DRM False Memories with Fear and Anger 
Experiment 3 was conducted to further examine the presence of a discrete 
emotion-congruency effect on spontaneous production of false memories.  The 
same basic design and procedure was used as in Experiment 2. However, 
improvements were made in order to better distinguish between the false memory 
production of the two negative emotions.  The DRM paradigm was used to measure 
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false memory production and two distinct negative emotions were induced at 
encoding.  Fear and anger were chosen as the emotional manipulations as, 
according the circumplex model of affect, both emotions are similar in arousal and 
valence (Russell, 1980).   
Lerner and Keltner (2000) looked at the effect of fear and anger on risk 
perception in an attempt to highlight the limitation of focussing on valence effects.  
Fear led to more pessimistic decision making while anger led to more optimistic 
judgements.  Fear and anger have also been used to demonstrate the effect of 
discrete emotion on memory, irrespective of arousal and valence effects.  In an 
investigation of arousal and negative affect on memory for peripheral and central 
details, Talarico, Berntsen, and Rubin (2009) found that although negative affect 
impaired recall of peripheral details, there were distinct differences in the results for 
fear and anger.  Talarico et al. took a measure of reliving at retrieval and found that 
this was negatively correlated with peripheral recall for anger but not fear, 
regardless of the similarities in dimensions between these two emotions.   
Given the high semantic relatedness of negative emotions, and the 
increased chances of interconnectivity between lists, it is possible that randomising 
list presentation (in Experiment 2) may enhance spreading activation across what 
are intended to be incongruent emotional lists.  In order to avoid this confound in 
Experiment 3, the lists were blocked and the presentation orders were 
counterbalanced within the control group in order to assess whether list order itself 
effects false memory production.  In addition, emotional word lists have been used 
to induce emotion, and therefore to avoid an additional confound of incongruent 
lists affecting participants emotional state the congruent emotion lists were always 
presented first. 
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A final alteration in the design relates to the filler items.  It is usual to select 
negative and neutral filler items that are unrelated to the target stimuli in order to 
get a measure of signal detection.  However, in order to look specifically at each of 
the discrete emotions induced there is a need for filler items, unrelated to the 
specific words presented, but still related to the emotion category.  Thus, fillers 
used in Experiment 3 are grouped according to the three categories of the lists.  
3.4.1. Method 
Participants 
A total of 83 (25 male) A-level students, all aged 18, took part in the 
experiment, voluntarily.  For an 80% chance of finding a medium effect size with an 
alpha of .05 we need 90 participants.  The experiment was conducted at the 
participants’ school, with the approval of the teachers.  All participants gave written 
informed consent and were fully debriefed at the end of the experiment. 
Design 
A 3(Emotion: anger vs. fear vs. control) x 3(List: anger, fear, neutral) mixed 
design was used, with a standard DRM paradigm and recognition memory test.  
Emotion was the between-participant variable and list type was the within-
participant variable.  Recognition responses were taken for target words, filler 
items, and critical lures, along with additional judgements of either remember, 
know, or guess (R/K/G).  Instructions were again based on those from (Rajaram, 
1993).  Participants were randomly assigned to the anger condition (N = 27), fear 
condition (N = 28), or control condition (N = 28).   
Materials 
As with Experiment 2, participants in the control group underwent no 
emotion induction procedure.  The two experimental groups, fear and anger, were 
presented with short film clips from Rottenberg et al. (2007).  Anger was induced by 
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showing people a clip from the film “My Bodyguard”, in which one male was 
harassing and bullying another.  Fear was induced by showing participants a clip 
from the movie “The Shining”, in which a young boy is troubled and playing in a 
haunted building8.   To demonstrate that any differences in memory were not the 
result of a temporary mood change at retrieval, all participants watched a neutral 
video clip (from a wildlife documentary) lasting 5 minutes prior to retrieval.  To 
monitor emotional states throughout the experiment participants reported levels of 
valence and arousal through the SAM questionnaire. 
A total of six 10-item DRM word lists were presented, two of which were 
related to fear, two to anger, and two were neutral (see Appendix D).  Lists were 
presented in emotion consistent pairings and the list orders for the fear and anger 
groups were different so that the lists congruent to the participants’ emotion always 
came first.  This was done to prevent incongruent lists contaminating the emotional 
state of the participants at the beginning of encoding.  To ensure this choice of list 
order was not a confounding variable, the different list orders were replicated and 
counterbalanced within the control group to enable later comparison9.  Lists were 
created from those used by Stadler, Roediger, and McDermott (1999) and using The 
University of South Florida word association database (Nelson et al., 2004).  The six 
critical lures were anger, war, fear, danger, earth, and hair.  Backward associative 
strength (BAS) was controlled across the lists and word frequency for the critical 
lures was equated across the negative lists, but was slightly higher for the neutral 
                                                 
8
 Different film clips were used for the fear induction within Experiments 2 and 3 however 
comparison of the SAM results shows no significant difference between valence scores for 
experiment 2 (M = 4.06, SD = 1.63) and 3 (M = 4.81, SD = 1.36), t(37) = 1.58, p = .12, and no 
significant difference between the arousal scores for experiment 2 (M = 6.44, SD = 1.82) and 
3 (M = 5.86, SD = 1.62), t(37) = 1.07, p = .29.  
9
 Independent samples t-tests were conducted for all true and false recognition responses, 
as well as for remember responses, within the control group, to look at the different list 
orders used.  No significant differences in recognition responses to list words were found 
between participants who received the anger lists first and those who received the fear lists 
first, all p’s > .1. 
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lists.  Valence and arousal scores were taken from the Affective norms for English 
words database (Bradley & Lang, 1999) for all available words (see Table 3.6).  For 
both negative lists, valence was lower than the neutral lists and arousal was higher.  
Between the negative lists, both valence and arousal were equal.  The recognition 
test contained 42 words.  These were made up of the 6 critical lures, 18 old words, 
and 18 new words.  Old words were those from positions 1, 5, and 10 in each of the 
6 presented lists, and new words consisted of 3 emotionally congruent non-
presented low associates for each of the critical lures. 
 
Table 3.6:  Average BAS, arousal, and valence scores for fear, anger, and neutral 
DRM lists. 
  
 BAS 
 
Arousal 
 
Valence  
  
 M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD  
List:  
        
 
 
Neutral  0.26 0.11  5.15 1.00  5.21 1.68  
 
Fear  0.19 0.17  5.97 1.18  4.36 1.14  
 
Anger  0.22 0.14  5.93 1.15  4.10 1.69  
 
Procedure 
Participants received a standard set of instructions at the start of the 
experiment, along with the first SAM questionnaire.  Comprehensive instructions 
were given with the first SAM to avoid confusion later in the task (subsequent SAM 
questionnaires contained basic instructions).  Experimental groups watched one of 
the short video clips, and completed a SAM questionnaire afterwards.  All groups 
were then presented with the 6 DRM lists in auditory form, with words 2 seconds 
apart, and 3 seconds between lists.  Following this the neutral video clip was 
presented, and again participants filled out a SAM questionnaire.  They then began 
the recognition test. Standard instructions to indicate old and new words were 
given, as well as instructions to report if recognition of old words was based on a 
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remember, know, or guess judgement.  Finally, participants were asked to complete 
one more SAM questionnaire to ensure there were no lasting effects of the negative 
emotion induction. 
3.4.2. Results 
Emotion Manipulation 
Of the 83 participants, 8 were removed from the analysis as their arousal 
scores decreased following the emotion induction video and 3 were removed 
because their valence scores increased following the video.  Of the remaining 
participants 28 were in the control group, 21 in the fear group, and 23 in the anger 
group.  No significant differences were found between the groups for arousal, F(2, 
69) = .51, p = .60, or valence, F(2, 69) = 2.93, p = .06, before the emotion 
manipulation.  However, following the emotion induction the difference between 
groups for arousal was significant, F(2, 69) = 7.14, p < .01, as was the difference in 
valence, F(2, 69) = 16.47, p < .01.  Bonferroni pairwise-comparisons (alpha set at .05) 
indicated that arousal scores for the fear group (M = 5.85, SD = 1.62. 95% CI [5.12, 
6.60]) and anger group (M = 5.30, SD = 1.64, 95% CI [4.60, 6.01]) were significantly 
higher than the control group (M = 4.21, SD = 1.26, 95% CI [3.73, 4.70]) following the 
emotion induction.  In addition, valence scores were significantly lower in the fear 
(M = 4.80, SD = 1.36, 95% CI [4.12, 5.43]) and anger group (M = 4.52, SD = .67, 95% 
CI [4.23, 4.81]) compared to the control group (M = 6.39, SD = 1.52, 95% CI [5.80, 
6.98]) following the emotion induction.   
These results provide validation for the emotion induction procedure since 
it was expected that participants experiencing fear and anger would score higher on 
measurements of arousal and lower on measurements of valence compared to 
participants in the control group.  In addition, fear and arousal are very similar in 
terms of arousal and valence, and for the purposes of this experiment, these 
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emotions were chosen specifically for this similarity.  It is therefore reassuring that 
there were no differences in arousal or valence scores between the two negative 
emotion groups (p = .52 for arousal, and p = 1 for valence).  Finally, arousal and 
valence scores were compared between the groups following the neutral video, 
before the recognition test.  No significant differences were found between the 
groups in either arousal, F(2, 69) = 2.30, p = .35, or valence, F(2, 69) = 1.33, p = .49.  
Thus, participants’ emotions differed only at encoding, and not at retrieval. 
Recognition Responses 
The proportion of correct recognition of old words, false recognition of 
critical lures, and false recognition of filler words were coded. Separate 3 (Emotion: 
fear, anger, control) x 3 (List: fear, anger, neutral) ANOVAs were conducted for 
overall recognition responses for each set of words, one each for remember 
responses, for know responses, and for guess responses.  Before analysing data for 
all conditions, the responses for the control group were analysed based on the 
order in which the lists were presented. For target items and critical lures, analyses 
of old and remember responses showed no significant differences between the 
different list orders (p > .05 in all cases).  Thus, it was concluded that the order of list 
presentation is not likely to have had an effect on performance on the memory task. 
False recognition of critical lures. Where critical lures were recognized as 
being present in the original lists, responses were first analysed for false 
recognition, and then separately for whether the recognition was accompanied by 
remember, know, or guess responses (see Table 3.7).  For all false recognition of 
critical lures (see Figure 3.3) there was no significant main effect for Emotion, F(2, 
69) = .40, p = .70, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, but a significant main effect of List F(2, 138) = 10.00, p < 
.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .13, and a significant interaction effect between List and Emotion  F(4, 
138) = 3.83, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .10.   
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Pairwise comparisons using the Bonferroni correction showed that within 
the control group there were no significant differences between the lists (all p’s > 
.05).  Within the fear group the proportion of recognition of critical lures was 
significantly higher for congruent emotion lists, fear lists, compared to incongruent 
lists, anger (p < .01) and neutral (p < .01) and there were no differences between the 
anger and neutral list (p = 1.00).  This enhancement of fear related false memories 
supports the hypothesis that discrete emotional states increase false memory 
production for congruent stimuli above and beyond the generic emotion-congruent 
effects that have been previously demonstrated (Knott & Thorley, 2013; Ruci et al., 
2009).   
However, this is only one of the two experimental groups.  When the results 
from the anger group were analysed the pattern was not so clear.  Within the anger 
group, the proportion of false recognition was significantly higher for anger lists 
compared to neutral lists (p < .05) but no significant difference was found between 
the anger and fear lists (p = .62) or fear and neutral lists (p = .33).  These results 
indicate the presence of a generic emotion congruence effect, since false memories 
for the neutral lists were much lower in this group. However, there is no evidence of 
a difference in false memory rates between the two negative emotions and 
therefore the hypothesis is not supported.  These results represent the old 
recognition responses.  Not only do these data encompass uncertain, guess, 
responses but it is also important to separate memory responses based on 
familiarity judgements and those whereby participants report having an explicit, 
vivid memory.    
For false remember responses (see Figure 3.4) there was a significant main 
effect of Emotion, F(2, 69) = 3.61, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .10, no significant effect of List, F(2, 
138) = 2.63, p = .08, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, and a significant Emotion x List interaction, F(4, 138) = 
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12.45, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .27.  For the fear emotion group, pairwise comparisons 
revealed that the proportion of remember responses was significantly higher for 
fear lists than anger lists (p < .01) and neutral lists (p < .01), but the difference 
between the anger and neutral lists was not significant (p = .93).  For participants in 
the anger group, the proportion of false memories for anger lists was significantly 
greater than fear lists (p < .01) and neutral lists (p < .05) but the difference between 
the fear and neutral lists was not significant (p = .78).  For the control group there 
were no significant differences between the lists (all p’s > .05).  Here there is strong 
evidence for the hypothesised discrete emotion-congruency effect.  Participants 
believed to be experiencing fear or anger falsely remembered significantly more 
critical lures from the lists for which the content was congruent to their emotional 
state.  Not only does this replicate previous findings of an emotion congruency 
effect driven by valence (Knott & Thorley, 2013; Ruci et al., 2009), but extends these 
findings to discrete emotions, even when arousal and valence are similar across 
experimental conditions.   
Participants additionally made know or guess responses to a selection of the 
falsely recognized critical lures, however the figures for these categories were very 
low, thus reducing the power for any subsequent analyses.  For the know 
judgements the main effect for List, F(2, 138) = 1.08, p = .34, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, main effect for 
Emotion, F(2, 69) = 1.3, p = .28, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, and the List x Emotion interaction, F(2, 138) 
= 2.30, p = .06, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06, were all not significant.  For guess judgements the main 
effect of List, F(2, 138) = 1.37, p = .26, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, main effect of Emotion, F(2, 69) = 
1.10, p = .34, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03,  and the Emotion x List interaction, F(2, 69) = 1.25, p = .29, 𝜂𝑝
2 
= .04, were also not significant. 
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Table 3.7: False recognition responses to critical lures as a function of emotion and list  
  Fear Group  Anger Group  Control Group 
    95% CI    95% CI    95% CI 
  M SE LL UL  M SE LL UL  M SE LL UL 
Overall Recognition               
 Fear lists .93 .04 .85 1.01  .63 .07 .48 .78  .77 .06 .64 .89 
 Anger lists .57 .08 .42 .77  .78 .07 .62 .90  .61 .07 .46 .75 
 Neutral lists .53 .09 .34 .71  .48 .08 .31 .64  .61 .06 .47 .74 
Remember                
 Fear lists .74 .07 .58 .89  .09 .05 -.02 .19  .36 .07 .21 .51 
 Anger lists .17 .07 .02 .32  .39 .05 .28 .50  .39 .08 .23 .55 
 Neutral lists .29 .08 .12 .46  .20 .07 .05 .34  .36 .06 .23 .48 
Know                
 Fear lists .12 .05 .02 .22  .30 .06 .18 .43  .25 .05 .14 .36 
 Anger lists .21 .07 .08 .35  .24 .07 .10 .38  .09 .04 .01 .16 
 Neutral lists .12 .05 .02 .22  .15 .07 .01 .29  .21 .05 .12 .31 
Guess                
 Fear lists .07 .04 -.01 .15  .24 .08 .08 .40  .16 .05 .05 .27 
 Anger lists .19 .08 .02 .36  .15 .06 .03 .27  .13 .04 .04 .21 
 Neutral lists .12 .06 .00 .24  .13 .05 .03 .23  .04 .02 -.02 .09 
- 1
0
4
 - 
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Figure 3.3. Proportion of ‘old’ responses to critical lures as a function of emotion 
group and list emotion (Error bars represent SE) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Proportion of false ‘remember’ responses as a function of emotion 
group and list emotion (Error bars represent SE) *p < .05 
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True recognition of list items. For true recognition responses (see Table 3.8) 
there was a significant main effect of List, F(2, 138) = 5.63, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .07, no 
significant main effect of Emotion, F(2, 69) = .84, p = .44, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, and a significant 
List x Emotion interaction, F(4, 138) = 3.75, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .1.  Pairwise comparisons 
within the fear group showed partial evidence for an emotion congruency effect 
whereby recognition for fear lists was significantly higher than neutral lists (p < .05) 
but the difference between fear and anger lists was not significant (p = 1.00) nor 
was the difference between anger and neutral lists (p = .25).  Within the anger 
group, the proportion of correct recognition responses was significantly higher for 
anger lists compared to fear lists (p < .01). However, the difference between the 
anger and neutral lists was not significant (p = .48) and the difference between the 
neutral and fear lists was also not significant (p = .14).  Within the control group 
there were no significant differences between lists (all p’s > .05).   
For remember responses to correctly recognised items there was a 
significant main effect of List, F(2, 138) = 3.56, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .05, but not Emotion, 
F(2, 69) = 1.02, p = .37, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, and a significant List x Emotion interaction, F(4, 138) 
= 6.53, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .16.  Pairwise comparisons for the fear group and control group 
revealed no significant differences between lists (all p’s > .05).  Within the anger 
group the remember responses to anger lists were significantly greater than fear 
lists (p < .01). However, the difference between the anger and neutral lists was not 
significant (p = .18).  In addition, the responses for the neutral lists were also 
significantly greater than the fear lists (p < .05).   
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Table 3.8: Recognition responses to target items as a function of emotion and list  
  Fear Group  Anger Group  Control Group 
    95% CI    95% CI    95% CI 
  M SE LL UL  M SE LL UL  M SE LL UL 
Overall Recognition               
 Fear lists .60 .05 .50 .70  .38 .04 .30 .45  .56 .05 .46 .65 
 Anger lists .57 .05 .45 .68  .66 .06 .51 .76  .61 .05 .51 .70 
 Neutral lists .42 .06 .30 .54  .50 .05 .40 .61  .52 .04 .44 .60 
Remember                
 Fear lists .44 .05 .33 .56  .14 .03 .08 .20  .36 .05 .25 .47 
 Anger lists .37 .06 .24 .49  .49 .04 .39 .58  .38 .05 .28 .47 
 Neutral lists .33 .06 .21 .46  .33 .05 .24 .43  .35 .03 .28 .42 
Know                
 Fear lists .13 .03 .06 .19  .15 .04 .08 .23  .12 .03 .06 .18 
 Anger lists .09 .02 .04 .14  .10 .03 .04 .17  .18 .04 .11 .26 
 Neutral lists .03 .01 .00 .06  .10 .02 .06 .14  .09 .03 .03 .15 
Guess                
 Fear lists .03 .01 .00 .06  .09 .03 .03 .14  .08 .02 .03 .13 
 Anger lists .11 .04 .03 .19  .07 .02 .03 .11  .05 .02 .01 .09 
 Neutral lists .06 .02 .01 .11  .07 .02 .03 .11  .08 .02 .04 .11 
- 1
0
7
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For know responses to correctly recognised list items there was a significant 
effect of List, F(2, 138) = 4.30, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06, but not of Emotion, F(2, 69) = 1.46, p 
= .24, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, or the List x Emotion interaction, F(4, 138) = 1.91, p = .11, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .05.  
Within the fear group pairwise comparisons show that know responses for the fear 
lists were significantly higher than the neutral lists (p < .05).  No significant 
differences were found between the fear and anger lists (p = .78) and anger and 
neutral lists (p = .21).  Within the anger group and control group there were no 
significant differences (all p’s > .05).   
For guess responses there was no significant main effect of List, F(2, 138) = 
.35, p = .70, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, no main effect of Emotion, F(2, 69) = .13, p = .88, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, or 
any List x Emotion interaction, F(4, 138) = 1.93, p = .11, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .05.  Within the fear 
group the guess responses for anger lists were significantly higher than fear lists (p < 
.05) however no other differences were significant (all p’s > .05). 
False recognition of fillers. For recognition of filler items (see Table 3.9) 
there was a significant main effect of List, F(2, 138) = 35.59, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .34, but not 
Emotion, F(2, 69) = .08, p = .93, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, or the List x Emotion interaction, F(4, 138) = 
1.32, p = .27, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04.  Pairwise comparisons for List show that recognition of fillers 
was significantly higher for fear lists (M = .34, SD = .26) compared to anger (M = .15, 
SD = .19), p < .01, and neutral lists (M = .09, SD = .16), p < .01.  The difference 
between anger and neutral lists was not significant, p = .07. 
For remember responses there was a significant main effect of List, F(2, 138) 
= 4.17, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06, but not Emotion, F(2, 69) = 1.59, p = .21, η2 = .04, or the List 
x Emotion interaction, F(4, 138) = .91, p = .46, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03.  Pairwise comparisons show 
responses for fear lists (M = .09, SD = .14) were significantly higher than neutral lists 
(M = .04, SD = .10), p < .05, and were higher than anger lists (M = .05, SD = .11) but 
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this difference was not significant, p = .12.  The difference between anger and 
neutral lists was also not significant, p = 1.00. 
For know responses there was a significant effect of List, F(2, 138) = 23.02, p 
< .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .25, but not Emotion, F(2, 69) = .98, p = .38, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, or the List x Emotion 
interaction, F(4, 138) = 2.43, p = .07, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06.  Pairwise comparisons again show 
significantly greater responses for fear lists (M = .13, SD = .17) compared to anger 
(M = .03, SD = .07), p < .01, and neutral lists (M = .02, SD = .06), p < .01.  The 
difference between anger and neutral lists was not significant, p = .83. 
For guess responses to filler items there was a significant effect of List, F(2, 
138) = 7.91, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .10, but not Emotion, F(2, 69) = 2.98, p = .06, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .08, and 
the List x Emotion interaction was significant, F(4, 138) = 2.68, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .07.  
Within the fear and control group the pairwise comparisons show no significant 
differences between lists (all p’s > .05).  For the anger group the guess responses to 
anger lists were significantly greater than neutral lists (p < .05) and the responses to 
fear lists were significantly greater than neutral lists (p < .05).  The difference 
between the anger and fear lists was not significant (p = 1.00). 
The consistently greater responses for the fear related filler items may be 
due to an increase in response bias.  There is evidence in the literature that negative 
stimuli elicit higher proportions of unselective responding (Windmann & Kutas, 
2001) even when accounting for sematic density (Dougal & Rotello, 2007).  
However, this would not account for the differences seen between the fear and 
anger lists. 
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Table 3.9: Recognition responses to filler items as a function of emotion and list  
  Fear Group  Anger Group  Control Group 
    95% CI    95% CI    95% CI 
  M SE LL UL  M SE LL UL  M SE LL UL 
Overall Recognition               
 Fear lists .34 .06 .22 .46  .28 .05 .21 .40  .36 .06 .25 .48 
 Anger lists .15 .04 .05 .23  .20 .05 .10 .29  .11 .03 .06 .17 
 Neutral lists .07 .03 .01 .14  .05 .03 .01 .12  .12 .03 .05 .20 
Remember                
 Fear lists .08 .02 .03 .13  .07 .02 .02 .11  .11 .03 .04 .18 
 Anger lists .09 .04 .01 .16  .01 .01 -.01 .04  .04 .01 .01 .07 
 Neutral lists .04 .03 -.01 .09  .02 .02 -.02 .07  .04 .02 .01 .08 
Know                
 Fear lists .18 .04 .10 .27  .08 .03 .02 .14  .14 .04 .06 .21 
 Anger lists .02 .01 -.01 .04  .04 .02 .01 .08  .04 .02 .01 .08 
 Neutral lists .01 .01 -.01 .02  .01 .01 -.01 .04  .04 .02 .01 .08 
Guess                
 Fear lists .08 .02 .03 .13  .13 .03 .07 .19  .11 .03 .05 .17 
 Anger lists .04 .02 .01 .07  .15 .05 .06 .25  .03 .01 .00 .06 
 Neutral lists .02 .02 -.01 .06  .02 .01 .00 .05  .04 .02 .00 .08 
- 1
1
0
 - 
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Signal Detection Analysis 
False Memory Data.  Signal detection analysis (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999) 
was conducted using false critical lure responses and false filler items.  These scores 
were then entered into the same ANOVAs as above.   
Sensitivity analysis.  For overall false recognition responses, the 
corresponding d’ scores yielded no significant main effect of List, F (2, 138) = .47, p = 
.63, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, Emotion, F(2, 69) = .35, p = .71, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, or List x Emotion interaction, 
F(4, 138) = 2.11, p = .08, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06.  For d’ scores of remember responses there was no 
significant main effect of List, F(1.66, 114.84) = .75, p = .48, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, no significant 
main effect of Emotion, F(2, 69) = .2.57, p = .08, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .07, but a significant interaction 
effect of List x Emotion, F(4, 118) = 14.53, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .30.  Pairwise comparisons for 
the anger group showed scores were significantly higher for anger lists (M = .90, SD 
= .26) compared to fear lists (M = .53, SD = .27), p < .05, and neutral lists (M = .68, 
SD = .30), p < .05.  The difference between fear and neutral lists however was not 
significant, p = .33.  For the fear group scores were significantly higher for fear lists 
(M = 1.16, SD = .30) compared to anger lists (M = .59, SD = .28), p < .05, and neutral 
lists (M = .76, SD = .35), p < .05.  The difference between anger and neutral lists 
however was not significant, p = .32.  With the control group there were no 
significant differences (all p’s > .05) between the d’ scores for fear (M = .77, SD = 
.37), anger (M = .85, SD = .40), and neutral lists (M = .83, SD = .33).  There is 
evidence here of an emotion congruency effect as the sensitivity scores are higher 
for the congruent emotion lists compared to the incongruent list for each negative 
emotion group.  Since there was no interaction effect for recognition of filler items, 
this finding is most likely due to the increased responses in the recognition of critical 
lures for congruent emotion stimuli.  
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For d’ scores of know responses there was no significant main effect of List, 
F(2, 138) = .17, p = .84, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, and no significant main effect of Emotion, F(2, 69) = 
.1.29, p = .28, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04.  There was a significant interaction effect of List x Emotion 
F(4, 138) = .2.78, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .07, however after adjusting for multiple comparisons 
no pairwise comparisons were significant (all p’s > .05).  For d’ scores of guess 
responses there was also no significant main effect of List, F(2, 138) = .1.32, p = .27, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, Emotion, F(2, 69) = .82, p = .44, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, or List x Emotion interaction, F(4, 
138) = .94, p = .45, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03.   
Response bias analysis.  The criterion C scores for overall false recognition 
responses showed a significant main effect of List, F (2, 138) = 26.94, p < .001 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.28, no significant main effect of Emotion, F(2, 69) = .19, p = .83, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, and a 
significant List x Emotion interaction, F(4, 138) = 4.26, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .11.  Post-hoc 
tests of the interaction effect show that within the anger group scores for the 
neutral lists (M = .94, SD = .21) were significantly higher than the anger lists (M = 
.76, SD = .20), p < .05, and fear lists (M = .77, SD = .19), p < .05.  The difference 
between the fear and anger lists was not significant, p = 1.00.  Within the fear group 
response bias was significantly lower for the fear lists (M = .63, SD = .13) compared 
to the anger lists (M = .87, SD = .20), p < .01, and neutral lists (M = .92, SD = .22), p < 
.01.  The difference between the anger and neutral lists was not significant, p = 1.00.  
In the control group response bias was significantly lower for the fear lists (M = .70, 
SD = .19) compared to the anger (M = .86, SD = .20), p < .01, and neutral lists (M = 
.86, SD = .19), p < .01.  The difference between then anger and neutral lists was not 
significant, p = 1.00.  
For remember responses there was a significant main effect of List, F(2, 138) 
= 4.08, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06, a significant effect of Emotion, F(2, 69) = 3.64, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.10, and a significant interaction effect of List x Emotion, F(4, 138) = 10.01, p < .01, 
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𝜂𝑝
2 = .23.  Pairwise comparison for the anger group show scores for the anger lists (M 
= 1.00, SD = .14) were significantly lower than the fear lists (M = 1.14, SD = .13), p < 
.01, and lower than the neutral lists (M = 1.11, SD = .19) but this difference was not 
significant, p = .07.  The difference between the fear and neutral lists was also not 
significant, p = 1.00.  Within the fear group response bias was significantly lower for 
the fear lists (M = 0.81, SD = .18) compared to the anger lists (M = 1.10, SD = .21), p 
< .01, and neutral list (M = 1.10, SD = .21), p < .01.  The difference between the 
anger and neutral lists was not significant, p = 1.00.  In the control group the 
differences between the anger (M = 1.00, SD = .21), fear (M = 1.00, SD = .22), and 
neutral lists (M = 1.01, SD = .17) were not significant (all p’s = 1.00). 
For know responses there was a significant main effect of List, F(2, 138) = 
6.88, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .09, no significant main effect of Emotion, F(2, 69) = 1.16, p = .32, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, and no significant List x Emotion interaction, F(4, 138) = 2.39, p = .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.07.  Pairwise comparisons for the main effect of List show criterion C scores were 
significantly lower for fear lists (M = 1.03, SD = .16) compared to anger (M = 1.09, SD 
= .16), p < .05, and neutral lists (M = 1.12, SD = .15), p < .01.  The difference between 
anger and neutral lists was not significant, p = .66.  For guess responses there was 
also a significant main effect of List, F(2, 138) = 4.56, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06, but not a 
significant main effect of Emotion, F(2, 69) = 1.01, p = .37, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, or List x Emotion 
interaction, F(4, 138) = 1.27, p = .29, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04.  Pairwise comparisons show criterion C 
scores were significantly higher for neutral lists (M = 1.16, SD = .11) compared to 
fear lists (M = 1.08, SD = .16), p < .05, and were higher compared to anger lists (M = 
1.12, SD = .15) but the difference was not significant, p = .37.  The difference 
between fear and anger lists was also not significant, p = .52. 
These results show that response bias for fear stimuli is consistently lower 
than for neutral stimuli and that anger stimuli elicited significantly lowered response 
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bias in the anger group for old responses.  Previous research has shown a general 
decrease in response bias to emotional stimuli compared to neutral (e.g. Windmann 
& Kutas, 2001) and has claimed that recognition data is not evidence of a false 
memory effect but instead represents this unselective responding.  However, the 
interaction effect for remember responses shows that this effect is not present in 
the control group, suggesting the increased response bias is not simply due to the 
valance of the stimuli but of the congruency between the stimuli and emotion.   
True Memory Data.  Likewise, d’ and criterion C scores were calculated for 
true memory data using recognition responses for target items and for 
corresponding filler items, and entered into the same ANOVAs as before.   
Sensitivity analysis.  For overall true recognition responses, the 
corresponding d’ scores yielded a significant main effect of List, F (2, 138) = 27.04, p 
< . 001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .28, no significant main effect of Emotion, F(2, 69) = .30, p = .74, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.01, and no significant List x Emotion interaction, F(4, 138) = 1.36, p = .25, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04.  
For d’ scores of remember responses there was a significant main effect of List, F(2, 
138) = .4.50, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, no significant main effect of Emotion, F(2, 69) = .75, p 
= .48, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, and a significant interaction effect of List x Emotion, F(4, 118) = 7.10, 
p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .17.  Pairwise comparisons for the anger group showed scores were 
significantly higher for anger lists (M = .78, SD = .11) compared to fear lists (M = .57, 
SD = .08), p < .05, and higher scores for neutral lists (M = .69, SD = .13) compared to 
fear lists, p < .05.  The difference between anger and neutral lists was not 
significant, p = .16.  For the fear group there were no significant differences (all p’s > 
.05) between scores for fear lists (M = .74, SD = .33) anger lists (M = .70, SD = .14) 
and neutral lists (M = .69, SD = .14).  For the control group there were also no 
significant differences (all p’s = 1.00) between scores for fear lists (M = .69, SD = .15) 
anger lists (M = .71, SD = .13) and neutral lists (M = .70, SD = .10).   
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For d’ scores of know responses there was no significant main effect of List, 
F(2, 138) = 2.14, p = .12, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, and no significant main effect of Emotion, F(2, 69) 
= 1.46, p = .24, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, or List x Emotion interaction F(4, 138) = 1.83, p = .13, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.05.  For d’ scores of guess responses there was also no significant main effect of 
List, F(2, 138) = 1.27, p = .28, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, Emotion, F(2, 69) = .01, p = 1.00, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, or 
List x Emotion interaction, F(4, 138) = 1.81, p = .13, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .05.   
Response bias analysis.  The criterion C scores for true recognition 
responses showed a significant main effect of List, F (2, 138) = 21.42, p < .001 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.24, no significant main effect of Emotion, F(2, 69) = .41, p = .67, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, and a 
significant List x Emotion interaction, F(4, 138) = 2.96, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .08.  Pairwise 
comparisons show that within the anger group scores for the neutral lists (M = 1.04, 
SD = .09) were higher than the anger lists (M = .96, SD = .12) and fear lists (M = .98, 
SD = .11), and were higher for the fear lists compared to the anger lists, but none of 
the differences were significant (all p’s > .05).  Within the fear group response bias 
was significantly lower for the fear lists (M = .91, SD = .12) compared to the anger 
lists (M = 1.00, SD = .11), p < .01, and neutral lists (M = 1.06, SD = .11), p < .01.  The 
difference between the anger and neutral lists was not significant, p = .13.  In the 
control group response bias was again significantly lower for the fear lists (M = .92, 
SD = .13) compared to the anger lists (M = 1.00, SD = .09), p < .01, and neutral lists 
(M = 1.01, SD = .10), p < .01.  The difference between the anger and neutral lists was 
not significant, p = 1.00.  
For remember responses there was no significant main effect of List, F(2, 
138) = 3.07, p = .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, no significant effect of Emotion, F(2, 69) = 1.30, p = .28, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, but a significant interaction effect of List x Emotion, F(4, 138) = 6.406, p < 
.01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .16.  Pairwise comparison for the anger group show scores for the fear lists 
(M = 1.19, SD = .04) were significantly higher than the anger lists (M = 1.07, SD = 
- 116 - 
.06), p < .05, and neutral lists (M = 1.12, SD = .06), p < .05, The difference between 
the anger and neutral lists was not significant, p = .19.  Within the fear and control 
group there were no significant differences between lists (all p’s > .05). 
For know responses there was a significant main effect of List, F(2, 138) = 
8.29, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 11, no significant main effect of Emotion, F(2, 69) = 1.32, p = .27, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, and no significant List x Emotion interaction, F(4, 138) = 2.04, p = .09, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.06.  Pairwise comparisons for the main effect of List show criterion C scores were 
significantly higher for neutral lists (M = 1.19, SD = .04) compared to anger (M = 
1.17, SD = .05), p < .05, and fear lists (M = 1.16, SD = .15), p < .01.  The difference 
between anger and fear lists was not significant, p = .29.  For guess responses there 
was no significant main effect of List, F(2, 138) = .83, p = .44, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, no significant 
main effect of Emotion, F(2, 69) = .64, p = .53, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, and no significant List x 
Emotion interaction, F(4, 138) = 2.07, p = .09, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06.   
As with the false memory data, in many instances the response bias for fear 
related stimuli is lower compared to anger and neutral stimuli.  For the old 
responses participants in the fear and control group appear to have more selective 
responding for neutral and anger lists compared to fear, and in the know responses 
there is a general enhancement for selective responding to neutral lists compared 
to both fear and anger lists.  This pattern is reversed in the remember responses as 
participants were more selective in their responding to fear stimuli compared to 
anger and neutral stimuli. 
3.4.3. Summary 
Experiment 3 extends previous research on the emotion congruency effect 
(Howe & Malone, 2011; Knott & Thorley, 2013; Ruci et al., 2009) by using discrete 
emotions that are dimensionally similar with regard to arousal and valence.  In order 
to better understand the link between memory and emotion, we need to go beyond 
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a simple examination of the effects of emotional arousal and valence and instead be 
able to classify to-be-remembered information as emotionally congruent or 
incongruent with a specific emotional state (e.g., fear, anger). 
The results from this study are the first to demonstrate evidence of a 
discrete emotion congruency effect with DRM false memories.  Participants 
experiencing fear were more likely to report explicit false memories for fear related 
stimuli compared to anger and neutral, whereas participants experiencing anger 
were more likely to report explicit false memories for anger related stimuli 
compared to fear and neutral.  This pattern of discrete emotion congruency is 
consistent with spreading activation theories, such as AAT (Howe et al., 2009) and 
Bower’s (1981) Network Theory of Affect, as well as other theories such as FTT 
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2002), and appraisal theories of emotion (Oatley & Johnson-
Laird, 2014). 
According to AAT, we would be more likely to produce false memories 
related to the emotion we are experiencing due to the heightened activation of the 
related emotion node in the associative network, which contains both semantic and 
affective memory structures.  Where past research has demonstrated this through 
activation of general negative emotion nodes, Experiment 3 shows that this 
associative network activation is much more selective, activating discrete emotion 
nodes.  This account is in line with appraisal theories of emotion since discrete 
emotions serve a purpose and so cognitive mechanisms process relevant, 
emotionally congruent, stimuli differently to irrelevant stimuli. 
An alternative explanation can be found in the response bias literature 
(Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Windmann & Kutas, 2001).  Dougal and Rotello (2007) 
demonstrated that when semantic densitiy was matched between negative, neutral, 
and positive stimuli there was no difference in sensitivity or memory accuracy 
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between the three conditions.  They did, however, find a difference in response bias 
whereby participants were more liberal in their recognition responses to negative 
stimuli compared to neutral and positive.  This finding suggests that negative stimuli 
generally elicit higher proportions of responding and may, therefore, cause one to 
question whether an increased response to negative emotional stimuli is in fact due 
to a congruent emotion induction or simply an increased bias.  However, this 
prediction can only account for a general increase for negative stimuli.  The 
experimental manipulation used here involves two different negative emotions, 
each with similar levels of valence and arousal, and any increase in recognition rates 
for negative stimuli within each of our groups is specific to the congruent emotion. 
This suggests that there is more to the increase in negative false memories than 
response bias alone.   
Although the results support the assumption that the emotion induction 
procedure was successful there are limitations in the method used that need to be 
addressed.  Ethically, one could not induce the same emotional state experienced 
when being attacked. However, the chosen induction technique has been normed 
extensively for producing the desired discrete emotions (Bartolini, 2011; Gross & 
Levenson, 1995; Jonathan Rottenberg et al., 2007a).  With regard to the emotion 
groups, when inducing anger it must also be noted that there is often a subsequent 
induction of disgust.  While this may be the case with the chosen film clip it would 
only be a mild induction and unlikely to confound the results.  In addition, due to 
the nature of the stimuli being used it was not possible to employ a more 
comprehensive subjective measure of emotion.  The emotion words necessary for 
any such measure would have confounded the results of the memory test.  
Nevertheless, analysis of the SAM scales confirmed the appropriate changes in 
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mood following the induction procedures, and the clips used are not known to 
induce the contrasting emotion.   
With regard to the DRM lists used none of the words presented had high 
BAS for the critical lures on the incongruent emotion lists.  However, given the 
nature of fear and anger there may be weak, indirect, associations across lists.  With 
most typical DRM studies false recognition rates for filler items would be relatively 
low.  This however was not the case.  The filler items used were congruent to each 
of the list emotions and therefore not strictly unrelated.  It was expected therefore 
that the same congruency effects, although much weaker, would be produced.  
According to AAT, very weak associates would not normally create spreading 
activation significant enough to produce false memories.  However, the congruent 
emotional states would have enhanced these activations, subsequently bringing 
many of these items to the threshold necessary to produce false memories.  
3.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, there is novel evidence that discrete emotional states 
experienced at encoding can increase production of subsequent false memories for 
emotionally congruent stimuli.  As mentioned in the introduction, previous research 
had begun looking at the emotion-congruency effect with false memories but had 
focussed solely on valence effects (Knott & Thorley, 2013; Ruci et al., 2009).  It is 
now apparent that this congruency effect can act independently of valence, and 
arousal, when the discrete emotions manipulated are similar across these two 
dimensions (e.g. fear and anger).  These novel findings highlight the need for 
researchers to look beyond the effects of valence and arousal, and support models 
of discrete emotion effects (Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 2013; Oatley & 
Johnson-Laird, 2014; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).   
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This is not to say that research should abandon valence and arousal effects, 
far from it in fact.  Experiment 2 replicates past research and demonstrates that 
high arousal stimuli elicit greater spontaneous false memory rates compared to low 
arousal stimuli.  Arousal and valence are important dimensions and account for 
many of the effects of emotion on cognition (Colibazzi et al., 2010). However, 
research should be cautious to consider additional explanations (possibly masked by 
the effects of arousal and valence) and to seek out additional effects that may occur 
irrespective of these dimensions.   
One alternative dimension to be considered is the approach/avoidance 
model of emotion (Elliot, 2006).  This posits that emotions can be plotted on a scale 
going from those promoting approach behaviours to those promoting avoidance 
behaviours.  Typically, negative emotions are considered to be avoidance emotions 
since they encourage the person to avoid similar situations, while positive emotions 
encourage behaviours to approach and seek out situations.  With regard to fear and 
anger, although both emotions are often associated with similar situations, fear is 
considered to provoke avoidance behaviours, where an organism retreats from the 
stimulus, whereas anger would provoke an approach response, where the organism 
may attack the stimulus (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Elliot, 2006; Rutherford & 
Lindell, 2011).   
The approach/avoidance mechanism has clear adaptive value and aligns 
well with appraisal theories mentioned throughout this chapter.  Emotions are 
adaptive mechanisms for survival.  They can increase the efficiency of reactions to 
events and optimise the response by biasing cognitive resources toward relevant 
stimuli in the environment (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 
2014).  This biasing effect can subsequently increase activation of concepts 
accounting for subsequent increases in false memories.   
- 121 - 
As well as emotions being adaptive, Howe (2011) highlights the adaptive 
nature of false memories, and their role in survival and goal attainment.  Research 
has shown that memory is biased towards survival relevant conditions (Nairne, 
2010; Nairne, Thompson, & Pandeirada, 2007).  It adapts to encode information that 
will be most beneficial to the present goals and future survival of the person.  The 
different appraisals and actions associated with different emotions therefore 
benefits from a memory system that is biased towards information most associated 
with that specific emotion and subsequently the desired goal.   
The effect of emotion congruency on spontaneous false memory production 
has significant implications for clinical settings in which therapists may discuss 
emotional memories with patients, or therapies aimed at encouraging new positive 
memories.  Research has shown how important specific emotional states may be in 
false memory.  For example, Howe and Malone (2011) showed that the presence of 
major depressive disorder significantly increased false memory production for 
depression relevant information.  Although caution is appropriate when generalizing 
from psychopathology to everyday emotional experiences, the evidence presented 
in this chapter demonstrates that this highly specific emotion congruency effect is 
also present outside of the clinical disorder.  Those not diagnosed with major 
depressive disorder are still at risk of producing false memories congruent to the 
specific negative emotion that they experience at encoding. 
 In addition, in legal cases, in which much weight is put on eyewitness 
testimonies, it is important to consider that the emotional state and the motivations 
of the person at the time of, experiencing, or witnessing, a crime may affect the 
false memories produced.  Although many advances have been made with regards 
to interviewing techniques (Fisher, & Geiselman, 2010) and procedures designed to 
minimise the production of false memories after the fact, little can be done about 
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spontaneously produced false memories at the time of the event.  Therefore, it is 
important for research to continue its exploration of the factors leading to less 
accurate memory.  
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Chapter 4 
Misinformation and Emotion 
4.1 Overview 
In the previous chapter the effect of emotion at encoding on the production 
of spontaneous false memories was examined and evidence was presented of a 
discrete emotion congruency effect within the DRM paradigm.  Emotion can also 
affect false memory production at other stages.  After a memory has been formed 
additional information may be presented and through reconsolidation or source 
monitoring errors the new, incorrect details are perceived as part of the original 
event memory.  The current chapter is used to examine the effect of emotion on 
manipulating memories and source memory for new erroneous information.   
Literature on the effect of emotion within the misinformation paradigm is 
reviewed, looking specifically at both the effect of the emotional content of the 
stimuli as well as the effect of the emotional state of the participants.  There is a 
wealth of research on this topic (for reviews see Kaplan, Van Damme, Levine, & 
Loftus, 2015; Loftus, 2005). However, due to the complexity of the paradigm there 
remain many unanswered questions.  Novel findings from modified versions of the 
misinformation paradigm are also presented.  The experiments conducted 
demonstrate that in the absence of suggestion participants remain prone to 
endorsing misinformation and that source memory for misinformation is worse for 
negative stimuli compared to positive and neutral stimuli.  In addition, in this 
chapter there is evidence that a negative emotion induction at retrieval can also 
affect the qualitative properties of a memory. 
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4.2 Introduction 
The misinformation paradigm was first developed by Elizabeth Loftus in 
order to emulate suggestive interviewing techniques used in legal and clinical 
settings.  Within the legal and clinical sectors, there is evidence of the use of various 
suggestive techniques that have a dangerous side effect of increasing the chances of 
false memories being produced and reported as veridical.  In contrast to the DRM 
paradigm discussed in Chapter 3, the misinformation paradigm investigates more 
directly the real-life impact of false memories.  Where the DRM paradigm elicits the 
production of spontaneous endogenous false memories, exposing underlying 
cognitive mechanisms, the misinformation paradigm examines the fallibility of 
already formed memories and the effect external influences may have on distorting 
such memories.   
The classic paradigm involves presenting participants with an event, in this 
case a car crash, and in a later session they are given misleading information about 
the event (Loftus, 1975).  In subsequent recognition memory tests, many 
participants are found to incorporate the misleading information into their memory 
for the event, misremembering the severity of the crash.  Another well-known 
example of this is that from Stark, Okado, and Loftus (2010), where participants 
were shown images of a man stealing a woman’s purse and hiding it in his jacket 
pocket.  In the misinformation stage participants were presented with narratives in 
which the event is described with the alteration that the purse was placed into the 
thief’s pants pocket.  In a later memory test, many participants falsely reported the 
misinformation. Even more compelling is that many participants also reported that 
they remembered these details from the photographs and not just from the 
interview phase.   
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Soon after the popularity of this paradigm became apparent, McCloskey and 
Zaragoza (1985) cautioned that a distinction should be made between the 
acceptance of misinformation and a reconsolidation effect.  Without evidence that 
participants in the original study encoded the stop sign, the misleading suggestion 
of a yield sign does not conflict with a stored memory and may therefore be 
incorporated to fill this gap in the memory.  Therefore, misinformation experiments 
should not only ask if a participant has a memory of the misinformation but also 
what their memory of the source is.  Incorrect source monitoring responses 
subsequently indicate a serious failure in memory and highlight the issue of using 
these memories as evidence. 
As well as implications for clinical and legal settings the misinformation 
paradigm has been applied to various other sectors.  Misinformation is a common 
occurrence in everyday life. As well as occurring through suggestive questioning, 
misinformation can be encountered through discussions with other witnesses, 
doctored photographs, and misrepresentations of events in the media.  Over the 
years there have been several reviews of this literature (e.g. Frenda, Nichols, & 
Loftus, 2011; Loftus, 2005), however, the focus of this chapter is the role emotion 
plays in the manipulation of source memory.  In both clinical and legal settings, 
emotional influences are common and may affect the misinformation acceptance 
rate, either via the individual’s emotional state, the emotional content of the stimuli 
being remembered, or in the case of misinformation, the emotional content of the 
new information being presented.  Chapter 3 contained evidence that at encoding 
emotion enhances activation of related concepts and leads individuals to confuse 
that activation with the stimuli originally presented to them, producing false 
memories for emotionally congruent information.  Within the misinformation 
paradigm, however, the results are not as straightforward.  
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There is evidence that misinformation acceptance is more likely for negative 
stimuli compared to positive and neutral.  It has been argued that this is due in part 
to the increased semantic density (Dougal & Rotello, 2007) or conceptual 
relatedness (Gallo et al., 2009) of negative emotional stimuli.  Increased associations 
between emotional concepts may increase the chances of additional information 
being misremembered as part of the event, just as AAT predicts spreading activation 
increases spontaneous false memory production (Howe et al., 2009).  This has been 
shown with adults viewing photographs (e.g. Gallo, Foster, & Johnson, 2009; Porter, 
Spencer, & Birt, 2003; Van Damme & Smets, 2014), with memory for media (Porter, 
Taylor, & ten Brinke, 2008), and with young children (Otgaar et al., 2008).  This 
enhancement appears to be more so for peripheral details than central (e.g. 
Harmon-Jones, Gable, & Price, 2012; Porter, ten Brinke, Riley, & Baker, 2014; Van 
Damme & Smets, 2014).  In earlier work, the “weapon focus” effect (Loftus, Loftus, 
& Messo, 1987) demonstrates a clear example of this centrality bias.  The arousal 
induced by seeing a weapon focuses attention on the central relevant details (the 
weapon itself), consequently improving memory for those aspects, but at the 
expense of peripheral details, such as the identity of the perpetrator (Christianson & 
Loftus, 1991).  Contradictory to much of the evidence discussed so far, Forgas, 
Laham, and Vargas (2005) failed to find any effect of emotional content on 
misinformation acceptance.  In their experiment participants were given one minute 
to study each emotional image.  In typical settings images are shown briefly on the 
screen and make up part of a whole scene.  Given additional time to study solitary 
images may have overridden any narrowing effects of attention, allowing 
participants to study central and peripheral aspects of both emotional and neutral 
images equally.   
- 127 - 
There are also limits found to the argument that arousal enhances memory 
for central aspects.  Morgan, Southwick, Steffian, Hazlett, and Loftus (2013) 
demonstrated extreme levels of arousal can inhibit memory for all aspects of an 
event and subsequently increase vulnerability to misinformation.  In a mock 
‘prisoners of war camp’ experiment with the U.S. Navy Survival School, participants 
underwent a stressful interrogation. Not only was memory poor for details about 
the interrogation and the interrogator, more than half falsely identified the 
interrogator.  As suggested, the emotional state of the individual is also an 
important consideration as in many cases, the emotional content of the event will 
induce an emotional reaction and subsequently affect memory.   
Autobiographical memories for a Red Sox game were evaluated and positive 
emotion at the time of the event was found to decrease memory consistency, 
through broadening attention, while the opposite effect was found for individuals in 
a negative emotional state (Kensinger & Schacter, 2006).  Hess, Popham, Emery, and 
Elliott (2012) found similar results in younger and older adults, where more positive 
moods at encoding predicted greater endorsement of misinformation.  Arousal 
appears to have similar effects to negative valence as higher inductions of arousal 
during encoding predict decreases in misinformation endorsements (Hoscheidt et 
al., 2014).   
The affect as information hypothesis explains these findings as it states that 
negative emotion encourages item-specific processing while positive emotion 
encourages more abstract heuristic processing.  Negative valence signals item-
specific processing to monitor and solve problems however positive valence signals 
relational processing to encourage seeking out new opportunities (Kensinger, 2009). 
FTT promotes a similar dual-process mechanism by which emotional valence, 
negative more so than positive, would strengthen gist traces (over verbatim traces) 
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leading to an increase in subsequent false memory production (Bookbinder & 
Brainerd, 2016).  In addition to these dual-process theories, AAT (Howe et al., 2009) 
accounts for these findings as spreading activation at encoding is enhanced for 
emotional concepts and these activations confuse later source monitoring 
judgments for consistent misinformation.  With central items being encoded better 
than peripheral, there is an increased chance that central items will be encoded 
correctly but that activation spreading to associated concepts may match that of the 
activation of the true peripheral details present and thus increase susceptibility to 
memory errors even more.   
Each of these theories provides reasonable explanations for the effect of 
emotion at encoding. However, there is less research concerned with the effect of 
emotional states after encoding, specifically at the misinformation stage.  In legal 
and clinical settings, as well as in general everyday scenarios, individuals are often in 
an emotional state when retrieving memories and this is likely to affect the 
susceptibility to misinformation acceptance.  For example, Forgas, Laham, and 
Vargas (2005) induced emotion immediately before misleading questions were 
presented and found that negative emotion decreased, while positive emotion 
increased, the rates of misinformaiton acceptance.  The authors argued that the 
results support accounts that negative valence narrowed attention and focussed 
cognitive processes on item-specific information thus reducing processing of the 
additional misleading details, while positive valence encouraged more heuristic 
processing and broadened attention to such information.  Looking instead at 
arousal, English and Nielson (2010) found that inducing arousal immediately after 
misinformation was presented decreased the endorsement of the misinformation at 
a later memory test.  It is likely in this case that arousal acted to enhance 
reconsolidation of the original memory retrieved, as well as enhancing memory for 
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the misinformation, and more specifically the source of the misinformation.  There 
is evidence in the true memory literature to support this theory as arousal 
immediately after learning has been shown to increase the strength of the memory 
(Finn & Roediger, 2011) possibly by modulating the strength of connections coming 
from the amygdala (Mickley Steinmetz et al., 2010).   
 Much like spontaneous false memories then, the effect of emotion on 
misinformation acceptance depends greatly on whether the emotion is embedded 
in the stimuli or is experienced by the participant.  Negative emotional states 
appear to focus attention on the stimuli, increasing the strength of subsequent 
memories and reducing errors, while negative stimuli increase the chances of false 
memories being produced through increased semantic density among related 
concepts.  AAT accounts for each of these effects when considered alongside 
leading theories of emotion processing.  False memories occur when activation of 
associated, but non-presented, concepts reaches a threshold, likely similar to that of 
the true memories produced.  Information related to negative emotion is more 
densely associated (Dougal & Rotello, 2007) and therefore spreading activation is 
enhanced and related concepts are more likely to be encoded.  Misinformation may 
then be more readily accepted due to the increased source confusion and 
congruency between concepts.  With regard to centrality effects, increased 
attention, and hence activation, of central details increases the strength of the true 
memories and so, while spreading activation may also be greater, the central details 
themselves are protected from errors.  Peripheral details, on the other hand, are 
not only vulnerable to misinformation due to a decrease in attentional processes, 
but also through the increased confusion of additional activated concepts.  The 
reverse effect seen with negative emotional states can be accounted for by the 
attentional bias negative emotion elicits toward relevant stimuli.  As with the 
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central details of emotional stimuli, increased processing through emotional 
attention narrowing leads to better overall memory for the stimuli, and thus a 
decreased vulnerability to errors, essentially negating any corresponding increases 
in spreading activation.   
 Although past research provides some ideas as to the effect of emotion on 
memory errors the question of emotion congruency is yet unanswered.  In addition, 
there is a confound between memory errors for the source of information and 
errors related to suggestibility.  With the typical misinformation paradigm, there are 
many contributing factors to consider, such as memory distrust, whereby 
participants may be easily suggestible due to an innate uncertainty about their own 
memory or a disproportionate trust in others memories or accounts of events 
(Frenda, Nichols, & Loftus, 2011).  The dissociation between the visually presented 
stimuli at encoding and the verbally presented misinformation may increase errors 
through a lack of concrete retrieval cues and a reliance on conceptual activation 
strengths to analyse the content of the memory.  In order to focus more on the 
effect of emotion alone, Experiment 4 uses a modification of the misinformation 
paradigm to reduce these additional, confounding factors. Although by definition 
the standard misinformation phase involves providing misleading details about the 
memorised event, in Experiment 4 participants are exposed to manipulated versions 
of the original images with new items embedded in either the central of peripheral 
focus of the images.  Such a change in the design means that any memories for 
these manipulated images will be true memory traces. However, what is of interest 
is participants’ ability to monitor the source of the images and the production of 
false memories that these embedded images were in fact the original items 
presented.  Often in the media, and especially with the prevalence of fake news 
reports on social media, people may be exposed to a variety of false images.  By 
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removing the element of suggestion, Experiment 4 provides insight into the effect of 
emotion on the production of false memories for the source of information.   
 Although in Chapter 3 the importance of going beyond valence and arousal 
effects to examine discrete emotion effects was stressed, it is still necessary to 
begin with this simplified model of emotion.  Experiment 4 therefore examines the 
induction of negative valence on source memory errors for a variety of negative, 
positive, and neutral images.  The simple exposure aspect of the design, as opposed 
to the standard suggestion procedure, is likely to produce slightly lower levels of 
misinformation acceptance. However, this should, in turn, enable a clearer 
assessment of the effect of emotional content, emotion induction, and emotional 
congruency effects.  
4.3 EXPERIMENT 4: 
Negative Emotion Effects on Source Memory Errors 
Experiment 4 was designed to investigate the combined effect of emotional 
state and the emotional content of the stimuli on source memory for central and 
peripheral details.  Unlike the standard misinformation paradigm, where false 
information is introduced using suggestive techniques, this experiment introduced 
misinformation simply by exposing participants to manipulated stimuli containing 
new additional details.  The emotional state of the participants was manipulated 
using sad and neutral film clips (Rottenberg et al., 2007).  Neutral emotion 
inductions are problematic, as outlined in Chapter 2, in that they can induce a range 
of different emotions, from mild negative to mild positive emotions.  However, in 
Experiment 4, a neutral clip was necessary to avoid confounds of only showing the 
negative emotion group a video clip at the misinformation stage.  In addition, 
sadness was chosen as the negative emotion induction because, as demonstrated in 
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Chapter 2, self-report measures show greater intensity of the emotional experience 
compared to other negative emotion inductions.  
Past research on the effect of emotion on misinformation would suggest 
that misinformation acceptance be greater for negative compared to positive and 
neutral stimuli, and this increase would be most pronounced for peripheral details 
compared to central (e.g. Porter, Spencer, & Birt, 2003; Van Damme & Smets, 2014).  
In addition, the negative emotion induction compared to the neutral should 
increase processing of the manipulated image and increase the strength of any new 
memory traces formed.  In the case of peripheral details this would likely result in 
an increase in source monitoring errors due to increased endorsement rates.  
Whereas for central details participants are most likely to recognise these as false 
and the increased processing should enhance source memory for these details.   
 Considering discrete emotion theories and the issue of appraisals and 
motivations, interactions between the emotion and the central and peripheral 
details are only likely if the central details are relevant to the motivations of the 
participant at the time of encoding (Kaplan, Van Damme, & Levine, 2012).  Given the 
complexity and variety of concepts presented in the images it is unlikely that an 
emotional component alone will have such an effect on the pattern of results.  AAT 
predicts an increase in the source monitoring errors if the misinformation is 
consistent with the original spreading activation, without a motivational component 
there should be no distinction between so-called central and peripheral details and 
therefore errors are equally likely.  The congruency between the emotion induction 
and the emotional content of the stimuli may inflate memories for misinformation 
items.  AAT would predict faster and stronger activation of the negative stimuli, 
resulting in increased processing, as the same concepts would already be activated 
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by the induction.  Therefore, processing of misinformation items in congruent 
stimuli would be enhanced, leading to an increased likelihood of errors.   
4.3.1 Method 
Participants 
A total of 59 volunteers (16 male) from within and around City, University of 
London participated, with an age range of 18-47 (M = 21.81, SD = 5.89).  For an 80% 
chance of finding a medium effect size with an alpha of .05 we need 58 participants.  
An additional 43 participants completed voluntary online pilot surveys to create the 
stimuli sets (10-12 participants completed each of 4 surveys).  Participants were 
fully informed, for the pilot and main experimental procedure, as to the emotional, 
and at times disturbing, nature of the stimuli.  However, participants in the memory 
experiment were not informed that some of the images shown again at session 2 
had been altered from their original state.  This deception was explained fully in the 
debrief procedure and participants were reminded of their right to withdraw their 
data at this time.   
Design 
The experiment was conducted across three short sessions, each conducted 
on three consecutive days.  A 2 (Emotion: negative, neutral) x 3 (Stimuli: negative, 
neutral, positive) x 2 (Change: central, peripheral) x 3 (Presentation: session 1, 
session 2, session 1&2) mixed design was used, where Emotion was a between-
participants variable, and Stimuli, Change, and Presentation were within-participant 
variables.  The dependent variable was recognition responses and post-hoc 
measures were taken of recollective experience and source monitoring.  
Recognition responses were recorded for true items presented only on day 1, true 
items presented again on day 2, misinformation items, and filler items.  Recollective 
experience was measured using the standard remember, know, guess paradigm, 
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where remember responses correspond to explicit memory for item presentation, 
know corresponds to familiar items, and guess corresponds to recognition 
responses based upon guess work.  For items recognised by participants, source-
monitoring questions were used to determine from which of the two proceeding 
sessions the participants remember the item being presented.  Participants were 
randomly allocated to the Emotion groups with roughly an equal number in each, 
and Stimuli, Change, and Presentation were counterbalanced across 6 permutations 
of the experiment.   
Permutations/Counterbalancing.  A total of 24 image pairs were created for 
each emotion category: negative, neutral, and positive (72 in total).  For each 
category, the images were split into 3 sub-groups and arranged so that mean 
valence, arousal, and pair-similarity scores were equal across sub-groups.  All sub-
groups also had an equal split of image pairs with central or peripheral changes.  
Sub-groups were then matched, across the different emotion categories, on mean 
pair-similarity scores to create three super-ordinate groups of image pairs, each 
containing 24 images (8 Negative, 8 Positive, 8 Neutral [50% Peripheral changes, 
50% Central changes]).  Each of the three super-ordinate groupings were then used 
in the experiment as either true items presented once at session 1 (no-reminder), 
true items presented at session 1 and again at session 2 (reminder), or 
misinformation items presented in their original form in session 1 but changed 
when presented at session 2.  Six permutations of the experiment were created to 
allow for all combinations of this. 
Stimuli Creation 
 Images were first selected from The International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999) which provides arousal and valence ratings 
for each image and therefore facilitates the creation of emotion related sub-groups.  
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Three groups were created; positive, neutral, and negative images.  Negative images 
were classified as those images with valence ratings below 3, neutral between 4 and 
5, and positive above 7.  Images with valence ratings between 3 and 4, and 6 and 7 
were excluded to avoid ambiguity between the sub-groups, and images with an 
arousal rating above 5.5 were excluded in order to reduce the difference in arousal 
between the emotion, positive and negative, and neutral groups.   
Images were altered using the freely available GNU Image Manipulation 
Program (GIMP; www.gimp.org) by either adding or removing central or peripheral 
items.  Changes were validated as being related to either central or peripheral 
aspects of the images by 4 independent researchers and only images with an 
agreement of 75% or more were used.  Three initial pilot surveys were created, one 
for each sub-group, with 32 pairs of images in each.  Ratings for noticeable 
differences between image pairs were measured on a 7-point Likert scale and 
individual image ratings of arousal and valence were measured on a 9-point Likert 
scale, and were used to calculate differences in arousal and valence within the pairs.  
Image pairs differing in average arousal or valence ratings by more than 1 point 
were excluded as well as those with average ratings for noticeable differences 
below 4 ('moderately’) or above 6 (‘very’).  Finally, an additional pilot survey was 
created to bring the total number of usable image pairs to 24 per sub-group (see 
Appendix E). 
Materials 
 To-be-remembered stimuli were made up of 72 IAPS images with an 
additional 15 IAPS images used as filler items in the recognition test.  Of these 72 
images, 24 were negative, 24 were neutral, and 24 were positive (the same 1:1:1 
ratio was used for the 15 filler items).  Within each of these emotion groups, 12 had 
central aspects changed and 12 had peripheral details changed.  Although changes 
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were made to images by both adding and removing aspects, images presented in 
the first session were always the version with missing aspects.  Misinformation 
items were therefore characterised as having new aspects not originally present in 
the images.  Figure 4.1 shows examples of the image pairs. 
 Film clips to induce emotion were chosen from those normed by Rottenberg 
et al. (2007).  Negative emotion (sadness) was induced using a clip from the film 
“Champ” in which a young boy cries over the death of his father, and neutral 
emotion was induced using a clip from the film “All the President’s Men” in which a 
reporter is asking questions around a courtroom.  Both videos lasted approximately 
5 minutes.  The neutral clip chosen has been shown to induce little to no changes in 
emotional experience (Rottenberg et al., 2007), and in particular in Chapter 2 was 
shown to be elicit minimal changes in valence.  Emotional states were validated 
using the self-assessment manikin (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994). 
Procedure 
There were three experimental sessions, completed on consecutive days, and each 
lasted approximately 10 minutes.  In session 1 participants completed the SAM and 
were shown 72 images, presented in a random order for 5 seconds each with a 
fixation cross between each, presented for 500ms.  In session 2 participants 
watched either the neutral or negative clip and completed a second SAM.  Following 
this, participants saw a second slide show of images, again presented in a random 
order for 5 seconds with a fixation between.  The second slide show consisted of 48 
images, 24 seen previously, and 24 manipulated versions of those seen previously.  
Participants were informed at this stage that they would see a shortened slide show 
of images to that seen in session 1.  No indication was given as to whether the 
images were the same or new images, participants were simply asked to try to 
remember as many as possible.   
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In session 3 participants completed another SAM and a recognition test with 
63 images.  Participants were shown 24 misinformation images, 12 original images 
shown at time 1 only, 12 original images shown at both time 1 and time 2, and 15 
filler images.  For images recognised as ‘old’ participants were asked to report if 
recognition was based on a remember, know, or guess judgement (Rajaram, 1993), 
as well as providing source monitoring information whereby they indicated whether 
they recognise the image from session 1, 2 or both.  Participants were lastly asked 
to complete a forced choice task in which they were shown the pairs of images 
(original and manipulated) and asked to select which image was presented at time 
1.  ‘Unsure’ was provided as an option to reduce results at chance level. 
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Figure 4.1: Example Image pairs presented in either their original form or as 
manipulated (misinformation) images 
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4.3.2 Results 
One participant was removed from the analysis as their valence score 
following the negative induction was higher than before, leaving 31 participants in 
the negative group and 27 in the neutral group. 
Emotion Manipulation 
Separate 2 (Emotion: negative, neutral) x 3 (Time: Encoding, 
Misinformation, Test) ANOVAs were run for arousal and valence scores (see Table 
4.1).  For arousal there was no significant effect of Time, F(2, 112) = .79, p = .46, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.01, Emotion, F(1, 56) = 1.21, p = .28, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, or significant interaction effect of 
Time x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .64, p = .53, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01.  For valence scores there was a 
significant effect of Time, F(2, 112) = 22.92, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .29, Emotion, F(1, 56) = 
4.90, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .08, and a significant interaction effect of Time x Emotion, F(2, 
112) = 25.15, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .29.  Post-hoc analyses of the valence scores showed 
that differences between the negative and neutral group were not significant at 
encoding, p = .34, nor at the recognition test, p = .55. However, at the 
misinformation stage the valence scores for the negative group (M = 3.90, SD = 
1.74) were significantly lower than the neutral group (M = 6.26, SD = 1.10), p < .001. 
Recognition and Source Memory  
Results were separated into the recognition responses of old, remember, 
know, and guess.  Because guess responses for misinformation items were at floor 
these data were not analysed further.  Memory was analysed in two ways.  First 
incorrect source monitoring responses for misinformation items were analysed as a 
function of the emotion induction, emotional content of the images, and the 
location of the misinformation (central versus peripheral).  Second, recognition 
memory rates were analysed for target items.  Source monitoring responses for 
target items shown on both sessions could be argued as correct regardless of the 
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response given therefore only recognition rates were analysed for these images.  
For filler items the reverse is true – that no source monitoring responses are correct 
therefore only recognition responses were analysed (see Table 4.2 for descriptive 
statistics).   However, results of this analysis are omitted from the chapter because 
the values were extremely low and there were no significant main or interaction 
effects (all p’s > .05; see Appendix F). 
 
Table 4.1: Arousal and Valence ratings for each emotion group at each stage of 
the experiment 
 
  
Encoding 
 
Misinformation 
 
Recognition 
 
  
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
Arousal          
 Negative 
 
3.63 2.01 
 
3.97* 1.56 
 
4.00 2.17 
 Neutral 
 
4.19 2.22 
 
4.07* 1.73 
 
4.56 1.93 
Valence          
 Negative  6.73 1.14  3.80* 1.67  6.53 1.14 
 Neutral  6.37 1.28  6.26* 1.10  6.07 1.47 
* post-emotion induction ratings 
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Table 4.2: Proportion of false recognition of filler items, for each emotion group, as a function of recognition response and stimuli emotion 
  
Negative Group 
 
Neutral Group 
 
    
95% CI 
   
95% CI 
 
  
M SE LL UL 
 
M SE LL UL 
 
Overall Recognition 
          
 
Positive .08 .03 .02 .15  .08 .02 .03 .13 
 
 
Neutral .06 .02 .01 .11  .09 .03 .03 .14 
 
 
Negative .06 .02 .02 .11  .10 .03 .04 .16 
 
Remember 
 
         
 
Positive .03 .01 .00 .06  .01 .01 -.01 .04 
 
 
Neutral .02 .01 .00 .04  .03 .02 -.01 .07 
 
 
Negative .02 .01 .00 .04  .02 .01 .00 .05 
 
Know 
 
         
 
Positive .01 .01 -.01 .03  .03 .01 .00 .06 
 
 
Neutral .01 .01 -.01 .03  .01 .01 -.01 .04 
 
 
Negative .02 .01 .00 .04  .04 .02 .00 .08 
 
Guess 
 
         
 
Positive .04 .03 -.02 .10  .04 .02 .01 .07 
 
 
Neutral .03 .02 -.01 .06  .04 .02 .00 .09 
 
 
Negative .03 .02 -.01 .06  .03 .02 -.01 .07 
 
- 1
4
1
 - 
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Misinformation items.  Incorrect source monitoring responses for 
misinformation items were analysed for old responses, and then for remember, 
know, and guess responses using a 2 (Emotion: negative, neutral) x 3 (Stimuli: 
negative, neutral, positive) x 2 (Change: central, peripheral) mixed ANOVA, for ‘both 
session’ responses (see Table 4.3) and then for ‘session 1 only’ responses (see Table 
4.4).  In cases where the assumption of sphericity was violated the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction is reported.   
Source monitoring for sessions 1 and 2.  For old recognition the ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = 8.68, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .13, no 
significant main effect of Change, F(1, 56) = .25, p = .62, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, and no main effect 
of Emotion, F(1, 56) = .13, p = .72, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00.  There was also no significant interaction 
effects of Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .55, p = .58, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, Change x Emotion, F(1, 
56) = 0, p = .97, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.00, Stimuli x Change, F(2, 112) = .56, p = .57, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01 or Stimuli 
x Change x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .45, p = .64, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01.  Post-hoc analysis of the main 
effect of Stimuli showed that false memories for negative stimuli (M = .43, SD = .27) 
were significantly greater than positive (M = .32, SD = .25), p < .01, and neutral 
stimuli (M = .34, SD = .28), p < .01, and the difference between neutral and positive 
was not significant, p = 1.00.  This finding supports a plethora of past research 
showing that misinformation acceptance is more likely for negative information (e.g. 
Gallo et al., 2009; Porter, Spencer, & Birt, 2003; Van Damme & Smets, 2014) and 
extends it to this simplified paradigm.  This finding is typically found more so for 
peripheral compared to central information (Harmon-Jones, Gable, & Price, 2012; 
Porter, ten Brinke, Riley, & Baker, 2014). However, the current results show no such 
distinction.   
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Table 4.3: Proportion of false ‘session 1 and 2’ source monitoring responses for each emotion group, as a function of recognition response, stimuli 
emotion, and type of misinformation  
   
Negative Group 
 
Neutral Group 
 
     
95% CI 
   
95% CI 
 
   
M SE LL UL 
 
M SE LL UL 
 
Overall Recognition 
           
 
Positive Central .29 .04 .21 .37 
 
.34 .05 .24 .44 
 
  
Peripheral .31 .04 .22 .41 
 
.33 .06 .22 .45 
 
 Neutral Central .36 .05 .26 .47 
 
.36 .05 .25 .47 
 
  
Peripheral .33 .05 .23 .43 
 
.30 .05 .19 .40 
 
 
Negative Central .43 .05 .32 .53 
 
.43 .05 .32 .53 
 
  
Peripheral .40 .05 .30 .50 
 
.47 .05 .36 .58 
 
             
Remember 
           
 
Positive Central .26 .04 .18 .34 
 
.30 .05 .20 .40 
 
  
Peripheral .27 .05 .17 .36 
 
.29 .06 .17 .41 
 
 
Neutral Central .29 .05 .18 .40 
 
.31 .06 .19 .42 
 
  
Peripheral .28 .05 .17 .39 
 
.26 .05 .15 .37 
 
 
Negative Central .36 .05 .25 .47 
 
.34 .05 .23 .45 
 
  
Peripheral .33 .05 .23 .43 
 
.39 .06 .27 .51 
 
             
- 1
4
3
 - 
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Know 
           
 
Positive Central .03 .02 -.01 .07 
 
.05 .02 .01 .09 
 
  
Peripheral .04 .02 -.01 .09 
 
.03 .02 -.01 .07 
 
 
Neutral Central .07 .04 .00 .15 
 
.06 .03 .00 .11 
 
  
Peripheral .04 .02 .00 .08 
 
.04 .02 -.01 .08 
 
 
Negative Central .06 .03 .00 .13 
 
.07 .03 .01 .14 
 
  
Peripheral .06 .03 .00 .11 
 
.06 .03 .01 .12 
 
             
Guess 
           
 Positive Central - - - - 
 
- - - - 
 
  
Peripheral .01 .01 -.01 .02 
 
.02 .01 -.01 .04 
 
 
Neutral Central - - - - 
 
- - - - 
 
  
Peripheral .01 .01 -.01 .02 
 
- - - - 
 
 
Negative Central - - - - 
 
.01 .01 -.01 .03 
 
  
Peripheral .02 .01 -.01 .04 
 
.02 .01 -.01 .04 
 
* values are omitted where data is constant at zero 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 1
4
4
 - 
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Table 4.4: Proportion of false ‘session 1 only’ source monitoring responses for each emotion group, as a function of recognition response, stimuli 
emotion, and type of misinformation 
   
Negative Group 
 
Neutral Group 
 
     
95% CI 
   
95% CI 
 
   
M SE LL UL 
 
M SE LL UL 
 
Overall Recognition 
           
 
Positive Central .19 .03 .12 .26 
 
.23 .05 .13 .33 
 
  
Peripheral .18 .04 .11 .25 
 
.22 .04 .13 .31 
 
 Neutral Central .13 .03 .06 .20 
 
.19 .05 .08 .29 
 
  
Peripheral .21 .04 .13 .29 
 
.20 .04 .12 .29 
 
 
Negative Central .11 .03 .05 .18 
 
.14 .04 .06 .21 
 
  
Peripheral .18 .04 .10 .26 
 
.20 .04 .11 .29 
 
             
Remember 
           
 
Positive Central .17 .03 .11 .23 
 
.11 .03 .04 .18 
 
  
Peripheral .14 .03 .07 .21 
 
.12 .03 .06 .18 
 
 
Neutral Central .10 .03 .05 .16 
 
.17 .05 .06 .27 
 
  
Peripheral .16 .03 .09 .23 
 
.14 .03 .08 .20 
 
 
Negative Central .10 .03 .04 .16 
 
.11 .04 .04 .19 
 
  
Peripheral .15 .04 .07 .22 
 
.14 .04 .06 .22 
 
             
- 1
4
5
 - 
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Know 
           
 
Positive Central .02 .01 .00 .05 
 
.06 .02 .01 .11 
 
  
Peripheral .03 .02 .00 .06 
 
.06 .03 .01 .12 
 
 
Neutral Central .02 .01 .00 .05 
 
.02 .01 -.01 .04 
 
  
Peripheral .02 .01 -.01 .04 
 
.02 .01 -.01 .04 
 
 
Negative Central .02 .01 -.01 .04 
 
.03 .02 .00 .06 
 
  
Peripheral .02 .01 .00 .05 
 
.04 .02 .00 .07 
 
             
Guess 
           
 Positive Central - - - - 
 
.06 .03 .01 .12 
 
  
Peripheral .01 .01 -.01 .02 
 
.04 .02 .00 .07 
 
 
Neutral Central - - - - 
 
- - - - 
 
  
Peripheral .03 .02 .00 .06 
 
.04 .02 -.01 .08 
 
 
Negative Central - - - - 
 
- - - - 
 
  
Peripheral .01 .01 -.01 .02 
 
.03 .02 .00 .06 
 
* values are omitted where data is constant at zero 
 
 
 
- 1
4
6
 - 
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 For remember recognition responses (Figure 4.2) the ANOVA revealed 
similar results to before, with a significant main effect of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = 4.55, p 
< .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .08, no significant main effect of Change, F(1, 56) = .16, p = .69, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.00, 
and no main effect of Emotion, F(1, 56) = .08, p = .79, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00.  There was also no 
significant interaction effects of Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .17, p = .84, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.00, 
Change x Emotion, F(1, 56) = .05, p = .83, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.00, Stimuli x Change, F(2, 112) = .22, p 
= .81, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.00, or Stimuli x Change x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .65, p = .52, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01.  Post-
hoc analyses again showed that false source monitoring responses were significantly 
greater for negative stimuli (M = .36, SD = .26) compared to positive (M = .28, SD = 
.22), p < .05, and neutral stimuli (M = .28, SD = .25), p < .05, and the difference 
between neutral and positive was not significant, p = 1.00. 
 For know responses there was a significant main effect of Stimuli, F(1.7, 
94.9) = 4.35, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .07, where responses were significantly greater for 
negative stimuli (M = .07, SD = .14) compared to positive (M = .04, SD = .09), p < .05, 
but not neutral (M = .05, SD = .14), p = .20, and the difference between neutral and 
positive was not significant, p = .53.  The ANOVA also revealed no main effect of 
Change, F(1, 56) = 1.75, p = .19, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03,  or Emotion, F(1, 56) = 0, p = 1, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00.  
There was also no interaction effect of Stimuli x Emotion, F(1.7, 94.9) = .5, p = .58, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, Change x Emotion, F(1, 56) = .06, p = .81, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, Stimuli x Change, 
F(1.67, 93.63) = .26, p = .73, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, or Stimuli x Change x Emotion, F(1.67, 93.63) = 
.23, p = .76, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00.   
Source monitoring for session 1.  For old recognition responses the ANOVA 
revealed no significant main effects of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = 1.87, p = .16, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, 
Change, F(1, 56) = 3.67, p = .06, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06, Emotion, F(1, 56) = .71, p = .4, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, nor 
significant interaction effects of Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .07, p = .94, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.00, 
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Change x Emotion, F(1, 56) = .27, p = .61, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, Stimuli x Change, F(2, 112) = 1.64, 
p = .2, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03,  or Stimuli x Change x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .35, p = .7, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .01.  The 
same was found for remember responses as there was no significant main effects of 
Stimuli, F(2, 112) = .44, p = .64, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, Change, F(1, 56) = .82, p = .37, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, 
Emotion, F(1, 56) = .02, p = .88, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, nor significant interaction effects of Stimuli 
x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .97, p = .38, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.02, Change x Emotion, F(1, 56) = .49, p = .49, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, Stimuli x Change, F(2, 112) = .61, p = .55, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01,  or Stimuli x Change x 
Emotion, F(2, 112) = .97, p = .38, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01.   
 For know responses the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Stimuli, 
F(1.58, 88.71) = 17.24, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .24, where feelings of familiarity were greater 
for negative stimuli (M = .12, SD = .16) compared to positive  (M = .04, SD = .09), p < 
.01, and neutral (M = .02, SD = .05), p < .01, stimuli.  However, there was no 
significant difference between positive and neutral stimuli, p = .19.  Negative stimuli 
are more densely related and associated and this increased noise can account for 
the source memory errors for familiar stimuli.  The ANOVA also revealed no main 
effect of Change, F(1, 56) = 1.42, p = .24, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, Emotion, F(1, 56) = .37, p = .54, 𝜂𝑝
2 
= .01, or interaction effect of Stimuli x Emotion, F(1.58, 88.71) = .48, p = .58, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.01, Change x Emotion, F(1, 56) = .03, p = .88, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, Stimuli x Change, F(1.48, 
82.83) = 1.04, p = .34, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, Stimuli x Change x Emotion, F(1.48, 82.83) = .13, p = 
.82, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .0.   
Target items.  Correct source monitoring responses for target items were 
analysed for old responses, and then for remember, know, and guess responses (see 
Table 4.5) using a 2 (Emotion: negative, neutral) x 3 (Stimuli: negative, neutral, 
positive) x 2 (Presentation: reminder, no-reminder) mixed ANOVA.  In cases where 
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the assumption of sphericity was violated the Greenhouse-Geisser correction is 
reported.   
For old recognition responses there was a significant main effect of 
Presentation, F(1, 56) = 154.59, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .73, whereby recognition was 
significantly greater for the reminder condition (M = .85, SD = .22) compared to the 
no-reminder condition (M = .60, SD = .28), p < .001.   There was no significant effect 
of Emotion, F(1, 56) = .00, p = 0.97, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, but a significant effect of Stimuli, F(2, 
112) = 3.92, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .07, whereby recognition was significantly greater for 
neutral images (M = .75, SD = .25) compared to positive images (M = .68, SD = .26), p 
< .05, but no differences where significant with the negative images (M = .73, SD = 
.24), p = .13, p = 1.00.  For the interaction effects, there was a significant effect of 
Reminder x Emotion, F(1, 56) = 9.17, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.14, and Reminder x Stimuli, F(2, 
112) = 5.14, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .08, but no significant effect of Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) 
= .22, p =  .81, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, or Reminder x Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .88, p = .42, 𝜂𝑝
2 
= .02.   
Post-hoc analyses of the interactions revealed that within the negative 
emotion group recognition was significantly higher for the reminder condition (M = 
.82, SD = .22) compared to no-reminder (M = .62, SD = .24), p < .05.  The same 
pattern is seen in the neutral group, however the difference between the reminder 
condition (M = .88, SD = .12) and no-reminder (M = .56, SD = .18), p < .05, is greater.  
Recognition for the reminder condition is also significantly greater compared to the 
no-reminder condition when the results are broken down into negative stimuli (M = 
.84, SD = .22; M = .63, SD = .27), p < .001, positive (M = .85, SD = .23; M = .50, SD = 
.30), p < .001 and neutral (M = .84, SD = .22; M = .65, SD = .28), p < .001, however 
the difference is greatest in the positive condition.  
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For remember responses (Figure 4.3) there was a significant main effect of 
Presentation, F(1, 56) = 81.87, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.59, whereby recognition was 
significantly greater for the reminder condition (M = .68, SD = .28) compared to the 
no-reminder condition (M = .43, SD = .21), p < .001.   There was no significant effect 
of Emotion, F(1, 56) = 0.18, p = 0.67, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, but a significant effect of Stimuli, F(2, 
112) = 8.33, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .13, whereby recognition was significantly greater for 
neutral images (M = .60, SD = .28) compared to positive images (M = .50, SD = .24), p 
< .01, and significantly greater for negative images (M = .58, SD = .26) compared to 
positive, p < .01, but there was no different between negative and neutral images, p 
= 1.00.  For the interaction effects, there was a significant effect of Reminder x 
Emotion, F(1, 56) = 7.40, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.12, and Reminder x Stimuli, F(2, 112) = 5.17, p 
< .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .09, but no significant effect of Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .08, p = 
0.92, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, or Reminder x Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = 0.96, p = 0.39, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02.   
Post-hoc analyses of the interactions revealed that same pattern of results 
as the old responses.  Responses for the reminder condition were significantly 
greater than the no-reminder condition in both the negative group (M = .66, SD = 
.30; M = .48, SD = .23), p < .001, and neutral group (M = .70, SD = .29; M = .38, SD = 
.21), p < .001, but the difference was greater in the neutral group.  Recognition for 
the reminder condition was also significantly greater compared than the no-
reminder condition when the results were broken down into negative stimuli (M = 
.67, SD = .32; M = .48, SD = .28), p < .001, positive (M = .67, SD = .33; M = .31, SD = 
.28), p < .001 and neutral (M = .69, SD = .32; M = .51, SD = .32), p < .001, however 
the difference is again greatest in the positive condition.  
For the know responses there was no significant effect of Reminder, F(1, 56) 
= 1.34, p = .25, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, Stimuli, F(2, 112) = .72, p = .49, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, Emotion, F(1, 56) = 
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.13, p = .72, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, or Reminder x Emotion, F(1, 56) = .02, p = .89, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, Stimuli 
x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .34, p = .71, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, Reminder x Stimuli, F(2, 112) = .08, p = 
.93, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, or Reminder x Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = 2.23, p = .11, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04.  For 
the guess responses however there was a significant effect of Reminder, F(1, 56) = 
5.16, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .08, whereby responses were significantly higher for the no-
reminder condition (M = .05, SD = .08) compared to the reminder condition (M = 
.03, SD = .05).  There was no significant effect of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = .36, p = 0.70, 𝜂𝑝
2 
=.01, Emotion, F(1, 56) = 1.08, p = 0.30, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.02, or interaction effects of Reminder x 
Emotion, F(1, 56) = 2.88, p = 0.1, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.05, Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .48, p = .62, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, Reminder x Stimuli, F(2, 112) =.38, p = 0.69, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, Reminder x Stimuli x 
Emotion, F(2, 112) = .09, p = .92, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00.  
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Table 4.5: Proportion of correct recognition responses for each emotion group as a function of recognition responses, stimuli emotion, and reminder 
condition 
   
Negative Group 
 
Neutral Group 
 
     
95% CI 
   
95% CI 
 
   
M SE LL UL 
 
M SE LL UL 
 
Overall Recognition 
           
 
Positive Reminder .53 .06 .41 .65  .47 .05 .37 .58 
 
  
No Reminder .82 .05 .72 .93  .88 .03 .82 .95 
 
 Neutral Reminder .69 .05 .58 .79  .61 .05 .5 .71 
 
  
No Reminder .79 .05 .69 .89  .91 .03 .85 .96 
 
 
Negative Reminder .65 .05 .55 .76  .61 .05 .51 .72 
 
  
No Reminder .83 .05 .74 .92  .84 .03 .77 .91 
 
             
Remember 
           
 
Positive Reminder .35 .06 .23 .46  .29 .05 .19 .38 
 
  
No Reminder .67 .06 .54 .80  .68 .06 .55 .80 
 
 
Neutral Reminder .58 .06 .46 .70  .43 .06 .31 .55 
 
  
No Reminder .65 .06 .53 .77  .73 .06 .61 .86 
 
 
Negative Reminder .52 .05 .42 .63  .44 .06 .32 .55 
 
  
No Reminder .65 .06 .53 .76  .70 .06 .58 .83 
 
             
- 1
5
2
 - 
- 153 - 
 
Know            
 
Positive Reminder .14 .03 .07 .21  .11 .03 .05 .17 
 
  
No Reminder .11 .04 .02 .20  .18 .05 .08 .28 
 
 
Neutral Reminder .09 .03 .03 .14  .11 .03 .05 .18 
 
  
No Reminder .11 .04 .02 .20  .14 .06 .02 .26 
 
 
Negative Reminder .08 .02 .03 .13  .11 .03 .04 .18 
 
  
No Reminder .15 .04 .08 .23  .11 .04 .03 .19 
 
             
Guess 
           
 Positive Reminder .05 .02 .00 .09  .07 .02 .03 .12 
 
  
No Reminder .04 .02 .00 .08  .03 .02 .00 .06 
 
 
Neutral Reminder .02 .01 -.01 .04  .06 .03 .01 .12 
 
  
No Reminder .02 .01 .00 .05  .04 .02 .00 .07 
 
 
Negative Reminder .05 .02 .00 .09  .06 .02 .02 .11 
 
  
No Reminder .03 .02 .00 .06  .03 .02 .00 .06 
 
- 1
5
3
 - 
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Figure 4.2: Proportion of incorrect, session 1 and 2, source memory responses for 
misinformation items for each emotion group, as a function of the stimuli emotion 
and location of the embedded detail (error bars represent SD) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Proportion of correct recognition of target items for each emotion 
group, as a function of the stimuli emotion and presentation reminder (error bars 
represent SD) 
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Signal Detection Analysis  
Signal detection analysis was conducted with correct recognition responses 
to target items and false recognition of filler items10.  Because there were many 
proportion rates of 0 and 1, the data were transformed using the Snodgrass 
correction (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999).   
Sensitivity analysis.  For old recognition responses to target items, the 
corresponding d’ scores yielded no significant effect of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = 2.08, p = 
.13, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, Emotion, F(1, 56) = .06, p = 0.80, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, or interaction effect effect of 
Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .53, p = .59, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01.  Results for the remember 
responses revealed a significant effect of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = 5.04, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .08, 
whereby participants responding was more selective toward target than filler items 
for negative (M = .35, SD = .14) and neutral stimuli (M = .35, SD = .15) when 
compared to positive stimuli (M = .30, SD = .16), p < .05 and < .05.  The analysis also 
showed no significant effect of Emotion, F(1, 56) = 1.65, p = .21, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, or 
interaction effect of Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .09, p = .92, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00.  Know 
responses gave no significant effects of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = 0.75, p = .48, , 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, 
Emotion, F(1, 56) = .17, p = .68, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, or Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .73, p = 
.49, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01.  Guess responses also showed no effects of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = .35, p = 
.70, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, Emotion, F(1, 56) = 3.54, p = .07, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06, Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = 
1.47, p = .24, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03.  
Response bias analysis.  The criterion C scores for old responses showed no 
significant effect of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = 1.42, p = .25, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, or interaction effect of 
Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .20, p = .82, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, but a significant effect of 
Emotion, F(1, 56) = 12.51, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .18.  Participants in the neutral group (M = 
                                                 
10
 The same analyses were conducted using the false memory data as the target responses 
but no significant effects were found in any category. See Appendix G. 
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1.59, SD = .07) were more selective in their responding compared to the negative 
group (M = 1.53, SD = .08), p < .01.  For the remember responses there was a 
significant main effect of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = 5.33, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .09.  As criterion C 
scores show that responses for positive stimuli (M = 1.63, SD = .07) were more 
selective than responses for neutral stimuli (M = 1.61, SD = .08), p < .05, however, 
the difference between negative stimuli (M = 1.61, SD = .08) and positive and 
neutral stimuli was not significant, p = .06 and p = 1.00 respectively.  This is 
somewhat contradictory to previous research that has shown that participants are 
more liberal in their responses to negative stimuli compared to neutral and positive 
(Dougal & Rotello, 2007).  There was no significant effect of Emotion, F(1, 56) = 2.85, 
p = .10, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .05, or interaction effect of Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .16, p = .85, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .00.  For know responses there was no significant effect of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = 
1.13, p = 0.33, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, Emotion, F(1, 56) = 2.02, p = .16, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, or Stimuli x 
Emotion, F(2, 112) = 1.88, p = .16, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03.  Finally, for guess responses there was 
no significant main effect of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = .75, p = .48, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.01, or Emotion, 
F(1, 56) = 2.88, p = .10, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .05, however, there was a significant interaction effect 
of Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = 4.15, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .07.  Within the negative group 
there were no significant differences between scores for positive stimuli (M = 1.77, 
SD = .06), negative stimuli (M = 1.77, SD = .06), and neutral stimuli (M = 1.76, SD = 
.06), all p’s > .05.  Within the neutral group, however, participant’s responses were 
more selective for the neutral stimuli (M = 1.80, SD = .02) compared to the positive 
stimuli (M = 1.77, SD = .04), p < .05.  The difference between the positive and 
negative stimuli (M = 1.79, SD = .03) was not significant, p = .24, nor was the 
difference between the negative and neutral stimuli, p = .41. 
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4.3.3 Summary 
Experiment 4 investigated the direct effect of emotion on false memories 
for the source of information using manipulated images.  Although typical 
misinformation experiments introduce misinformation through suggestive and 
misleading verbal information, with the prevalence of erroneous visual information 
and questionable sources it is also important to consider source memory errors for 
simple manipulated images.  Experiment 4 therefore measured errors in 
participants’ memory for the source of manipulated emotional images and the 
effect of emotion during the encoding of these new images. 
The results supported the hypothesis that memory errors would be greater 
for negative images compared to positive and neutral images.  This is seen within 
the overall recognition memory and explicit memories for manipulated images 
falsely remembered as being presented during both sessions.  There is also evidence 
of this within the recognition responses for images reported as being familiar.  
Although the explicit memory data is the key interest, as it gives the strongest 
indication of an existing memory trace and has great theoretical implications, the 
familiarity judgements are also important to consider from a practical perspective.  
In most everyday situations, a feeling of familiarity can be enough for individuals to 
report having a memory of an event.  Combined with motivation to use the 
memory, for example, to help solve a crime, or getting to the route of an underlying 
psychological issue, individuals’ confidence in, and reporting of, these memories 
may be inflated.   
The response bias literature would caution that these effects are not a 
reflection of memory but of more liberal responding associated with negative 
stimuli (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Windmann & Kutas, 2001). However, the analysis of 
sensitivity and response bias scores revealed no significant effect of the emotional 
- 158 - 
content of the stimuli or the emotion induction.  In addition, this explanation relates 
specifically to increased responding with recognition responses, whereas the results 
from Experiment 4 considered source memory responses.  While more liberal 
responding may inflate recognition rates, it is not clear whether this would extend 
to source memory errors.   
This effect of negative stimuli is also seen in previous misinformation 
research (e.g. Otgaar et al., 2008; Porter, Spencer, & Birt, 2003; Porter, Taylor, & ten 
Brinke, 2008; Van Damme & Smets, 2014).  An additional effect often found in the 
literature is that misinformation acceptance is also greater for peripheral details 
compared to central (Harmon-Jones, Gable, & Price, 2012; Porter, ten Brinke, Riley, 
& Baker, 2014; Van Damme & Smets, 2014). However, the results from this study 
found no such distinction.  Centrality effects are attributed to a narrowing of 
memory for central, relevant, details that leaves the periphery vulnerable to more 
errors.  Levine and Edelstein (2009) argued, however, that discrepanies in the 
reulsts of memory narrowing due to emotion could be explained by the view that 
the narrowing is related to the current goals of the individual.  Given the variety of 
emotional scenes presented in the images, and lack of a consistent focus or story, 
there was no specific motivation tied to the content and thus no distinction was 
made between central and peripheral information.    
Experiment 4 also examined the effect of the negative emotion induction, 
and emotion congruency but found no effect of either.  It was predicted that the 
negative emotional state would increase processing and encoding of the 
misinformation images, thus increasing source monitoring for manipulations 
identified as new and increasing errors for those misidentified as old.  In addition, 
spreading activations as a result of the induction were predicted to increase source 
confusions for congruent images.  However, these congruency effects may be 
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specific to discrete emotions whereas the present design manipulated negative 
valence only.  Assocations between sadness and the variety of negative images 
shown may be too convoluted. 
 So far the experiments and research disucssed focus solely on manipulating 
explicit details of a memory or event. However, the affect qualities of the emotions 
have not yet been considered.  The emotions assoicated with specific memories 
have obvious implications for clinical settings, and as demonstrated in Chapter 1, 
autobiographical recall can be an effective emotion induction tool.  Over time 
memories may become assoicated with specific emotions. However, if these 
emotions don’t match the original manner in which the memory was encoded they 
can be argued to be false.  Experiment 5, therefore, investigates whether mundane 
neutral memories can be altered from their original true state and later associated 
with negative emotion. 
4.4 EXPERIMENT 5: 
Emotion Induced Changes to Affective States of Existing Memories 
Experiment 4 investigated the effect a negative emotional state would have 
on encoding information into an already existing memory. However, it does not 
consider the changing affective state of the memory itself.  As well as creating false 
memories by adding erroneous details, memories may also stray from accurate 
recollections if they are later associated with different emotional states.   
Research on memory reconsolidation suggests that brief periods of 
rehearsal return the memory to a labile state and render it vulnerable to 
reconsolidation processes and possible alterations.  While the misinformation 
paradigm incorporates factors of suggestibility, and memory distrust (Loftus, 2005), 
memory reconsolidation research has shown that in very simple experimental 
designs, new information can be incorporated into the original memory trace 
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(Hupbach, Gomez, & Nadel, 2009, 2011; Hupbach, Hardt, Gomez, & Nadel, 2008).  
These findings have also been extended to procedural memories (Walker, 
Brakefield, & Hobson, 2003).   
The effects of emotion on reconsolidation have been considered briefly, 
however, the focus has been on the strengthening or disruptive properties rather 
than on any new associations formed (e.g. Coccoz, Maldonado, & Delorenzi, 2011; 
Finn & Roediger, 2011; Schwabe & Wolf, 2009).  Finn and Roediger (2011) gave 
participants pairs of Swahili-English words to learn.  At test, presentation of negative 
arousing images following correct recall enhanced future recall of the corresponding 
pair, compared with correct recall that was followed by a neutral, or no, image.  The 
effects of valence, however, and the production of new associations has not yet 
been investigated.  AAT has so far been discussed in terms of affective stimuli and 
emotional states activating associated concepts. Based on this, it is also possible 
that if specific memories are retrieved and reconsolidated during an emotional 
experience a new association may form.  With complex memories of events these 
new associations may take time and resources. However, by investigating memories 
for meaningless stimuli, with no pre-existing emotional associations, it may be 
possible to change the affective state of the memory itself.   
Experiment 5 therefore investigates the effect of a negative emotional state 
on the affective properties of reconsolidated nonsense stimuli.  Participants are 
asked to remember nonsense words, and immediately following a recognition test 
for half of the items, go through an emotion induction.  As with the previous 
Experiment, a neutral induction is used to control for any effects of simply viewing a 
video, and sadness was chosen as the negative emotion due to the effectiveness of 
the inductions.  At a final recognition test, participants are also asked to rate the 
nonsense words they have seen according to how negative or positive they seem.  
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Affective ratings for the words can then be compared between the groups for items 
presented before the emotion induction and those not presented, as well as for 
items remembered during the first recognition test and those not remembered.  
4.4.1 Method 
Participants 
 For the main experiment 49 participants volunteered, 10 of which were 
male, between the ages of 18 and 22 (M = 18.73, SD = .96).  For an 80% chance of 
finding a medium effect size with an alpha of .05 we need 54 participants.  
Participants were informed of the basic procedure, memory tests, and emotion 
induction, but were not told about the affective ratings questionnaire given at the 
very end of the experiment.  An additional 50 participants completed an online pilot 
questionnaire to create the stimuli.  
Design 
 A 2 (Emotion: negative, neutral) x 2 (Reactivation: reminder, no-reminder) 
mixed design was used, with Emotion as the between group variable, with 
participants randomly allocated to each group (25 in the negative, and 24 in the 
neutral).  Reactivation was the within group variable with randomly selected of 
stimuli for the reminder condition.  Recognition responses for the reminded stimuli 
was also used as a within-group post-hoc variable (Memory: old, new).   
Stimuli Creation and Materials 
Participants rated 100, 6-letter, nonsense words, according to how positive 
or negative they seemed to them on a 7-point scale (1 being extremely negative and 
7 extremely positive).  Participants were also given space to report any real words 
that immediately came to mind upon seeing each nonsense word.  The nonsense 
words were selected from the The ARC Nonword Database (Rastle, Harrington, & 
Coltheart, 2002).  Although the words hold no meaning they are pronounceable.  
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Nonsense words with associations to real words were excluded and the final 60 
chosen (see Appendix H) were those with the highest ratings (M = 3.97, SD = 0.30).  
 For the emotion induction procedure, the negative film clip was again taken 
from the film “Champ”, in which a young boy cries over the death of his father, and 
the neutral film clip was from the film “All the President’s Men”, in which a reporter 
is asking questions around a courtroom (Bartolini, 2011; Gross & Levenson, 1995).  
As with Experiment 4, the neutral clip chosen depicts interactions between people 
and is therefore intended to hold participants’ attention without inducing any 
emotion.  Both videos lasted approximately 5 minutes.  The SAM was used to 
measure emotional valence and arousal levels, and was completed at the start of 
each session and immediately after the emotion induction. 
Procedure  
Participants attended three separate testing sessions, run on consecutive 
days.  In session 1, participants were shown 30 nonsense words presented one at a 
time, for 5 seconds, in a random order.  Participants were informed in advance that 
there would be a later memory test for the nonsense words and asked to try and 
remember as many as possible.  In session 2, participants were shown a collection 
of 30 nonsense words, made up of 15 old nonsense words and 15 new nonsense 
words presented in the same way as before, and asked to report whether they 
recognised the nonsense words from the first session.  Immediately following this, 
participants were asked to watch one of the two emotion induction videos.  In 
session 3, participants were given a second recognition test, this time with all 30 
original nonsense words, and a new set of 15 filler items.  For old responses to 
items, participants were also asked whether this was based on a remember, know, 
or guess judgement.  Finally, before leaving the participants were asked to provide 
affective ratings, on a 7-point scale, for each of the original 30 nonsense words.  
- 163 - 
4.4.2 Results 
Of the 49 participants, one did not return for session 3 and so was removed 
from the analysis, leaving 25 participants in the negative group and 23 in the neutral 
group.  Mean recognition rates were recorded for session 2 and 3, with additional 
recollective experience (remember/know/guess) responses rates for session 3.  
Recognition rates from session 3 were also calculated using old and new responses 
from session 2 as a variable (see Table 4.6).  Mean affective ratings were then also 
calculated for nonsense words according to the Reactivation condition (reminder, 
no reminder), the corresponding recognition responses at the final recognition test, 
and as a function of the recognition responses for reminded items (Memory: old, 
new). 
Emotion Manipulation 
Arousal and valence scores from the SAM were compared between Emotion 
groups at stages of the experiment using separate 2 (Emotion: negative, neutral) x 4 
(Time: Session 1, Session 2, Induction, Session 3) ANOVAs (see Table 4.7).  For 
arousal, there was no significant effect of Time, F(3, 138) = 2.04, p = .11, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, 
Emotion, F(1, 46) = 1.41, p = .24, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, or significant interaction effect of Time x 
Emotion, F(3, 138) = 1.30, p = .28, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03.  For valence scores, there was a 
significant effect of Time, F(3, 138) = 22.59, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .33, Emotion, F(1, 46) = 
9.68, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .17, and a significant interaction effect of Time x Emotion, F(3, 
138) = 12.88, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .22.  Post-hoc analyses of the valence scores showed 
that differences between the negative and neutral group were not significant at the 
start of Session 1, 2, or 3 (all p’s > .10). However, immediately following the emotion 
induction, the valence scores for the negative group (M = 4.33, SD = 1.42) were 
significantly lower than the neutral group (M = 6.09, SD = 1.28), p < .001. 
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Table 4.6: Final recognition responses for nonsense words as a function of Emotion and intermediate recognition response 
  
 Neutral 
 
Negative 
  
 
  
95% CI 
   
95% CI 
  
 M SE LL UL 
 
M SE LL UL 
Old 
 
 
         
 
Old  .90 .03 .83 .97 
 
.87 .02 .82 .92 
 
Remember  .65 .06 .52 .78 
 
.55 .05 .44 .66 
 Know  .14 .03 .07 .20 
 
.20 .04 .11 .28 
 
Guess  .11 .04 .03 .18 
 
.12 .02 .07 .17 
  
 
         
New 
 
 
         
 
Old  .66 .07 .50 .81 
 
.50 .06 .38 .62 
 
Remember  .34 .06 .22 .46 
 
.24 .06 .12 .37 
 
Know  .12 .04 .05 .20 
 
.12 .03 .06 .19 
 
Guess  .19 .06 .08 .31 
 
.14 .04 .05 .22 
 
 
  
- 1
6
4
 - 
- 165 - 
Table 4.7: Arousal and Valence ratings for each emotion group at each stage of the experiment 
  Arousal 
 
Valence 
  Session 1 
 
Session 2 
 
Induction 
 
Session 3 
 
Session 1 
 
Session 2 
 
Induction 
 
Session 3 
  M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
Negative  3.96 1.72 
 
4.44 2.04 
 
4.84 1.49 
 
4.20 2.16 
 
5.84 1.62 
 
6.24 1.36 
 
3.44 1.42 
 
6.68 1.44 
Neutral  4.30 1.94 
 
5.22 1.65 
 
4.65 2.04 
 
5.13 2.03 
 
6.43 1.47 
 
6.65 1.03 
 
6.09 1.28 
 
6.43 1.56 
 
- 1
6
5
 - 
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Recognition Rates 
Separate 2 (Emotion: negative, neutral) x 2 (Reactivation: reminder, no 
reminder) ANOVAs were run for old, remember, know, and guess responses, 
obtained at the final recognition test during Session 3.  For old responses, there was 
a significant effect of Reactivation, F(1, 46) = 37.79, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .45, for which final 
recognition responses from Session 3 of nonsense words shown in the recognition 
test at Session 2 (M = .77, SD = .12) were significantly greater compared to those not 
presented (M = .60, SD = .14), p < .01.  There was no significant main effect of 
Emotion, F(1, 46) = 1.49, p = .23, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, nor a significant interaction effect of 
Reactivation x Emotion, F(1, 46) = 1.34, p = .25, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03.  For remember responses, 
the same patterns were observed as there was a significant effect of Reactivation, 
F(1, 46) = 27, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .37, again with recognition responses being greater for 
reminder items (M = .46, SD = .16) compared to no-reminder items (M = .31, SD = 
.14), p < .01.  There was again no significant effect of Emotion, F(1, 46) = 1.28, p = 
.27, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, and no significant effect of Reactivation x Emotion, F(1, 46) = .30, p = 
.59, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01.  For know and guess responses, respectively, there was no significant 
effect of Reactivation, F(1, 46) = 1.86, p = .18, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, F(1, 46) = .95, p = .34, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.03, Emotion, F(1, 46) = .03, p = .86, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, F(1, 46) = .00, p = 1.00, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, or 
interaction effect of Reactivation x Emotion, F(1, 46) = .03, p = .87, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, F(1, 46) 
= .42, p = .52, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01.  
Looking only at the nonsense words in the reminder condition, and taking 
into account the recognition responses at this intermediate test, separate 2 
(Emotion: negative, neutral) x 2 (Memory: old, new) ANOVAs were run for old, 
remember, know, and guess, responses, obtained at the final recognition test 
during.  For old responses there was a significant effect of Memory, F(1, 43) = 39.62, 
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p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .48, whereby final recognition responses were significantly greater for 
items reported as old (M = .88, SD = .10) at Session 2 compared to those reported as 
new (M = .58, SD = .23), p < .01.  There was no effect of Emotion, F(1, 43) = 2.83, p = 
.10, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06, or a Memory x Emotion interaction, F(1, 43) = 1.64, p = .21, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04.  
For remember responses, there was also a significant effect of Memory, F(1, 43) = 
54.51, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .56, whereby responses were significantly greater for items 
reported as old (M = .60, SD = .20) at Session 2 compared to those reported as new 
(M = .29, SD = .20), p < .01.  There was again no effect of Emotion, F(1, 43) = 1.94, p 
= .17, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, and no effect of Memory x Emotion, F(1, 43) = .00, p = .97, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00.  
For know and guess responses respectively, there was no effect of Memory, F(1, 43) 
= 2.33, p = .13, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .05, F(1, 43) = 1.62, p = .21, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, Emotion, F(1, 43) = .59, p = 
.45, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, F(1, 43) = .34, p = .57, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, or Memory x Emotion, F(1, 43) = .97, p 
= .33, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, F(1, 43) = .69, p = .41, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02.  
Signal detection analyses were run using the correct and incorrect 
recognition rates for responses from the intermediate recognition test at Session 2, 
and for responses from the final recognition test at Session 3.  No significant effects 
were found for both sets of analyses in either the response bias or sensitivity scores 
(see Appendix I for results of these analyses). 
Affective Ratings 
 A 2 (Emotion: negative, neutral) x 2 (Reactivation: reminder, no reminder) 
ANOVA was run with the affective ratings of nonsense words.  There was no 
significant effect of Reactivation, F(1, 46) = 1.08, p = .30, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, no significant 
effect of Emotion, F(1, 46) = .07, p = .80, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, and no significant effect of 
Reactivation x Memory, F(1, 46) = .07, p = .80, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00.  In order to look at the 
effects on reconsolidation an additional 2 (Emotion: negative, neutral) x 2 (Memory: 
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old, new) ANOVA was run for affective ratings of images shown at Session 2.  There 
was no significant main effect of Memory, F(1, 36) = .36, p = .55, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, and no 
significant main effect of Emotion, F(1, 36) = 1.12, p = .30, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, however there 
was a significant interaction effect of Memory x Emotion, F(1, 43) = 4.36, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 
= .11.  Post-hoc analyses revealed that for items recognised as old in Session 2, 
affective ratings were significantly higher in the neutral group (M =5.36, SD = 1.49) 
compared to the negative group (M =4.46, SD = 1.36), p < .05.  For items recognised 
as new however, affective ratings were lower in the neutral group (M =4.84, SD = 
1.38) compared to the negative group (M =5.07, SD = 1.49), however this difference 
was not significant, p = .63 (see Figure 4.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Affective ratings for nonsense words reactivated at Session 2, as a 
function of Emotion group and recognition response from Session 2 (error bars 
represent SD) 
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4.4.3 Summary  
 Experiment 5 presents novel findings of a change in affective ratings for 
stimuli retrieved immediately before a negative emotion induction.  The most 
interesting finding here is that the effects of the emotion induction are not apparent 
when the stimuli are grouped according to whether they were presented or not 
before the induction, but only when those presented are grouped according to 
whether participants reported remembering the items.  This suggests that the 
assoication between the items and the negative emotion did not occur through 
mere exposure but through reconsolidation of the retrieved and recognised items.  
 The findings support the hypothesis that concepts activated by the emotion 
induction would remain active when the nonsense items were reconsolidated into 
memory, and that subsequent new associations would be formed.  When 
participants were asked to rate the items according to how negative or positive they 
seemed, the activation of the item would have caused spreading activations to 
various negative concepts.  In addition, the findings support theories of 
reconsolidation processes occuring when a memory enters a labile state (Lee, 2009), 
and expand on emotion and reconsolidation literature by showing that, as well as 
affecting quantitative properties (Finn & Roediger, 2011), emotion at rehearsal can 
also alter the qualitative properties.  The experiment also highlights a novel 
approach to considering false memories as it demonstartes more abstract ways in 
which a true memory may be manipulated and altered.  
As expected there was no effect of the negative emotion induction on 
recognition rates.  Certain levels of stress and arousal have been shown to 
strengthen and disrupt reconsolidation of memory traces (Coccoz et al., 2011; Finn 
& Roediger, 2011). However, no effects of valence have been investigated since it is 
unlikely valence alone would have the same effect.  Ecker (2015) argued that 
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reconsolidation of existing memories is not activated unless there is something 
worth learning, and along the same lines, emotion effects on memory have been 
argued to be motivational (Levine & Edelstein, 2009), thus without a goal or 
motivation for change there is little effect seen.  Negative valence, in the absense of 
high arousal, typically corrseponds to post-goal emotions (Kaplan et al., 2012).  
Although the emotions still indicate important information, any assoicated future 
goals are not immediate and thus cognitive resources may not be activated. 
4.5 Conclusions 
In this Chapter two alternate approaches to examining exogenous false 
memory production are presented.  Experiment 4 demonstrates the prevalence of 
errors in source moniroting for manipulated images.  Many participants falsely 
identified manipulated images presented at an intermediate session as being 
presented at the beginning of the experiment, and this was enhanced for negative 
images.  In contrast, Experiment 5 shows that mundane, neutral memories can be 
altered and associated with a negative emotion induction. 
Experiment 4, along with previous research, shows the prevalence of 
misinformation effects and the falibility of individuals source memory for erroneous 
information.  The experimental results in particular highlight the issue that many 
people fail to monitor the source of information, and especially so for negative 
stimuli.  Negative concepts are considered more interrelated (Dougal & Rotello, 
2007; Gallo et al., 2009) than positive or neutral and thus, associated concepts are 
more readily activated resulting in increased noise and source monitoring errors.  
The implications of misinformation effects and source monitoring errors are 
significant for both clinical and legal sectors which rely heavily on the accuracy of 
memory.  In addition, individuals may be presented with erroneous images or 
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information in a variety of settings and as the results of Experiment 4 show, even 
with central details being changed, people are highly vulnerable to memory errors. 
In addition to increased errors for negative the stimuli, it was predicted that 
this would be greater for peripheral changes, and that the negative emotion 
induction would increase noise and subsequent source monitoring errors.  No such 
effects were observed. However, this may be explained by considering appraisal 
theories of emotion (Erbas, Ceulemans, Koval, & Kuppens, 2015; Moors et al., 2013).  
Levine and Edelstein (Levine & Edelstein, 2009) argued that discrepanies in the 
results of memory narrowing could be explained by considering the current goals of 
the individual.  In the absense of any clear goal, or motivation, associated with the 
emotion, there is little benefit to any memory narrowing or enhancement.   
Research into emotion and false memory production would benefit from 
further investigation of the possible mediating role of motivation and goal appraisal.  
In a review of emotion and false memory research, Kaplan, Van Damme, and Levine 
(2016) argue that considering emotions as either pre- or post-goal can account for 
motivational effects on cognitive resources.  In both experiments presented in this 
Chapter the emotion induced was sadness which is considered a post-goal emotion.  
Post-goal emotions are said to broaden the scope of attention, thus processing and 
memory for the manipulated images in Experiment 4 would be similar to that in a 
neutral condition.   
Although explicit details of memory in Experiment 4 were unnaffected by 
the negative emotion induction, in Experiment 5 the same induction was shown to 
succesfully alter the qualitative properties of memory.  It is important to remember 
that although emotions may not always effect the production of explicit false 
memories, potential associations that are formed may still draw memories away 
from their original true state.  It should also be highlighted that since the same 
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emotion induction was used in each experiment, the differences in results are likely 
due to the different types of memory paradigms used.  In Experiment 4 the emotion 
driven centrality and biasing effects hypothesised rely on the motivational aspects 
of the emotion induction and the stimuli.  Whereas, the paradigm used for 
Experiment 5 relies on associations forming between the memories and the 
emotional state of the individual.  The efffect of the emotion induction in 
Experiment 5 therefore is not so affected by the motivations associated with the 
emotion. 
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Chapter 5 
General Discussion 
In summary, the work in this thesis examined the effect of negative emotion 
inductions on the production of endogenous and exogenous false memories.  The 
thesis presents a new understanding of the specificity of emotion congruency 
effects, in which discrete negative emotions can greatly inflate the production of 
false memories for congruent emotional stimuli.  In addition, the thesis presents 
new perspectives on the effect of negative emotion on source memory errors for 
new and false information associated with an existing memory. Moreover, it 
presents evidence that the affective qualities of a memory may also be changed, 
providing a novel approach to investigations of how memories may deviate from 
their original true state. 
In this chapter the key findings and conclusions from each of the 
experimental chapters are summarised, limitations of the experiments are 
considered, and the broader implications of the research and directions for future 
investigations are discussed. 
5.1 Chapter Summaries 
5.1.1 Chapter 2 
 To successfully examine the effect of emotion on false memory production a 
reliable and effective emotion induction technique is needed.  Therefore, a review 
was conducted of several different techniques currently used in the literature and 
experimental evidence of the success of a selection of these techniques was 
presented.  Inductions were examined for a variety of discrete emotions and two 
different modes of measurement were assessed.  Consistent with past research, it 
was concluded that autobiographical recall and film clips were both effective 
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methods of emotion induction (Salas et al., 2012), and that they were preferred over 
the alternatives (news reports and pictures slideshow).   
 Autobiographical recall has been shown to be highly effective with regard to 
the intensity of emotions induced (e.g. Hazlett, 2012; Jallais & Gilet, 2010) and has 
good ecological validity. However, there is little experimental control over the 
selectivity and discriminability of the emotions induced.  Interactive manipulations 
were also discussed, but not assessed experimentally.  Evidence shows interactive 
manipulations are highly effective at inducting intense and natural emotional 
experiences (Kučera & Haviger, 2012; Lobbestael et al., 2008; Roberts et al., 2007). 
However, there is again a lack of experimental control, but even more so, this 
technique is highly problematic from a practical and ethical perspective. 
Film clips, on the other hand, may be slightly less ecologically valid for some, 
mainly those individuals able to detach from the scenes.  For others however, the 
emotions induced by the films ability to draw a viewer in are arguably much like any 
emotion induced through witnessing real life events.  A key advantage of film clips, 
especially in relation to autobiographical memory, is the control afforded over which 
emotions are induced and to what extent (Gross & Levenson, 1995; Rottenberg, Ray, 
& Gross, 2007).  Also, Experiment 1 demonstrated a clear advantage to film clips 
over pictures.  News reports did not appear as effective as other techniques, 
however there is potential with this technique if developed as a more personally 
relevant alternative to film clips.   
In addition to the inductions of different discrete emotions, in Chapter 2 the 
use of neutral emotion inductions were discussed.  A common argument being that 
there is no such thing as a neutral emotion.  The results from Experiment 1 highlight 
the variability of neutral inductions between mildly negative and mildly positive on a 
valence scale, and for the potential for neutral induction to fall quite low on an 
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arousal scale.  The alternative, control group, however poses a similar issue in terms 
of variability as these approaches allow for no control over the emotional state of 
the participants.  In Chapter 2 it was concluded that the choice is best made by 
considering the design of the experiment itself and the characteristics of the other 
emotion inductions employed.  Use of neutral inductions should consider carefully 
the specific characteristics of the emotional state being induced and the comparison 
being made.   
Finally, theories of emotion were considered, with specific reference to the 
collective opinion that goal relevance and motivations are key in understanding the 
effect of emotion on cognition (e.g. Coppin & Sander, 2016; Erbas et al., 2015; 
Moors et al., 2013).  Consequently, for induction techniques to induce more intense 
ecologically valid emotional experiences, future work should focus on the 
corresponding motivations, and facilitate expression of the emotions being induced, 
thus encouraging activation and manipulation of associated cognitive processes. 
5.1.2 Chapter 3 
 In Chapter 3 the first evaluation of the effect of emotion on false memory 
production is presented, by examining spontaneous, endogenous false memories.  
Research on this topic typically examines the effect of valence and arousal and has 
shown that, when manipulating the emotional state of the participants, arousal 
increases false memory production while valence has no effect (Corson, Verrier, & 
Bucic, 2009).  When the stimuli being remembered is varied in terms of arousal and 
valence, studies find that false memory rates are higher for negative compared to 
neutral and positive stimuli, and for high arousal negative stimuli compared to low 
arousal negative stimuli (Brainerd et al., 2010; Steinmetz, Addis, & Kensinger, 2010).  
Research also demonstrated that these effects are compounded when the 
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emotional state of the participant is congruent with the stimuli and subsequent false 
memories were increased (Knott & Thorley, 2013; Ruci et al., 2009).   
 Experiments 2 and 3 extended this line of research by considering discrete 
emotion congruency effects.  Although arousal and valence highlight many 
important effects of emotion on cognition, researchers have rightly argued that 
there is little sense in limiting research to these dimensions (Kaplan et al., 2016; 
Levine & Pizarro, 2004).  Manipulating sadness and fear, and anger and fear, in the 
DRM paradigm allowed an examination of the effects of emotion irrespective of 
arousal and valence dimensions.   
The findings of Experiment 3 supported the hypothesis that discrete 
emotions would increase false memory production for emotionally congruent 
stimuli.  The findings supported assumptions of Associative Activation Theory (Howe 
et al., 2009) that congruent emotions would increase spreading activation to 
associated concepts, enhance activation of the associated critical lures, thus 
increasing false memory production.  The findings also support theories of discrete 
emotions and emphasise the need to investigate additional characteristics and 
dimensions of emotion.   
 There are several papers and reviews now highlighting the motivational 
aspects of emotions and the advantage of considering emotions effects on cognitive 
processes in terms of their survival relevance and the current goals of the individual 
(Coppin & Sander, 2016; Erbas et al., 2015; Kaplan, Damme, & Levine, 2012; Lazarus, 
1991; Moors et al., 2013).  It was also stressed, however, that research should not 
abandon investigations of arousal and valence, but rather, consider the limited view 
these dimensions give in terms of behavioural responses and consider carefully 
motivational distinctions.  In addition, the cognitive mechanisms underlying these 
effects of discrete emotions are still unclear.  There is evidence of neural correlates 
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with the effects of valence and arousal on memory, however, the effect of 
motivation is less well understood (Erk et al., 2003; Kragel & LaBar, 2016; LaBar & 
Cabeza, 2006).  
5.1.3 Chapter 4 
 As well as being produced spontaneously, and as a result of natural 
processes underlying memory production, false memories may be produced through 
manipulations and alterations to already established true memories.  The research 
in Chapter 4 examined these exogenous false memories from two perspectives.  
First by looking at errors in memory for the source of new false information 
presented after an event and second by looking at reconsolidation processes in 
which the affective qualities of an originally neutral memory may be altered. 
 The literature reviewed, and findings from Experiment 4, highlight the 
prevalence of source memory errors.  Although many participants reported knowing 
images had been manipulated and were therefore vigilant in reporting the correct 
sources at the recognition test, many manipulated images were still falsely reported 
as being presented in the first session.  In addition, the ability to monitor memory 
errors and manipulated images was worse in the negative stimuli condition 
compared to the positive and neutral stimuli.  Negative emotions and negative 
stimuli are considered to be more semantically associated and thus spreading 
activation and source confusions are more likely (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Gallo et 
al., 2009; Howe et al., 2009).   
 Contrary to some of the hypotheses, there were no centrality effects 
associated with the negative stimuli and no effect of the emotion induction.  As 
discussed previously, emotion research now stresses the importance of motivation 
and goal relevance for emotions to have an effect on cognitive processes (e.g. 
Coppin & Sander, 2016; Erbas et al., 2015; Kaplan, Damme, & Levine, 2012; Lazarus, 
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1991; Moors et al., 2013).  The false memory paradigm used in this experiment 
relies in particular on motivational aspects of the emotion.  Centrality effects 
assume aspects of the stimuli are more important to the individual, however, with 
little to no motivation associated with the emotion induction chosen, it is possible 
this prevented any changes being observed in the cognitive processes underlying 
source memory errors.  
 In contrast, in Experiment 5, the same emotion induction successfully 
altered the properties of the memories produced.  Where Experiment 4 examined 
errors in memory for explicit details added after the event, Experiment 5 instead 
examined a change in the affective properties of memory through the formation of 
new associations with the negative emotion induction.  Neutral, meaningless, 
stimuli were retrieved for a recognition test immediately before a negative or 
neutral induction was conducted.  At a later recognition test, those stimuli 
remembered correctly at the intermediate test were rated as more negative by 
participants who underwent the negative induction compared to those who 
received a neutral emotion induction. 
5.2 Practical and Theoretical Implications 
 The research presented in this thesis has significant implications for any 
settings in which the accuracy of memory is relied upon, and more specifically, in 
settings where emotion may influence such memories.  Most notably, these 
implications extend to legal and counselling practices.  In each, memories of events 
are used as evidence, either in discerning the details of a crime or in assessing 
personal events that may be impacting psychological wellbeing.  
 Evidence in Chapter 3 demonstrated the fallibility of memory processes for 
encoding emotional information.  Memories for associated emotional stimuli that 
were not actually presented to participants were reported as being explicitly 
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remembered.  There are novel findings that this false memory production is 
enhanced for stimuli that specifically matches the discrete emotion being 
experienced.  Such false memories are experienced as true memories and may 
therefore be reported in eyewitness statements or in accounts to therapists.  In 
legal practice, it is important to understand the likelihood that the memories being 
reported are false.  The results from Experiment 2 highlight the fact that memories 
for negative-arousing aspects of crimes are more likely to induce false memories 
than neutral aspects.  Experiment 3 expanded on this and demonstrates that 
aspects of a crime congruent to the emotional state elicited in the individual are 
even more likely to produce false memories. 
 In relation to clinical practice it is important to remember that with vivid 
emotional memories the accuracy or objective truth is not as important as it is with 
legal practice as the implications of the memory for the person experiencing it will 
be the same regardless.  A more pertinent issue would be to avoid eliciting new false 
memories associated with the negative emotional state an individual might be in 
during a counselling session.  The results of Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that 
discussing memories and information with details congruent to an individual’s 
emotional state may increase the risk of creating new false memories.  
 In Chapter 4 the fallibility of memory was highlighted as memories that have 
been altered were reported as true.  Participants’ memory for the source of new 
information, especially negative, was shown to be quite poor, and neutral mundane 
memories were later reported as being more negative.  This is further evidence that 
in counselling settings, in which memories are retrieved and reported in an 
emotional state, there is a need for caution as the emotions being experienced may 
inadvertently change the affective state of the memory, and consequently its 
relevance and meaning to the individual.   
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 It is also important to note the potential positive ramifications of this 
finding.  There are already practices focussed on reappraising and re-scripting 
memories in order to reduce any emotional distress associated with them.  The 
results from Experiment 5 demonstrate that this may also be achieved through 
simply creating new associations between the memories and different emotional 
states.  In terms of Experiment 4, although many usual effects of misinformation 
and emotion were not replicated, the finding that even mere exposure created false 
memories, and errors in source monitoring, has implications for the surplus of fake 
images and news found online and especially on social media.  Individuals find it 
difficult to remember the source of information, especially for negative stimuli, and 
this may cause problems for any future decision making that may be influenced by 
the information provided.  
These manipulations of memory indicate the need for vigilance when 
dealing with memory as evidence so as not to inflate the risk of false memories 
being produced.  In addition, the findings should be taken as a caution that 
regardless of how memories are reported there is always a risk that details of, or 
even the affective qualities, are false.  Memories that elicit a negative emotional 
response may be regarded or reported differently and so it is important to avoid 
changing the affective nature of otherwise neutral memories. 
The research discussed also has implications for theories of false memory 
production.  As mentioned in the Introduction Chapter fuzzy trace theory (FTT; 
Brainerd & Reyna, 2002; Brainerd & Reyna, 2001) and associative activation theory 
(AAT; Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009; Wimmer & Howe, 2009) are the 
two main theories focussed on throughout the thesis.  FTT comes from a dual-
processing perspective, suggesting that false memories arise when verbatim 
memory traces decay and gist traces are relied upon.  AAT on the other hand 
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suggests that spreading activations to associated concepts may cause these 
internally activated concepts to be falsely encoded.  Overall, both theories seem to 
be able to account for the effects of emotion on false memory production, however 
there are some limitations and weaknesses.   
The results from Experiment 2 support previous research in showing an 
enhancement of false memory produced for negative, arousing, stimuli (Brainerd et 
al., 2010; Steinmetz, Addis, & Kensinger, 2010).  AAT accounts for these findings in 
two ways.  First, activation of emotion concepts elicit greater speading activations 
due to increased semantic density (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Windmann & Kutas, 
2001).  Emotions are fundamental to human experience and as such greater 
associations exist.  Increased spreading activations to assoicated concepts 
subsequently increases the chances of false memories being produced.  Second, 
moderate increases in arousal are likely to draw and increase attention.  This 
increased processing of the information would increase subsequent spreading 
activations and lead to a greater chance of false memories being produced.   
FTT also accounts for the increase in false memories for emotional stimuli as 
the theory suggests that gist traces are stronger for emotional information.  In 
contrast however FTT is said to predict fewer false memories with moderate arousal 
as the arousal would increase the strength of verbatim traces thus reducing the 
reliance on gist (Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2016).  This prediction however conflicts 
with the findings.  Results from Experiment 3 do not cause such conflicts however as 
both theories are able to account for the congruency effect.  AAT posits that the 
emotional enhancement of false memories through increased spreading activations 
is compounded when the emotional state of the individual is congruent to that of 
the stimuli presented (Knott & Thorley, 2013).  FTT suggests that false memories in 
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this instance are increased because the congruent emotional experience provides 
additional gist traces consistent with the gist of the stimuli. 
With regards to misinformation effects discussed in Chapter 4, past research 
supports the idea that memory errors are more likely for peripheral details of 
negative stimuli compared to central (Porter, ten Brinke, Riley, & Baker, 2014; Van 
Damme & Smets, 2014), as well as an overall increase in errors for negative 
compared to neutral stimuli (Porter, Spencer, & Birt, 2003; Porter, Taylor, & ten 
Brinke, 2008).  Increased processing of negative stimuli, whether through greater 
semantic density (Dougal & Rotello, 2007) or enhanced item-specific processing 
(Kensinger, 2009), would subsequently increase gist traces available and thus FTT 
can account for the increased false memory production.  However, FTT is also 
limited as it does not clearly explain the distinction between central and peripheral 
items.  It is unclear whether an increased focus on central items would increase gist 
traces only or also increase verbatim traces.  AAT on the other hand does account 
for these centrality effects.  Increased activation of central details would increase 
the strength of the true memory trace and thus reduce memory errors for central 
details, while decreased processing of peripheral details increases the vulnerability 
to errors and increased spreading activations enhances memory errors.  
The mutual limitation of both theories in this specific context is that neither 
theory can account for the assumption that processing is enhanced for central 
details, or indeed what defines a detail as central versus peripheral.  This can only be 
explained by considering appraisal theories of emotion (see Moors, et al., 2013).  
Information that is central to an image is more relevant or more important and thus 
narrows attention.  It is therefore essential to understand the current goals and 
motivations of an indidivudal in order to explain emotional memory narrowing 
(Levine & Edelstein, 2009).  It is also this reliance on motivation and relevance that 
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explains the lack of some findings in Experiment 4.  Combined with these appraisal 
theories, AAT is effective in predicting the production of subsequent false memories.  
Finally, the findings from Experiment 5 are especially difficult for either theory to 
explain since it takes an unconventional approach to false memories.  The results 
suggest that associations form between the old memory and the current emotional 
state of the participants.  This suggests some support for AAT however both false 
memory theories are typically applied to the production of false content and thus 
cannot be applied in this context. 
Although both theories account for many of the findings discussed, AAT is 
more reliable because FTT fails to account for the effect of arousal, and does not 
clearly explain the centrality effect with misinformation.  In addition, AAT is 
relatable to neural activations and so easier for many to conceive as a theory of 
cognitive processes.  Finally, associations and associative strength are concrete 
measures that can be operationalised in research and could be used to predict more 
accurately the rates of false memory production.  The systematic and 
comprehensible nature of AAT gives additional weight and support to the theory. 
5.3 Limitations 
Throughout the thesis, the research discussed has been related to legal and 
clinical settings, however, caution should be taken when generalising laboratory 
findings to real-life situations.  In Chapter 2 this issue was particularly salient as 
Experiment 1 attempted to induce emotional states in participants.  As the results 
demonstrated, experiences of sadness and happiness were more intense than fear 
and anger, and one explanation given was the suppression of corresponding 
emotional expressions.  While happiness and sadness can be expressed in a passive 
environment, the responses associated with fear and anger are more active, but in a 
laboratory these aspects of the emotions are supressed.  In addition, many emotion 
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inductions often induce a blend of emotions.  Although Experiment 1 took this into 
account when evaluating induction techniques, emotion inductions may still be 
confounded on some level by the simultaneous presence of more than one basic 
emotion (Schaefer, et al., 2010). 
The false memory research discussed and presented in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4 is also limited due to the laboratory environment in which the memories 
were encoded and measured.  The DRM paradigm especially, used in experiments 2 
and 3, lacks ecological validity.  Researchers have argued (e.g., Pezdek & Lam, 2007) 
that conclusions drawn using this list learning paradigm can not be generalised to 
more typical forensic situations involving the (mis)recollection of an entire 
autobiographical event.  However, Howe et al. (2010) point out that the results from 
DRM experiments are often similar to those of more complex experiments of false 
autobiographical memories (e.g., Otgaar et al., 2008), and thus it is likely that the 
mechanisms underlying the production of DRM false memories are also operational 
outside the laboratory.  Moreover, Howe discusses the cross over between 
recognition and recall memory in “real-life” situations.  Recall of autobiographical 
memories if often cued by recognition of stimuli in the environment (e.g. looking at 
photographs) or recognition-like prompts from reminiscing or discussing past events 
with others. 
 The purpose of the misinformation experiment used in Chapter 4 was 
designed to somewhat overcome the issue of ecological validity by using a paradigm 
that was designed to mimic forensic interview techniques.  In addition, the stimuli 
often used are more complex scenes, similar to witnessing an event in real-life.  That 
said, the stimuli used in Experiment 4 and Experiment 5 are much different from 
typical misinformation studies (e.g. Forgas, Laham, & Vargas, 2005; Van Damme & 
Smets, 2014).  Using slideshows of a variety of images in experiment 4 retains some 
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ecological validity, however the emotional content of the stimuli is somewhat lost as 
the context and meaning of the images is confounded by the variety of other 
information being presented.   
Experiment 5 on the other hand used much less ecologically valid stimuli.  
The purpose of this study was not to mimic everyday memory processes but to 
demonstrate the effect negative emotion can have on the affective associations of 
originally neutral and mundane stimuli.  As this experiment was novel in its design 
and findings, the stimuli used were very basic, allowing for a controlled and clear 
examination of the affective changes.  The same effect with autobiographical 
memories would be much more complicated given the complexities of the 
associations already established, however, the implications of such an effect make it 
an important avenue to follow.  The affective qualities of a memory may change 
how that memory is processed and how it interacts with other cognitive processes, 
such as decision making.  Future research should therefore aim to extend these 
findings to more ecologically valid stimuli.  
Finally, there are general issues relating emotion research to clinical 
settings.  It should be clear that the research discussed and presented in this thesis 
can’t be generalised to clinical disorders.  However, there are many clinical and 
counselling therapies, regardless of the presence of a clinical disorder, in which 
memories are the main point of focus.  Often the content of these memories is 
emotional, or the state of the individual is emotionally laden.  The research 
presented in this thesis demonstrates the effect emotion can have on encoding and 
retrieving these everyday emotional memories.  
5.4 Future Research 
In all three experimental chapters the question of motivation and goal 
relevance of the emotions arose.  In Chapter 2 the more effective emotion 
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inductions were discussed as being those that allow for a natural response or 
expression of the emotions.  Emotions act as a fast and effective way to evaluate 
survival relevant aspects of the environment and guide responses associated with 
the specific goals of the individual (Frijda, 1988; Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 
2013).  It has been argued that cognitive resources are not activated unless there is 
a need to do so (e.g. Ecker, 2015), some emotions induced in the lab may not elicit a 
motivation to act and therefore a key element of the emotional experience is 
supressed, consequently supressing activation of cognitive resources that would 
otherwise have affected memory production.  
With respect to the effect of emotion on memory, the difference in false 
memories produced in Chapter 3 when inducing fear and anger can be accounted 
for by considering the different responses and actions that these emotions elicit.  In 
Chapter 4 the lack of effect of the emotion induction on memory narrowing can be 
accounted for by the lack of corresponding emotional motivation.  Without a 
purpose or goal there is no need for cognitive resources to be activated and thus no 
effect on memory processes is observed.  Future research should therefore focus on 
the possible mediating role of motivation and goal appraisal with emotion effects on 
false memory production.   
In many legal and clinical settings there is a motivation to remember as 
much as possible and therefore discover the truth.  In doing so there may be an 
interaction effect between the motivation-driven activation of cognitive processes 
and the emotional state of the individual at the time, or emotional content of the 
memories being retrieved.  In addition, theoretical understandings of emotion and 
false memory would benefit from an investigation of the attentional process that 
may correlate with these findings.  Increased processing of emotion congruent, or 
goal relevant, information may be due to an immediate biasing of the attentional 
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system, therefore changing what is attended and encoded into memory, or 
alternatively through a biasing of cognitive resources to those aspects of the 
environment without the engagement of any outward changes in behaviour.  
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Appendix A 
Stimuli used for Experiment 1 
IAPS images selected for each emotion induction: 
Anger  Fear  Sad  Happy  Neutral 
2115  9810  9940  9830  8461 
2345.1  1050  9941  9831  8470 
2688  1052  2278  9926  8497 
2691  1201  2301  1440  2002 
2694  1202  2375.1  1460  2026 
2730  1205  2400  1463  2480 
2745.2  1220  2455  1500  2516 
2751  1300  2456  1610  2595 
3500  1304  2457  1630  5130 
3530  1525  2520  1710  5395 
3550  4664.2  2703  1722  5534 
6021  5971  2710  1750  5535 
6212  5973  2715  1811  7002 
6220  6020  2716  1920  7006 
6312  6250  2718  2040  7009 
6315  6260  2722  2045  7010 
6360  6263  2750  2050  7012 
6530  6300  2752  2058  7013 
6800  6313  2753  2070  7018 
6838  6370  2800  2071  7020 
7136  6510  2900  2150  7025 
9005  6520  3005.1  2154  7030 
9006  6540  3191  2158  7031 
9042  6550  3300  2160  7032 
9043  6555  3350  2208  7034 
9075  6560  4233  2216  7035 
9140  6563  5120  2303  7036 
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9145  8485  6010  2345  7037 
9163  9120  6311  2346  7038 
9180  9160  6561  2347  7040 
9181  9254  7520  2352.1  7041 
9183  9600  9000  4612  7044 
9184  9611  9001  5621  7045 
9187  9620  9002  5623  7050 
9290  9621  9040  5825  7055 
9291  9622  9041  5833  7059 
9330  9623  9102  5910  7060 
9404  9630  9171  7330  7110 
9409  9635.1  9186  7405  7130 
9413  9902  9280  8180  7150 
9414  9903  9331  8185  7161 
9419  9904  9415  8186  7180 
9500  9905  9432  8190  7184 
9520  9908  9440  8200  7185 
9530  9909  9445  8208  7186 
9560  9910  9469  8300  7211 
9570  9921  9471  8350  7217 
9571  9925  9472  8370  7224 
9800  9930  9561  8380  7234 
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Appendix B 
Pilot of News Reports for Experiment 1 
Pilot results for articles and target emotions: 
  
Anger 
 
Fear 
 
Sadness 
 
Happiness 
  
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
Anger 
           
 
Gay Clubber* 3.67 0.94 
 
2.33 0.47 
 
2.67 1.25 
 
1.00 0.00 
 
Israeli Police 3.33 0.75 
 
1.40 0.49 
 
3.25 0.97 
 
1.00 0.00 
Fear 
           
 
Swimmer* 1.95 1.48 
 
3.14 1.12 
 
1.80 1.33 
 
1.00 0.00 
 
Bus fire 3.14 1.55 
 
2.20 0.75 
 
3.00 0.67 
 
1.00 0.00 
Sad 
           
 
Toddlers killed* 2.00 1.73 
 
1.60 0.80 
 
3.50 1.22 
 
1.50 0.87 
 
Inseparable pair 1.60 0.80 
 
1.25 0.43 
 
2.71 1.39 
 
1.75 0.43 
Happy 
           
 
Great Escaper* 1.33 0.47 
 
1.67 0.47 
 
1.40 0.49 
 
2.86 0.99 
 
Girl and her dog 1.00 0.00 
 
1.00 0.00 
 
1.00 0.00 
 
2.83 1.21 
* chosen article 
 
Pilot results for chosen articles: 
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Appendix C 
Stimuli used for Experiment 2 
DRM word lists 
 
Neutral 
 
Fear 
 
Sad 
Critical Lure: 
         
 
Needle Cup Slow 
 
Scared Fear Danger 
 
Sad Upset Sorrow 
 
thread saucer fast 
 
fright-
ened 
cape hazard 
 
un-
happy 
disapp-
oint 
grief 
 
pin mug 
leth-
argic  
nervous terror risk 
 
happy 
frust-
rate 
sym-
pathy 
 
eye 
meas-
uring 
snail 
 
panic doubt beware 
 
dep-
ressed 
pissed regret 
 
sewing straw turtle 
 
coward fright warn 
 
frown angry remorse 
 
sharp tea quick 
 
insecure afraid caution 
 
happi-
ness 
dismay empathy 
 
point coaster stop 
 
timid 
mon-
ster 
warning 
 
blues frantic joy 
 
prick handle speed 
 
super-
stition 
horror safe 
 
lonely disturb 
repen-
tance 
 
thim-
ble 
coffee delay 
 
vulner-
able 
scare safety 
 
misery anxiety apathy 
 
hay-
stack 
drink wait 
 
brave 
trem-
ble 
jeop-
ardy  
gloomy despair shame 
 
thorn plastic traffic 
 
hostage 
hesi-
tant 
daring 
 
pity 
emo-
tional 
cry 
 
inject-
ion 
lid 
hesi-
tant  
running scary 
motor-
cycle  
tears mad tragedy 
 
Knit-
ing 
sip 
cau-
tious  
nerves snake poison 
 
glad uneasy apology 
 
BAS for presented words was checked across list categories.  All available values are 
negligible with the exception of “hesitant” which appears on both the slow and fear list. 
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Appendix D 
Stimuli used for Experiment 3 
DRM word lists 
 Neutral 
 
Anger 
 
Fear 
Critical 
Lure: 
Earth Hair 
 
War Anger 
 
Fear Danger 
 planet strand 
 
battle mad 
 
terror risk 
 world scalp 
 
bomb frustrate 
 
fright caution 
 globe lice 
 
fight hate 
 
anxiety warning 
 ground conditioner 
 
revolution rage 
 
afraid safe 
 gravity comb 
 
nuclear temper 
 
panic daring 
 environment headband 
 
missile fury 
 
scared trouble 
 worm dandruff 
 
soldier ire 
 
horror zone 
 heaven mousse 
 
gun wrath 
 
monster fire 
 sphere bald 
 
destruction fight 
 
scream accident 
 geology clippers 
 
defeat hatred 
 
darkness harmful 
 
BAS for presented words was checked across list categories. All values are negligible 
with the exception of “scream” (found in the fear list), which has a BAS of .02 with 
anger.  In addition, fear and anger have BAS of .01 and .02. 
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Appendix E 
Stimuli used for Experiment 4 
IAPS images presented for each emotion category: 
  Positive   Neutral   Negative   
Subgroup 1:      
 
 5825b  2272b  6242b  
 
1610 
 
7161b 
 
3185 
 
 
8120b 
 
9171b 
 
2900b 
 
 
2057b 
 
2026 
 
9419 
 
 
1750b 
 
2525b 
 
9610 
 
 
2035b 
 
7038b 
 
3215b 
 
 
1630 
 
7006 
 
9340b 
 
 
2156b 
 
3550.2b 
 
2750b 
 
Subgroup 2:       
 
2388b 
 
7217b 
 
9342b 
 
 
1811b 
 
9913b 
 
9927b 
 
 
2346b 
 
5130 
 
6311b 
 
 
2391b 
 
8010b 
 
9332 
 
 
8540b 
 
1505b 
 
9291b 
 
 
7492b 
 
2400 
 
9520b 
 
 
2398b 
 
2695b 
 
2456b 
 
 
5830b 
 
1645 
 
2141 
 
Subgroup 3:       
 
5833b 
 
2410b 
 
9421 
 
 
2598b 
 
7180 
 
9041b 
 
 
1441b 
 
2002 
 
3230b 
 
 
8467b 
 
7595 
 
9415b 
 
 
5831b 
 
2780b 
 
9530b 
 
 
8461b 
 
5535b 
 
9000b 
 
 
5760b 
 
7234b 
 
9220b 
 
  1340b   2393b   9295b   
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Appendix F 
Filler analysis for Experiment 4 
Analysis of incorrect recognition responses for filler items: 
  
Negative 
 
Neutral 
    
95% CI 
   
95% CI 
  
M SE LL UL 
 
M SE LL UL 
Old 
         
 
Positive .08 .03 .02 .15 
 
.08 .02 .03 .13 
 
Neutral .06 .02 .01 .11 
 
.09 .03 .03 .14 
 
Negative .06 .02 .02 .11 
 
.10 .03 .04 .16 
Remember 
         
 
Positive .03 .01 .00 .06 
 
.01 .01 -.01 .04 
 
Neutral .02 .01 .00 .04 
 
.03 .02 -.01 .07 
 
Negative .02 .01 .00 .04 
 
.02 .01 .00 .05 
Know 
         
 
Positive .01 .01 -.01 .03 
 
.03 .01 .00 .06 
 
Neutral .01 .01 -.01 .03 
 
.01 .01 -.01 .04 
 
Negative .02 .01 .00 .04 
 
.04 .02 .00 .08 
Guess 
         
 
Positive .04 .03 -.02 .10 
 
.04 .02 .01 .07 
 
Neutral .03 .02 -.01 .06 
 
.04 .02 .00 .09 
 
Negative .03 .02 -.01 .06 
 
.03 .02 -.01 .07 
 
 
 
For old responses there was no significant effect of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = .13, p 
= .88, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, or Emotion, F(1, 56) = .40, p = .53, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, and no significant 
interaction of Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .52, p = .60, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01.  For remember 
responses there was no significant effect of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = .05, p = .95, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .00, 
no significant effect of Emotion, F(1, 56) = .02, p = .90, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .00, and no significant 
interaction effect of Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .75, p = .48, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .01.  For know 
responses, likewise, there was no significant effect of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = 1.37, p = 
.26, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .02, Emotion, F(1, 56) = 1.48, p = .23, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .03, or Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 
112) = .58, p = .56, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .01.  Finally for guess responses there was no significant 
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effect of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = .21, p = .81, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .00, Emotion, F(1, 56) = .11, p = .74, 𝜂𝑝
2 
=  .00, or Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .21, p = .81, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00. 
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Appendix G 
Signal Detection Analysis for Experiment 4 
Sensitivity analysis using false memory data as the hits: 
  
Negative 
 
Neutral 
    
95% CI 
   
95% CI 
  
M SE LL UL 
 
M SE LL UL 
Old 
         
 
Positive .44 .02 .40 .49 
 
.40 .03 .34 .46 
 
Neutral .43 .02 .38 .48 
 
.40 .03 .34 .47 
 
Negative .46 .02 .42 .50 
 
.43 .03 .38 .49 
Remember 
         
 
Positive .37 .03 .31 .43 
 
.41 .03 .35 .46 
 
Neutral .38 .03 .32 .45 
 
.39 .03 .32 .45 
 
Negative .40 .03 .34 .46 
 
.43 .03 .37 .48 
Know 
         
 
Positive .10 .02 .05 .15 
 
.03 .02 -.01 .07 
 
Neutral .07 .02 .03 .12 
 
.06 .03 .00 .11 
 
Negative .08 .03 .03 .14 
 
.05 .03 -.01 .11 
Guess 
         
 
Positive .02 .02 -.03 .07 
 
-.01 .02 -.04 .03 
 
Neutral .01 .02 -.02 .04 
 
-.01 .02 -.05 .03 
 
Negative .02 .02 -.02 .05 
 
.00 .02 -.04 .03 
 
 
For old responses there was no significant effect of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = 1.71, 
p = .19, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03 or Emotion, F(1, 56) = 1.10, p = .30, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, and no significant 
interaction of Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .09, p = .91, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00.  For remember 
responses there was no significant effect of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = 2.24, p = .11, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  
.04, no significant effect of Emotion, F(1, 56) = .31, p = .58, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .01, and no 
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significant interaction effect of Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .65, p = .53, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .01.  
For know responses, likewise, there was no significant effect of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = 
.01, p = .99, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .00, Emotion, F(1, 56) = 2.13, p = .15, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .04, or Stimuli x 
Emotion, F(2, 112) = 1.35, p = .26, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .02.  Finally for guess responses there was no 
significant effect of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = .05, p = .95, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .00, Emotion, F(1, 56) = 
1.02, p = .32, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .02, or Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .01, p = .99, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00. 
 
Response Bias analysis using false memory data as the hits: 
  
Negative 
 
Neutral 
    
95% CI 
   
95% CI 
  
M SE LL UL 
 
M SE LL UL 
Old 
         
 
Positive 1.52 .01 1.50 1.55 
 
1.54 .02 1.51 1.57 
 
Neutral 1.54 .01 1.52 1.57 
 
1.53 .02 1.50 1.57 
 
Negative 1.52 .01 1.51 1.54 
 
1.51 .02 1.48 1.55 
Remember 
         
 
Positive 1.59 .01 1.56 1.62 
 
1.59 .01 1.56 1.62 
 
Neutral 1.60 .01 1.57 1.62 
 
1.59 .02 1.55 1.62 
 
Negative 1.59 .01 1.56 1.62 
 
1.57 .01 1.54 1.60 
Know 
         
 
Positive 1.74 .01 1.72 1.77 
 
1.76 .01 1.74 1.79 
 
Neutral 1.76 .01 1.73 1.78 
 
1.76 .01 1.74 1.79 
 
Negative 1.75 .01 1.72 1.77 
 
1.74 .01 1.72 1.77 
Guess 
         
 
Positive 1.77 .01 1.75 1.79 
 
1.78 .01 1.76 1.79 
 
Neutral 1.78 .01 1.76 1.79 
 
1.77 .01 1.75 1.79 
 
Negative 1.78 .01 1.76 1.79 
 
1.78 .01 1.77 1.80 
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For old responses there was no significant effect of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = 2.56, 
p = .08, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04 or Emotion, F(1, 56) = .00, p = .95, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, and no significant 
interaction of Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = 1.47, p = .23, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03.  For remember 
responses there was no significant effect of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = 1.28, p = .28, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  
.02, no significant effect of Emotion, F(1, 56) = .26, p = .81, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .01, and no 
significant interaction effect of Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .21, p = .81, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .00.  
For know responses, likewise, there was no significant effect of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = 
2.23, p = .11, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .04, Emotion, F(1, 56) = .42, p = .52, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .01, or Stimuli x 
Emotion, F(2, 112) = 1.35, p = .22, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .03.  Finally for guess responses there was no 
significant effect of Stimuli, F(2, 112) = .30, p = .74, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .01, Emotion, F(1, 56) = .15, 
p = .70, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .00, or Stimuli x Emotion, F(2, 112) = .38, p = .69, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01. 
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Appendix H 
Stimuli used for Experiment 5 
Non-words presented and the pilot study affective ratings: 
Non-words Affective Rating 
 
Non-words  Affective Rating 
1-30 M SD 
 
31-60 M SD 
blaige 3.80 1.31 
 
krinte 3.84 1.00 
blikte 3.85 1.02 
 
kwegue 3.68 1.03 
clerlt 3.98 1.21 
 
kwerle 4.22 1.08 
coodge 4.10 1.36 
 
leamms 4.31 1.13 
creuce 3.58 1.10 
 
mermed 4.38 1.20 
crurms 3.80 1.13 
 
mophte 3.90 1.06 
cwoize 3.90 1.27 
 
phoffs 3.84 1.42 
dralfs 3.84 0.73 
 
phrong 3.96 1.13 
drawge 3.64 1.07 
 
pleebe 3.68 1.54 
drilcs 3.66 0.97 
 
plures 4.45 1.09 
dweitt 3.92 1.23 
 
queish 3.68 1.32 
dweufs 3.52 1.24 
 
quirph 4.14 1.18 
dylped 3.56 1.15 
 
rhuibb 4.24 1.05 
feenth 4.12 0.99 
 
rirphs 3.90 1.19 
flaufs 4.16 1.27 
 
sennth 4.28 1.02 
flufed 4.58 1.72 
 
slembs 3.60 1.20 
gheenn 4.12 1.05 
 
sloole 3.52 1.14 
ghlinz 4.46 1.14 
 
snunns 3.55 1.20 
glelce 3.90 0.95 
 
sprild 4.00 1.11 
glinse 4.72 0.94 
 
suibed 3.82 1.18 
graick 3.78 1.19 
 
swaush 4.30 1.17 
guects 3.72 1.10 
 
swylms 3.86 1.18 
gweade 3.72 1.22 
 
tannth 4.10 0.79 
hernth 3.76 1.07 
 
thoves 4.18 1.03 
jemmth 4.58 0.96 
 
thweep 4.28 1.39 
jirgns 3.84 1.08 
 
trerke 4.06 1.46 
kealte 4.16 1.09 
 
twique 4.68 1.30 
klafed 3.84 1.16 
 
yauped 3.86 1.34 
knaced 3.61 1.37 
 
yeuned 3.94 1.01 
koarfs 3.70 1.15 
 
yorphs 4.20 1.33 
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Appendix I 
Signal Detection Analyses for Experiment 5 
Signal Detection analysis of final recognition responses: 
  
Neutral  Negative 
    
95% CI  
  
95% CI 
  
M SE LL UL  M SE LL UL 
D Prime 
    
 
    
 
Old .15 .02 .10 .19  .13 .02 .09 .16 
 
Remember .17 .02 .13 .21  .14 .02 .11 .18 
 
Know .05 .02 .01 .09  .05 .02 .02 .08 
 
Guess -.04 .02 -.08 .00  -.03 .01 -.05 -.01 
Criterion C 
    
 
    
 
Old 2.00 .02 1.97 2.04  2.01 .02 1.98 2.05 
 
Remember 2.14 .01 2.11 2.17  2.15 .01 2.13 2.18 
 
Know 2.22 .01 2.20 2.24  2.21 .01 2.19 2.23 
 
Guess 2.17 .02 2.14 2.20  2.18 .02 2.14 2.21 
 
One-way ANOVA of d’ scores revealed no significant main effects of the 
emotion induction for old responses, F(1, 46) = .00, p = .54, remember responses, 
F(1, 46) = .01, p =.32, know responses, F(1, 46) = .00, p = .91, and guess responses, 
F(1, 46) = .00, p = .66.  The same pattern was found for C scores as there were no 
significant effects for old responses, F(1, 46) = .00, p = .59, remember responses, F(1, 
46) = .00, p = .50, know responses, F(1, 46) = .00, p = .57, and guess responses, F(1, 
46) = .00, p = .79. 
 
